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Why do representative policymakers in democracies offer protection to particular groups 
of domestic interests, despite its well-known inefficiency in redistributing resources? 
Why are some domestic groups more successful in receiving higher levels of trade 
protection than others, even without coordinating collective lobbying? How do elected 
representatives choose the recipients of trade protection among many constituencies 
adversely affected by international competition?  
For decades, indeed at least since Pareto (1927) and Schattschneider (1935), the 
presence of trade barriers still remains puzzling to both economists and political scientists. 
Protectionist measures and regulations provide benefits for the specific sectors of 
production but reduce the welfare of a society as a whole. Despite its well-known 
inefficiency, however, most trade and industrial policy tends to align against free trade 
and many countries use trade barriers as an important tool for income redistribution 
(Rodrik 1994; Dixit and Londregan 1996; Alt, Frieden, Gilligan, Rodrik, and Rogowski 
1996; Acemoglu and Robinson 2001). While it is frequently pointed out that multilateral 
trade negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) have generated the global rush toward free trade, both 
advanced and less-developed countries still protect domestic industries through the use of 
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trade-remedy laws (e.g. anti-dumping, countervailing duty, and escape clause) and non-
tariff barriers (e.g. import quotas, quantitative restrictions, price controls, and voluntary 
export restraints).  
In this vein, both trade economists and political scientists have paid a great deal of 
attention to the domestic determinants of trade protection. Earlier economic studies 
attribute the presence of trade barriers to the fact that protectionist interest groups are 
better at articulating policy demands, due to their greater abilities to overcome collective 
action problems. Protectionist interest groups are more strongly motivated to influence 
policy-makers than a large group of consumers since the benefits of protection are 
concentrated on a small set of producers but the costs are dispersed to the entire 
population. As in the later literature on endogenous tariff formation, therefore, these 
studies attribute patterns in trade-policy to protectionist demands of industrial sectors and 
their relative abilities to engaging in lobbying and campaign contributions. On the other 
hand, the latest studies in political science concentrate more on clarifying institutional 
conditions under which policymakers are insulated from protectionist pressures and 
reduce trade barriers for the welfare for society as a whole. A common argument found in 
this approach is that the formal design and nature of domestic political institutions (e.g. 
regime types, constitutional framework, and electoral systems) generate cross-national 
variations in protection, shaping political incentives of representatives to provide public 
goods (here, free trade) for diffused interests.  
Previous research, however, generates numerous anomalies regarding variations 
in protection across democracies. First, despite their emphasis on the nature of free trade 
as a public good, considerable disagreement prevails among researchers over the forms of 
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democratic institutions that induce political representatives to target the broad, collective 
interest of constituencies in policy decisions. While some argue that larger electoral 
districts and strong party discipline in proportional representation systems tend to lower 
protection by moderating protectionist pressures (Rogowski 1987; Mansfield and Busch 
1995; Grossman and Helpman 2005), others claim that electoral institutions per se are not 
systematically associated with levels of protection (McGillivray 2004; Mukherjee, Smith, 
and Li 2009). Moreover, contrary to many predictions in the literature, existing data also 
demonstrate considerable variance in levels of protection across democracies with similar 
electoral institutions as well as constitutional structures. Once we consider various 
indicators of protection other than tariff rates, the effect of specific features of electoral 
systems (e.g. electoral formula, party discipline, and constituency size) becomes even 
more ambiguous (McGillivray 2004; Karol 2007).  
Second and more importantly, most of the literature on political institutions does 
not say much about which groups are more likely to become the recipients of 
protectionist measures and how policymakers determine which industries and sectors to 
protect. With a few exceptions, they restrict their focus to analyzing variations in the 
average level of protection across countries, with national-level political-institutional 
variables as right-hand-side regressors to explain that aggregate variation. Although trade 
economists have illuminated several factors that create inter-industry variations in 
protection, they usually regard trade-policy outcomes only as a function of lobbying and 
campaign contributions of import-competing sectors without considering electoral 
incentives of policymakers and policy preferences of voters. In addition, most empirical 
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works in the endogenous tariff literature have been narrowly developed within the 
context of interest group politics in the United States.  
To fill this gap in the literature, my dissertation develops a theoretical framework 
explaining variation in the structure of trade protection within and across countries. Much 
of the literature on trade policy has exclusively focused on either the effects of industry 
group characteristics on sectoral protection or the influence of domestic political 
institutions on trade openness at the national level. Unlike previous research, my 
dissertation aims to explain the ways in which the partisan and electoral incentives of 
representative policymakers affect the allocation of distributive benefits generated from 
trade policies across domestic constituencies. Because of the income effects of 
international trade, domestic groups shape different policy preferences over trade 
openness according to types of industrial sectors in which they are employed or types of 
factors of production they own (i.e. capital or labor). Trade policy preferences of 
domestic groups, however, are not directly translated into policy outcomes because 
protectionist measures generate particular benefits for a small sector of population but 
spread out the costs across the entire population. Thus, representative policymakers have 
substantial political incentives to target protectionist rents toward their partisan 
constituents rather than opposition groups, or to pivotal groups and swing voters as 
opposed to committed supporters or opponents.  
Following these propositions, my dissertation argues that the ways in which 
governments distribute trade policy benefits across domestic constituencies depend on the 
strategic context shaped by two factors: first, the societal and geographic structure of 
domestic interests which delineates the scope and characteristics of political cleavages 
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over trade policy; second, electoral institutions and conditions which define the political 
importance of partisan and geographical constituencies to representative policymakers. 
First, the structure of domestic interests refers to the ways in which domestic 
constituencies shape collective policy demands over the issues of international trade. The 
extent to which domestic groups pressures representative policymakers for protectionist 
relief is mainly explained by their economic characters in the market, such as types of 
industrial sectors (i.e. import-competing and exporting sectors) and types of factors of 
production (i.e. capital and labor). Nevertheless, the structure of trade policy preferences 
of domestic constituencies is not directly translated into trade policy outcomes. 
Distributive benefits generated from trade barriers induce elected officials to target 
protection to particular groups of domestic constituencies to optimize their electoral 
prospects. Therefore, secondly, electoral institutions and conditions exert significant 
influence on the ways in which policy preferences of domestic groups over trade 
openness are mapped into trade policy outcomes. The degree to which protectionist 
interests receive favorable levels of protection is significantly affected by electoral 
institutions and conditions, which define types of domestic constituencies from which 
representative policymakers garner electoral support.  
To test the validity of my arguments, my dissertation relies on a variety of 
methods and data. Four chapters of my dissertation contain a set of empirical tests 
regarding the political and economic determinants of the structure of trade protection in 
democracies. In these empirical chapters, the aforementioned two key concepts are 
operationalized differently according to whether I examine patterns of trade protection 
within and across countries. The first three empirical chapters of my dissertation analyze 
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within-country variation in levels of protection across electoral constituencies and 
industrial sectors in the United States from 1989 through 2004. Using sectoral data on 
tariff and nontariff protection, district-level election outcomes, and geographical 
information about the distribution of industrial employment on the electoral map, I 
investigate the extent to which voter demand for protectionist measures and their political 
attributes affect the allocation of protectionist rents across the electorate. The fourth 
empirical chapter of my dissertation focuses on explaining variations in the structure of 
trade protection across countries. In this chapter, I analyze the economic and political 
conditions under which representative policymakers target protection toward skill-
intensive industries rather than unskilled-intensive industries. Relying on the median-
voter theory of trade policy in Mayer (1984) and its extensions (Dutt and Mitra 2002; 
Kono 2008) as well as the personal-vote literature (Carey and Shugart 1995), I maintain 
that variation in the skill-bias of tariff protection across countries is explained by the 
interaction between a country’s factor endowments and political particularism in electoral 
systems.  
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the 
existing literature on the political economy of international trade. In order to motivate the 
theory, this chapter compares two schools of thought regarding trade-policy decisions: 
first, the literature on endogenous tariff formation which emphasizes particular 
characteristics of industries associated with their group ability to overcome collective 
action problems and coordinate lobbying for group interests;  and second, institutional 
explanations clarifying structural conditions under which policymakers are insulated 
from protectionist pressures and pursue trade liberalization for diffused interests of 
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society as a whole. This chapter further points out that several empirical anomalies 
remain to be explained, since these two lines of research focus almost exclusively on 
either the demand or the supply of trade policies. Most institutional studies on trade 
policies mainly concentrate on variation in the aggregate-level of trade protection across 
countries, and hence are not able to explain why and how governments target rents from 
protectionist policies toward particular constituencies. While the endogenous protection 
literature proposes a general theoretical framework to explain the patterns of protection, 
their interest-group model does not explain why governments offer protectionist benefits 
to declining industries which do not have incentives and abilities to coordinate group 
lobbying efforts. Based on existing data on variation in the structure of protection within 
and across countries, this chapter closes by suggesting that democratic governments have 
partisan and electoral incentives regarding the levels of trade barriers and the distribution 
of trade policy benefits across the electorate.  
Chapter 3 analyzes the effects of geographical location of industries on the 
electoral map on the inter-industry structure of trade protection in the United States from 
1989 through 1998. Using data on the geographic distribution of industrial employment 
across electoral constituencies and district-level election outcomes from presidential, 
gubernatorial, and general elections from 1988 through 1997, I generate a set of 
indicators measuring the degree of the spatial concentration of industries in electorally 
competitive constituencies. Then I examine the extent to which this electoral distribution 
characteristic of industries explains variation in the level of tariff and nontariff protection 
across industries, as well as the marginal effects of industry comparative disadvantage on 
policy outcomes. The results of my analyses strongly suggest that industries located in 
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electorally competitive constituencies are more likely to receive higher levels of tariff 
protection than those located in safe constituencies and that the extent to which sectoral 
demands for protection increases tariff and nontariff protection at the industry level itself 
increases as industries contain more marginal voters. These findings do not confirm the 
previous literature on U.S. trade policy arguing that the spatial distribution of industrial 
employment determines the degree of political clout of industrial sectors (Busch and 
Reinhardt 1999; Rogowski, Kayser, and Kotin 1999) and that industries located in 
marginal districts are least likely to secure protection because of weak party discipline of 
congressional parties (McGillivray 1997, 2004). Rather, this chapter suggests that 
redistribution occurred through protectionist policies cannot be explained without 
considering the electoral competitiveness of domestic constituencies.  
Chapter 4 examines within-country variation in levels of trade protection across 
electoral constituencies in the U.S. from 1989 through 2004. In this chapter, I argue that 
constituency marginality influences not only the allocation of protectionist rents across 
the electorate but also government responsiveness to domestic pressures for protection. I 
first match industry-level data on trade volumes and protectionist measures with 
geographical data on the distribution of industrial employment on the electoral map. In 
doing so, I build a set of indicators of voter demands for trade protection and the amount 
of protectionist rents aggregated at the level of congressional districts. Then I investigate 
the extent to which the political characteristics of electoral constituencies (i.e. marginality 
and the relative safeness) affect the district-level concentration of trade protection as well 
as the marginal effect of protectionist demands on trade policy outcomes. First, the 
estimates of my models demonstrate that district competitiveness increases the extent to 
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which sectoral tariff protection is targeted toward industries in each district. All other 
things being equal, the district-level of tariff protection is greater in districts having two 
equally sized groups of partisans rather than in districts showing stable, strong support for 
either the Republican or the Democratic Party. Second, I find that the political 
characteristics of electoral constituencies affect the marginal effects of protectionist 
pressures on trade policy outcomes. The extent to which constituent demands for 
protection actually raise the amount of protectionist rents is much higher in electorally 
competitive constituencies rather than in safe constituencies. These findings imply that 
even when domestic political institutions promote trade liberalization at the national level, 
elected representatives still have strong incentives to target protectionist rents to 
particular constituencies to optimize their electoral prospects.  
Using the same dataset presented in Chapter 4, Chapter 5 evaluates the validity of 
the core voter model developed by Cox and McCubbins (1986) in the context of U.S. 
trade policy. This chapter begins with the assumption that the concentration of 
protectionist measures on marginal constituencies does not necessarily disconfirm the 
validity of the core-voter model, because marginal constituencies could contain two 
equally sized groups of partisan voters. As Cox (2010) points out, governing parties 
might target trade protection toward marginal constituencies to reward their core-partisan 
supporters. In this vein, I examine the extent to which the strength of voter partisanship 
for the incumbent president and the majority party in Congress affects the allocation of 
protectionist rents across districts and across states, respectively. The results of my 
analysis demonstrate that there is a curvilinear relationship between the strength of voter 
partisanship and the amount of protection aggregated at the level of congressional 
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districts. The quadratic model shows that the district-level of protection tends to be 
maximized when the share of a district’s presidential vote normalized around the national 
mean is close to zero, and when the average of the two-party vote share for the incumbent 
president and the majority party in a district reaches 0.52 and 0.45, respectively. I also 
find that constituency competitiveness increases the marginal effect of voter demand for 
protection on policy outcomes both at the district-level and at the state-level.  
Chapter 6 explains the political and economic determinants of the skill bias of 
tariff structure. Specifically, it focuses on explaining cross-national variation in the extent 
to which tariff protection is biased toward skill-intensive industries. The literature on 
endogenous protection commonly argues that the skill-bias of trade policy has features of 
public goods, because it tends to enhance output growth in a long-term perspective, 
regardless of the average level of protection (Grossman and Helpman 1990). 
Nevertheless, much previous research does not explain why some countries are better 
able to target protectionist measures toward skill-intensive industries rather than others. 
While some argue that the skill-bias of protection is promoted by good institutions, the 
existing literature does not clearly explain the conditions under which politicians have 
stronger incentives to favor skill-intensive industries over unskilled-intensive ones (Nuun 
and Trefler 2006). In this chapter, I maintain that variation in the skill-bias of tariff 
protection across countries depends on two factors: first, a country’s factor endowments 
that determine the median voter’s sector-specific trade policy preferences, and second, 
the degree of political particularism that affects the responsiveness of representative 
policymakers to rent-seeking behaviors of special interest groups. Using time-series cross 
sectional data on 29 industries in 52 democracies from 1989 through 2004, this chapter 
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produces two key findings: first, the skill-bias of tariff structure is higher in electoral 
systems which effectively mute the incentives of policymakers to build personal support 
bases; second, the extent to which political particularism in electoral systems reduces the 
skill-bias of tariff protection declines, as the capital-labor ratio at the national level 
increases. Tariff protection biased more toward skill-intensive industries is more likely to 
generate positive externalities and promote long-term growth than tariff protection biased 
toward unskilled-intensive industries. Hence the skill-bias of tariff protection is likely to 
increase when representative policymakers effectively control rent-seeking behavior of 
special interest groups for the collective interests of broad, national constituencies. These 
results suggest that the structure of trade protection is determined not only by the 
economic characteristics of domestic constituencies that shape their trade policy 
preferences, but also by institutional arrangements of domestic political systems that 










The Political Economy of International Trade 
 
 
This chapter reviews existing research on trade politics. The existing literature on the 
political economy of trade policy is dominated by two-well known approaches. The first 
is an interest group approach that centers on the influence of domestic pressure groups on 
trade policy outcomes. The second approach, usually known as “institutional 
explanations of trade policy,” postulates that institutional arrangements of domestic 
political systems affect trade policy. In this chapter, I point out that while each line of 
approach has received robust empirical support, the existing literature does not clearly 
explain the ways in which representative policymakers choose the recipients of trade 
protection across domestic constituencies. I maintain that in order to explain varying 
patterns of trade barriers within and across countries, we need to consider the interaction 
of two factors: first, the economic structure of domestic interests which delineates the 
scope and characteristics of political cleavages over trade policy; second, electoral 
institutions and conditions which define the political importance of partisan and 
geographical constituencies to elected officials. 
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2.1. Interest Group Approach 
The interest group approach emphasizes the impact of domestic pressure groups on trade 
policy outcomes. The level and structure of trade protection are mainly explained by the 
economic and organizational characteristics of domestic interests which have 
heterogeneous preferences over trade openness. An important assumption of the interest 
group approach is that some domestic groups are relatively better than others in 
articulating their policy demands over trade issues. Almost eighty years ago, Pareto (1927) 
already suggested that distributive benefits generated from trade barriers allow 
protectionist groups to organize for their collective interests more effectively than a large 
group of consumers.  
 
In order to understand how those who champion protection make 
themselves heard so easily, it is necessary to add the consideration which 
applies to social movements generally…A protectionist measure provides 
large benefits to a small number of people and causes a very great number 
of consumers a slight loss. This circumstance makes it easier to put a 
protectionist measures into practice (Pareto 1927, p.379).  
 
The relative efficiency of protectionist groups in articulating their policy demands 
is more fully conceptualized in Olson’s model of interest group politics (1965). When an 
interest group needs to organize political activities to maximize their common interests, 
each member of the group is strongly motivated to free ride on others’ efforts, since he 
can enjoy the collective benefits of group activities, regardless of his own contribution. 
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Self-interested behaviors of actors consequently yield the sub-optimal provision of 
collective activities on the part of a group as a whole. Here, Olson emphasizes that the 
degree to which groups are able to overcome the problems of collective action depends 
on two factors: first, the size of a group; and second, the probability that group members 
change the status quo. All other things being equal, interest groups can more effectively 
exercise control over free-riding behavior of group members when the benefits of 
collective actions are concentrated, and when the probability that members affect policy 
outcomes is relatively higher. These propositions explain why protectionist interests are 
more likely to further their collective benefits as organized groups, whereas ordinary 
consumers usually remain scattered and unorganized. If transaction costs per person are 
fixed, protectionist interest groups tend to incur smaller costs involved in coordinating 
collective political action than a large number of consumers. More importantly, each 
member of a protectionist group has a stronger incentive to take costly political actions 
for the issues at stakes since the probability that they affect policy outcomes is relatively 
higher. Consequently, Olson’s interest group model suggests that the issues of collective 
action problems are key factors explaining variation in the ability of domestic interest 
groups to influence trade policy outcomes. A small, powerful set of domestic 
protectionist interests are relatively better than a large group of consumers, and among 
domestic producers, small, highly concentrated industrial sectors are much more efficient 
in achieving policy demands than large, dispersed ones. 
In this vein, the interest-group models focuses on clarifying the demand-side 
factors of trade policy outcomes, such as policy preferences of domestic actors over trade 
issues and their organizational influences on policymakers. The first line of research 
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infers aggregate domestic demand for trade protection from macroeconomic proxies, 
such as economic downturns (Magee 1980; Shapiro and Page 1994), unemployment rates 
(Nowzad 1978; Hughes and Waelbroeck 1981; Bergsten and Cline 1983; Wallerstein 
1987), and exchange rate changes (Bergsten and Williamson 1983). The second line 
concentrates more on specifying the impact of policy preferences of domestic interests on 
the various dimensions of trade policy outcomes, including lobbying activities of sectoral 
interests (Magee 1980; Gilligan 1997), congressional voting patterns on trade bills (Irwin 
Kroszner 1999; Bailey and Brady 1998; Bailey 2001; Hiscox 2001, 2002; Beaulieu 2002; 
Ladewig 2005, 2006), and sectoral-levels of trade protection (Trefler 1993; Grossman 
and Helpman 1994).  
Specifically, the literature on endogenous protection provides a comprehensive 
framework explaining the inter-industry structure of trade protection. Endogenous 
protection theory argues that whether or not industrial sectors receive relief from 
international competition is contingent upon their incentives and abilities to pressure 
policymakers as organized groups. Cross-sectoral variation in trade barriers are, therefore, 
attributed to a set of industry characteristics which determine sector efficiency in 
organizing collective political actions: trading position of industries (Magee 1980), wages 
and employment (Olson 1983; Baldwin 1985), sector size (Anderson and Baldwin 1981), 
import penetration and export dependence (Trefler 1993; Lee and Swagel 1997), 
geographical concentration (Pincus 1975; Caves 1976, Lavergne 1983; Busch and 
Reinhardt 1999), and the amount of lobbying and campaign contributions (Magee, Brock 
and Young 1989; Grossman and Helpman 1994; Baldwin and Magee 2000; Gawande and 
Bandyopadhyay 2002).  
16 
 
The micro-foundation of endogenous protection theory has been more 
theoretically elaborated by the interest group model of Grossman and Helpman (1994, 
1995) which proposes that the levels of trade protection should be higher in industrial 
sectors that contribute money to the government through organized lobbies. In 
“Protection for Sale”, Grossman and Helpman (1994) regard trade policy decisions as a 
menu auction, where tariff rates are determined by interactions between industrial sectors 
and politicians. While industrial sectors attempt to influence politicians through 
organized lobbying, politicians maximize their utilities considering campaign resources 
and aggregate social welfare. When industrial sectors represented by organized lobbies 
show their promised contributions schedules, politicians, in turn, determine tariff rates 
through optimization process. Grossman and Helpman show that in equilibrium, re-
election minded politicians sell tariff and quotas to protectionist groups to the highest 
bidders, that is, sectors actively involved in interest group lobbying.
1
  
The interest group model systematically addresses the impact of domestic 
interests groups on trade policy outcomes. Numerous studies offer convincing evidence 
that varying patterns of trade policy outcomes not only reflect the structure of trade 
policy preferences of domestic constituencies but also indicate policy equilibria between 
self-interested policymakers and the organized demands of protectionist pressure groups. 
Cross-national research demonstrates that macroeconomic indicators effectively capture 
the effect of aggregate protectionist demands on the average level of trade openness at the 
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 The Grossman-Helpman model also suggests that the cross-sectoral structure of protection is also 
explained by two other economic factors: import elasticity and import penetration. The model predicts that 
import elasticity is negatively associated with the levels of trade protection, but the influence of import 
penetration depends on whether industries are organized or not. Import penetration lowers the levels of 
trade protection in industrial sectors with organized lobbies, but increase protection in the absence of 
lobbies. For different specifications of the Grossman-Helpman model, see Goldberg and Maggi (1997), 
Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2002), and Eicher and Osang (2002). 
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national level (Busch and Mansfield 1995; Henisz and Mansfield 2006). 
2
 The literature 
on endogenous protection also demonstrates that the economic and organizational 
characteristics of industrial sectors are significantly associated with their lobbying 
activities, as well as with the levels of protection that they obtain from governments. 
Specifically, the Grossman-Helpman model has received substantial empirical support in 
subsequent studies which focus on the cross-sectoral patterns of U.S. trade barriers. 
Goldberg and Maggi (1997) and Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2002) commonly find 
that industrial sectors represented by organized lobbies are more likely to receive higher 
levels of NTBs than unorganized sectors. Eicher and Osang (2002) show that protection 
is greater in industrial sectors represented by organized lobbies and that the size of 
lobbying expenditures from Political Action Committees (PACs) exerts significant 
influence on sectoral-levels of tariff rates.   
However, the micro-foundational explanations of the interest-group model raise 
theoretical and empirical questions, due to their emphasis on interest group influence. 
First, the idea that interest groups buy policies with money has been challenged by 
several studies. Goodhart (2008) points out that the Grossman-Helpman model and its 
extensions do not clearly explain why politicians offer particularistic benefits toward 
declining industries which do not have enough resources to devote to lobbying. 
Ansolabehere, Figueiredo, and Snyder (2008) argue that organized interests give money 
to politicians as a form of “political participation and consumption” rather than a form of 
“policy-buying.” They point out that despite the presumed importance of lobbying and 
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 The latest large-n studies provide some evidence that macroeconomic factors matter for cross-national 
variation in trade barriers, even after controlling differences in political systems. High levels of 
unemployment, for instance, are regarded as one important source of protectionist demands since the rise of 
imports not only makes it difficult for workers to find alternative jobs but also reduces their wages. 
Exchange rate changes also generate calls for protection by affecting the competitiveness of exporting and 
import-competing sectors in domestic industries.   
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political contributions suggested in the literature, the relative proportions of campaign 
money over total federal government spending and GDP in the United States remain 
consistently small for about the last 100 years. Ansolabehere et al. also raise a question 
about the effectiveness of campaign contributions as political investment. In their review 
of a series of studies on roll-call voting, they show that contrary to the predictions of the 
interest group model, previous studies do not offer clear and consistent evidence on the 
influence of PAC contributions on legislative voting behaviors.  
Secondly, the interest group model takes a “black-box” approach to the 
institutional context of trade politics which affect the interactions between representative 
policymakers and domestic constituencies. Trade policy decisions in democracies involve 
political parties and individual legislators, which represent a different set of domestic 
constituencies. However, most existing studies of endogenous protection rest on a highly 
simplified assumption that only two groups of actors are influential in setting trade 
barriers: domestic industrial sectors and a government. Once industrial sectors bid for 
protectionist measures in the form of campaign contributions, the government increases 
the levels of trade barriers until the deadweight loss caused by protection threatens their 
chance of retaining power. Such a framework often regards the government as a unitary 
actor which automatically responds to the demands of import-competing sectors, 
especially those represented by organized interests. In doing so, the interest group model 
implies that the aggregate preference of import-competing sectors is translated into the 
equilibrium policy outcome over trade issues.  
Thirdly, for these reasons, the explanatory power of the interest group approach 
relatively declines for cases in which interest groups do not have substantial access to the 
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policy-making process. The ways in which governments respond to protectionist 
pressures from domestic interest groups should vary across countries and over time. This 
is because the institutional context might affect not only the political representation of 
domestic constituencies in policy decisions, but also the political incentives of 
representative policymakers in selecting the recipients of trade protection. By ignoring 
these factors, the interest group model does not offer explicit answers to questions, such 
as why some declining industries often enjoy more protectionist rents, even without 
significantly engaging in lobbying activities, and why there are varying patterns of trade 
barriers across countries. With a few exceptions (Lee and Swagel 1997; Dutt and Mitra 
2002, 2005), therefore, most empirical research focuses on explaining the inter-industry 
structure of protection within country, especially within the United States.  
 
2.2. Institutional Approach 
The institutional model of trade pays more attention to the supply-side variables in trade 
policy, considering the links between domestic political institutions and the average 
levels of trade openness. While focusing on different layers of domestic political systems, 
institutional explanations of trade policy usually begin with the premise that trade 
protection is a private good for specific interest groups, whereas free trade is a public 
good for the interests of a broad national constituency. The levels of trade protection are 
supposed to be lower in systems where politicians have a strong incentive to provide a 
public good at the national level and maintain policy autonomy from protectionist 
interests. Most of these studies provide a common framework that cross-national 
variations in trade protection are attributed to the formal design and nature of political 
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institutions, including  types of political regimes (Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff 
2000, 2002; McGillivray and Smith 2004; Milner and Kubota 2005), the structure of 
executive-legislative relations (Lohmann and O’Halloran 1994), electoral institutions 
(Rogowski 1987; Mansfield and Busch 1995; Grossman and Helpman 2005; McGillivray 
1997, 2004; Kono 2006), the strength of political parties (Hankla 2006), and the number 
of institutional access points in political systems (Ehrlich 2007).  
One important implication of these studies is that political-institutional 
arrangements define the ways in which representatives maximize their chances of 
retaining power in trade policy decisions. The formal designs and features of political 
institutions exert influence on the average levels of protection by delineating the size and 
characteristics of the constituency which representatives are motivated to serve. For 
instance, as opposed to narrowness, representatives serving broad constituencies are 
argued to maintain relative autonomy from protectionist interest groups and thus 
concentrate on the provision of public goods for diffused interests of society as a whole 
(here, free trade).  
In this vein, some of the latest research on the influence of regime types draws on 
the selectorate theory which proposes that the provision of a public good is positively 
associated with the size of the winning coalition, that is, the minimal set of people whose 
support representatives should maintain to stay in office.
 3
 As the size of the winning 
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 In their theory of the selectorate and winning coalition, Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) rest on the 
assumption that an incumbent leader maximizes his chances of retaining power by rewarding the winning 
coalition – the minimal set of people whose support he should maintain to stay in office. When the size of 
the winning coalition is small, the incumbent leader retains power by providing private goods that enrich 
only members in his coalition. As the size of a coalition increases, however, it becomes more cost-effective 
for a leader to reward his supporters by providing public goods that benefit all members of society as a 
whole. Given that support from the winning coalition determines the political survival of incumbents, the 
selectorate theory proposes that a large winning coalition enhances political incentives for leaders to 
provide public goods.  
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coalition increases, it becomes more cost-effective for leaders to provide public goods for 
broad constituencies rather than private goods for a small sector of population. Thus 
systems with a large winning coalition, such as democracies, are more likely to have 
stable trade flows (McGillivray and Smith 2004) or lower levels of trade protection 
(Milner and Kubota 2005).
4
  
The literature on the effect of executive strength on trade policymaking similarly 
rests on the contention that constituency size is inversely related to incentives to pursue 
protectionism. Executives have a strong motivation and capability to adopt lower levels 
of protection for general welfare at the national level since their chances of retaining 
office are rarely affected by specific interest groups. By contrast, rank-and-file legislators 
who serve narrow geographical constituencies are strongly motivated to build their own 
support groups by satisfying particular demands of localized groups. In the legislation of 
trade bills, therefore, particularistic incentives of legislators frequently generate 
protectionist logrolling as equilibrium where each legislator proposing protectionist 
policy also supports similar proposals from other legislators. In this vein, Lohmann and 
O’Halloran (1994) maintain that the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act (RTAA) of 1934 
resulted in a significant reduction of tariff rates in the United States by changing the 
nature of the trade policymaking process. They point out that collective action problems 
among individual legislators were resolved by the RTAA which delegates authority to the 
president, “[who] would implement measures to trade off the marginal benefits from 
protectionist industries in one district against the marginal costs imposed on all other 
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 Another line of research sees trade liberalization in terms of international cooperation. The presence of 
competitive elections in democracies lead political leaders to cooperate more on commercial issues because 
the electoral control of voters over the executive increases the amount of gains that leaders obtain from 
trade agreements (Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff 2002). 
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districts”(Lohmann and O’Halloran 1994, p.599). Likewise, Nielson (2003) argues that 
presidents who have strong legislative power are more likely to reduce protectionism 
since the executives, by serving a single national constituency, are strongly motivated to 
pursue policies targeting broad interests.  
In fact, the idea that representatives serving a larger constituency are more likely 
to liberalize trade can be traced back to Rogowski’s insightful work (1987) on the link 
between political institutions in democracies and trade. He argues that, for trade 
dependent countries, the optimal form of democratic institutions is a closed-list 
proportional representation (PR) system which is characterized by a few larger electoral 
constituencies and political parties with strong discipline. Specifically, Rogowski 
emphasizes the importance of constituency size on policy autonomy of elected officials 
from localized interests as follows.  
 
Insulation from regional and sectoral pressure in a democracy, I claim, is 
most easily achieved with large electoral district…..When automakers or 
dairy farmers entirely dominate twenty small constituencies and are a 
powerful minority in fifty more, their voice will certainly be heard in the 
nation’s councils. Where they constitute but one or two percent of an 
enormous district’s electorate, representatives may defy them more freely 
(Rogowski 1987, p. 208). 
 
While Rogowski primarily focuses on the institutional choice of European countries that 
heavily rely on international trade, researchers explain the affinity between PR systems 
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and trade openness the other way around. Mansfield and Busch (1995) maintain that PR 
systems tend to have lower levels of protectionism because the diversity of trade policy 
preferences in large districts moderates protectionist pressures, and prevent logrolling 
among legislators in the legislation of protectionist bills.  Relying on Rogowski’s work, 
they provide evidence that developed democracies with more parliamentary 
constituencies (hence smaller electoral districts) tend to have higher levels of non-tariff 
barriers. In a related vein, Grossman and Helpman (2005) claim that systems with strong 
party discipline make PR systems more amenable to liberal trade policy. Their formal 
model rests on the assumption that political parties are more likely to maximize chances 
of winning the majority of seats in the legislature by serving heterogeneous 
constituencies. In systems with low party discipline, such as majoritarian systems, parties 
do not effectively prevent individual legislators from deviating from pre-announced 




Institutional research on trade protection provides a comprehensive theoretical 
framework for understanding the political incentives of representative policymakers in 
                                                     
5
 The logic of Rogowski’s argument is quite consistent with the literature on the relationship between 
electoral institutions and public policy outcomes. For instance, electoral institutions exert significant 
influence on the size and scope of public spending, because they affect types of domestic constituencies to 
which reelection-minded politicians target to maximize their chances of winning office. Legislators in 
single-member district (SMD) systems are likely to spend more on geographically-targeted projects rather 
than on universal public goods (Persson and Tabellini 1999; Chang 2008; Rickard 2009). There are several 
factors that explain SMD legislators’ inclination toward geographically-targeted allocation of resources. 
Compared to their PR counterparts, SMD legislators are more responsive to particular demands of their 
own geographical constituencies, since they are directly elected by voters rather than appointed by party 
leaders. Due to many small electoral districts and weak party discipline, SMD legislators are more likely to 
be influenced by localized distributive pressures (Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti, and Rostagno 2002; Grossman 
and Helpman 2005), and hence to increase the size of distributive programs through universal logrolling 
(Weingast, Shepsle and Johnson 1981). Moreover, political parties in SMD systems also have strong 
incentives to concentrate targetable resources in specific regions. To fulfill the requirement of a majority 
winner, parties should receive 50% plus one vote in 50% plus 1 district. Therefore, distributive benefits are 
more likely to be concentrated on some key marginal districts containing political moderates and swing 
voters which could be easily swayed by distributive benefits (Persson and Tabellini 1999). 
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setting trade policies. The implications of institutional explanations of trade policy raise 
the following issues: first, mixed findings about the relationship between electoral 
institutions and trade openness; second, the lack of explanations about varying patterns of 
trade barriers across countries.  
First, there is still considerable disagreement about the forms of electoral systems 
that induce political representatives to choose liberal trade policy for the broad, collective 
interest of constituencies. While some argue that larger electoral districts and strong party 
discipline in proportional representation systems increase trade openness by moderating 
protectionist pressures (Rogowski 1987; Mansfield and Busch 1995; Grossman and 
Helpman 2005; Saksena and Anderson 2008; Evans 2009), others suggest that 
majoritarian systems are more likely to have lower trade barriers (Hatfield and Hauk 
2003; Rosendorff and Doces 2007; Chang, Kayser, and Rogowski 2008). On the other 
hand, another group of research claims that electoral institutions per se are not 
systematically associated with the level of protection (McGillivray 2004; Kono 2007; 
Ehrlich 2007; Mukherjee, Smith and Li 2009).  
In his earlier work (1987), for instance, Rogowski addresses that there is a 
positive correlation between trade dependency, proportional representation, and party 
centralization in Western European countries. While relying on Rogowski’s proposition, 
Mansfield and Busch (1995) find that proportional representation itself tends to raise the 
levels of non-tariff barriers (NTBs), once the number of electoral constituencies is 
controlled. Relying on Grossman-Helpman (2005), Evans (2009) maintains that 
majoritarian electoral systems tend to have higher average tariffs than countries with 
proportional systems because PR legislatures take into account the interests of the nation 
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as a whole. Saksena and Anderson (2008) demonstrate that single-member district 
plurality (SMDP) systems are more prone to higher levels of NTBs rather than PR 
systems.  
In contrast, Rosendorff and Doces (2007) propose that majoritarian dyads tend to 
have larger volumes of bilateral trade than proportional dyads. Kono (2007) demonstrates 
that the liberalizing effect of constituency size is greater in majoritarian systems than 
proportional representation. Interestingly, the recent research of Rogowski and his 
collaborators (Rogowski and Kayser 2002; Chang, Kayser, and Rogowski 2008) 
advances an argument that PR systems tend to yield higher consumer prices which reflect 
policy decisions targeting particular interests of domestic producers. Greater seat-vote 
proportionality in proportional systems induces politicians to favor those who provide 
money (producers) over those who provide votes (consumers). In contrast, SMDP 
systems are more likely to produce pro-consumer policies because SMDP systems 
increase the marginal impact of a vote change on the distribution of seats in the 
legislature. 
Mixed findings about the impact of electoral institutions on trade policy outcomes 
result from two factors. First, some institutional research on protection has paid 
insufficient attention to the countervailing effects of electoral systems on policy decisions. 
Several studies point out that proportional systems have factors that yield inefficiency 
and particularism in government policy decisions. Both Cox (1990) and Myerson (1993) 
maintain that PR systems, by having large district magnitude, increase the number of 
competitors in electoral contests and promote their centrifugal incentives on a 
unidimensional policy space. As district magnitude gets larger, parties (and individual 
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candidates) are more likely to optimize their electoral prospects by taking a non-centrist 
position for a small sector of population rather than by converging toward the median 
voter’s preference. Moreover, fragmented electoral accountability in proportional 
representation is often pointed out as a reason for inefficient consequences in policy 
decisions. While a single-party government in SMDPs holds responsibility for the 
collective interest of broad constituencies, parties participating in coalition governments 
in PRs each represent only a small set of population. Thus PR systems, especially those 
that have more parties, are more likely to generate multi-party logrolling in policy 
decisions with less efficient outcomes (Scartascini and Crain 2002; Bawn and Rosenbluth 
2006; Mukherjee 2003).  
Hence, instead of using a majoritarian-proportional dichotomy, another line of 
research attempts to directly measure particularistic incentives of elected officials in 
policy decisions from specific components of electoral institutions. Nielson (2003) and 
Hankla (2006) maintain that levels of protection tend to be lower in party-centered 
systems where party leaders control ballot structures and thus legislators do not have 
incentives to cultivate personal votes by protecting their own constituencies. In 
explaining variations in agricultural subsidies across OECD countries, Park and Jensen 
(2007) calculate the Cox thresholds which measure the likelihood that electoral systems 
induce legislators to target narrow geographical constituencies in policy decisions.
6
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 Park and Jensen (2007) point out that a majoritarian-proportional representation dichotomy does not 
account for a cross-national variation in agricultural subsidies in OECD countries. For instance, their data 
show that several closed-list PR systems, such as Switzerland, Iceland, and Norway persistently maintain 
high levels of subsidies from 1986-2000, whereas some majoritarian systems including the United States 
and Canada have relatively lower levels of agricultural protection. To explain this variation, they calculate 
the Cox-thresholds which conceptualize the degree to which electoral systems induce legislators to protect 
the benefits of specific interest groups, using the number of noncumulative votes, the number of 




Ehrlich (2007) maintains that levels of protection are a function of the number of access 
points in domestic political systems since an increase in access points reduces lobbying 
costs that protectionist groups should pay to reflect their interest in trade policy decisions. 
On the other hand, Goodhart (2008) also offers a formal explanation for countervailing 
effects of electoral formulas on the levels of protection. She argues that SMDP legislators 
are strongly motivated to pursue protectionist policy at the local level since in small 
electoral districts of majoritarian systems benefits from protection often exceed costs 
imposed on consumers. At the national level, however, the protectionist bias in 
majoritarian systems is moderated by vote-maximization strategies of parties which are 
motivated to target distributive benefits only on some key marginal districts.  
Another factor that yields mixed findings is the institutional literature’s 
assumption on the relationship between electoral institutions, the provision of public 
goods, and the level of trade barriers. The current literature on the influence of electoral 
systems rests on the following common premises: first, free trade is a public good that 
benefits the interest of broad national constituency whereas protectionist policy is a 
private good for a small sector of population; and hence second, certain features of 
electoral institutions determine the incentive for elected officials to provide public goods 
and hence adopt lower, more efficient levels of protection.  
While it seems reasonable to think that free trade increases the welfare of a 
society as a whole, it is not clear whether the average level of trade protection is 
necessarily lower in institutions which promote the provision of public goods. First, if we 
consider public goods in terms of non-excludability, there are cases in which protectionist 
policies hold the characteristics of public goods for diffused interests. According to 
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Mayer (1984) and Dutt and Mitra (2002, 2005), the median voter’s preference over trade 
openness is significantly affected by relative factor endowments in a given country as 
well as equity in the distribution of factor ownership. For instance, if capital is 
concentrated in a few hands in a capital abundant country, a majority voting is more 
likely to generate protectionist trade policy in this country since trade openness 
negatively affects a large proportion of the population which owns labor.
7
  
Kono (2007) similarly exemplifies the situation where a majority of voters prefers 
higher protection by saying that “the reduction of protection on goods which are 
consumed by the half of the population is the same as the increase in protection for 
sectors that employ half of the population in terms of the size of beneficiaries.” Thus he 
argues that particularistic incentives in electoral systems are associated with the ways in 
which governments distribute protectionist measures across industrial sectors rather than 
the degree to which they impose protectionist measures for the interests of domestic 
producers. In a related vein, Hatfield and Hauk (2003) suggest that trade protection takes 
characteristics of a public transfer under certain circumstances. In advanced industrial 
counties, high tariffs might be regarded as a type of public good which redistribute 
wealth from owners of relatively abundant factors to owners of relatively scarce factors 
(i.e. labor). If this is true, PR legislators targeting the collective interests of broad, 
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 See Mayer (1984), Alt and Gilligan (1994), and Dutt and Mitra (2002 and 2005) for more explanations of 
the relationship between equality, factor endowments, and levels of protection.  
8
 Since the distribution of income is right-skewed in most countries, the median voter of a society is capital-
poor and labor-rich compared to the national mean in both developed and developing countries (Kono 
2008).     
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A final critique of broad-brushed institutional research on trade protection is that 
it does not tell us much about varying patterns of trade barriers within and across 
countries. This is mainly because most empirical works restrict their focus to analyzing 
the average level of protection across countries and also because they do not pay enough 
attention to structures of trade policy preferences of voters. While deriving trade policy 
preferences of representatives from the features of electoral systems at the level of 
districts, most institutional research infers aggregate preferences of constituencies at the 
national level, only from macroeconomic indicators (e.g. unemployment rate, exchange 
rates, economic growth, and the degree of import penetration, etc). Nevertheless, 
macroeconomic indicators alone do not clearly capture the ways in which domestic 
groups holding different policy preferences align themselves with parties and politicians 
to maximize their political-economic interests in trade policy decisions. Consequently, by 
concentrating only on cross-national variations in the forms of democratic systems, most 
of the literature on political institutions does not say much about which groups are more 
likely to become the recipients of protectionist measures and how policymakers 
determine which industries and sectors to protect. With a few exceptions, they restrict 
their focus to analyzing variations in the average level of protection across countries, with 
national-level political-institutional variables as right-hand-side regressors to explain that 
aggregate variation.  
 
2.3. Theoretical Statements 
To fill this gap in the literature, my dissertation develops a theoretical framework 
explaining varying patterns of trade barriers within and across countries. The interest-
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group model in the literature on endogenous protection focuses on examining the 
influence of lobbying and campaign contribution on sectoral levels of trade barriers. 
Institutional explanations for trade policy concentrate on specifying the effects of 
domestic political systems on the average level of trade openness of countries. Unlike 
these studies, my dissertation pays much more attention to the ways in which reelection-
minded parties and legislators allocate distributive rents generated from trade restrictions 
to particular groups of voters and industrial sectors. Since international trade exerts 
significant influence on the distribution of income within a country, domestic interest 
groups shape collective policy demands over the level of trade openness according to 
their different economic characteristics in the market. However, the ways in which 
different policy preferences of domestic groups are mapped into policy outcomes are 
significantly influenced by the incentives of representative policymakers associated with 
electoral targeting. Since protectionist measures and regulations concentrate targetable 
benefits on a small sector of population, representative policymakers have substantial 
political incentives to offer protectionist rents to particular groups of domestic 
constituencies that will optimize their electoral prospects.   
In this vein, my dissertation argues that the ways in which governments distribute 
trade policy benefits across domestic constituencies depend on the strategic context 
shaped by two factors: first, the societal and geographic structure of domestic interests 
which delineates the scope and characteristics of political cleavages over trade policy; 
second, electoral institutions and conditions which define the political importance of 
partisan and geographical constituencies to representative policymakers. First, the 
structure of domestic interests is related to the ways in which domestic constituencies 
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shape collective policy demands over the issues of international trade. As will be 
explained in greater detail, the extent to which domestic groups exert protectionist 
pressures can be explained according to types of industrial sectors in which they are 
employed (i.e. import-competing and exporting sectors) or types of factors of production 
they own (i.e. capital or labor). The structure of trade policy preferences of domestic 
constituencies, however, does not directly determine variation in the allocation of 
protectionist rents across the electorate. Because of distributive rents yielded by 
protectionist measures, elected officials shape substantial incentives to target protection 
to particular groups of electoral constituencies to maximize their chances of retaining 
power. Therefore, secondly, the ways in which trade policy preferences of domestic 
groups are mapped into policy outcomes are significantly influenced by electoral 
institutions and conditions. All other things being equal, the degree to which protectionist 
interest groups receive favorable levels of protection is explained by electoral institutions 
and conditions that define types of electoral constituencies from which representative 
policymakers garner electoral support.  
In the following four chapters of my dissertation, these two key concepts are 
operationalized differently according to whether I examine patterns of trade protection 
within and across countries. The first three empirical chapters of my dissertation explain 
within-country variations in levels of trade protection across electoral constituencies and 
across industrial sectors in the United States from 1989 through 2004. Using sectoral data 
on tariff and nontariff protection, district-level election outcomes, and geographical 
information about the distribution of industrial employment on the electoral map, I 
investigate the extent to which voter demands for protection and their political 
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characteristics presented in electoral competition affect the allocation of protectionist 
rents across the electorate. Specifically, these chapters evaluate the relative merits of 
extant models of distributive politics (i.e. swing voter and core voter models) in a context 
of U.S. trade policy, by examining the effects of constituency marginality and voter 
partisanship on the structure of protection at various levels. My findings demonstrate that 
electoral competitiveness increases the amount of tariff protection aggregated at the level 
of congressional districts, and that industries geographically located in electorally 
marginal constituencies are more likely to receive higher levels of tariff protection than 
those in safe constituencies. My results also show that the political characteristics of 
constituencies modify the relationship between domestic pressures for protectionist relief 
and trade policy outcomes. I find strong and consistent evidence that politically 
competitive constituencies magnify the effects of protectionist demands on the amount of 
tariff and nontariff protection both at the district-level and at the industry-level. 
The fourth empirical chapter of my dissertation focuses on explaining variations 
in the structure of trade protection across countries. In this chapter, I analyze the 
economic and political conditions under which representative policymakers target 
protection toward skill-intensive industries rather than unskilled-intensive industries. 
Under the assumption that higher levels of protection for skill-intensive industries 
generate positive externalities for long-term economic growth, I argue that a country’s 
factor endowments and the level of political particularism in electoral institutions explain 
variation in the skill-bias of tariff protection across democracies. A country’s factor 
endowments capture the sector-specific trade policy preferences of the median voter. The 
level of political particularism in electoral institutions affects the incentives for 
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politicians to offer favorable levels of protection for skill-intensive industries rather than 
unskilled-intensive industries. The results of my empirical analysis demonstrates that the 
skill-bias of tariff protection tends to be lower in candidate-centered electoral systems in 
which party leaders do not mute the incentives for individual legislators to cultivate 
personal support base. An increase in the relative abundance of capital compared to labor 
of the median voter, however, reduces the effects of particularism on the skill-bias of 













Why are some declining industries more successful in receiving higher levels of trade 
protection than others, even without actively engaging in lobbying? How does the 
political representation of industrial sectors influence the cross-industry structure of trade 
protection? Most previous studies of trade policies begin with the premise that interest 
groups need to resolve their collective action problems in order to maximize their 
common interests (Olson 1965). Like all other public goods, collective activities to 
achieve policy goals are undersupplied to the group as a whole, since non-excludable 
benefits generated from group efforts induce individual members to free-ride on others’ 
contributions.  
In this vein, the literature on endogenous protection maintains that the cross-
industry structure of protection is explained by industry characteristics, which affect their 
incentives and abilities to coordinate lobbying efforts for sectoral interests. Industries 
organize costly political actions more effectively, when transaction costs involved in 
monitoring and bargaining are relatively low and when there is a substantial probability 
that group members can actually affect policy outcomes (Alt and Gilligan 1994). 
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Whether industries receive favorable levels of protection, therefore, depends on 
the organizational and economic features of industries, such as import penetration and 
export dependence (Magee 1980; Lee and Swagel 1997; Gilligan 1997), industry size 
(Anderson and Baldwin 1981; Milner 1988; Busch and Reinhardt 1999), firm 
heterogeneity (Milner 1988), firm concentration (Trefler 1993; Gawande and 
Bandyopadhyay 2000), and geographic concentration (Pincus 1975; Caves 1976, 
Lavergne 1983; Hansen 1990; Milner 1997; Busch and Reinhardt 1999). The micro-
foundation of endogenous protection theory has been more formally elaborated in the 
interest-group model by Grossman and Helpman (1994) in which the presence of political 
contributions and organized lobbying efforts determine the sectoral-level of protection.  
What is left unexplained by the endogenous protection literature, however, is that 
politicians often give privileged access in the form of protectionist tariffs to declining 
industries (e.g. textiles, footwear, apparel, etc.) which do not have enough monetary 
resources devoted to lobbying activities (Marvel and Ray 1983; Dixit and Londregan 
1995; Goodhart 2008). Moreover, it is somewhat difficult to discern the effects of 
lobbying and campaign contributions on policy outcomes in terms of both magnitude and 
direction because money provided from organized pressure groups only constitutes a 
small part of overall campaign finance (Ansolabehere, Figueiredo, and Snyder 2003).  
To fill this gap, this paper pays attention to another important aspect of political 
calculations that reelection-minded politicians make in setting trade policies: votes. It 
analyzes the relationship between the geographical location of industries on the electoral 
map and the inter-industry structure of trade protection in the United States from 1989 
through 1998. In doing so, I examine the extent to which the electoral characteristics of 
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industrial sectors affect cross-industry variation in the level of tariff and nontariff 
protection, respectively. My study builds upon previous research on the political 
geography of U.S. trade barriers (Busch and Reinhardt 1999; Rogowski, Kayser, and 
Kotin 1999; McGillivray 1997, 2004; Muûls and Petropolou 2008). Despite the insights 
offered by each, these studies show considerable disagreement about how industrial 
location influences the political representation of sectoral interests and trade policy 
outcomes. Moreover, their findings also raise the issue of generalizability, because most 
of them infer the political clout of industries from the geographical location of industries 
on the electoral map during a particular year. 
It is not a simple task to empirically clarify the political characteristics of 
industrial sectors and their effects on the structure of trade protection. This is mainly 
because data on trade barriers are generated at the level of industrial sectors, whereas 
election results are measured at the level of geographic units. I resolve these issues as 
follows. Based on data on the geographic distribution of industrial employment across 
electoral constituencies and district-level election outcomes, I first generate a set of 
indicators measuring the degree of the spatial concentration of industries in electorally 
competitive constituencies. Then I examine the extent to which the electoral 
characteristics of industries explain variation in the level of tariff and nontariff protection 
across industries, as well as the marginal effects of industry comparative disadvantage on 
policy outcomes.  
The present study attempts to contribute to the literature on the political economy 
of U.S. trade policy as follows. First, some previous work suggests that the political 
representation of industrial sectors is mainly determined by the number of legislators 
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representing industries as their own geographic constituencies (Pincus 1975; Busch and 
Reinhardt 1999; Rogowski, Kayser, and Kotin 1999). However, this paper maintains that 
the political clout of industries should be considered not only in terms of the spatial 
distribution of industrial employment across districts, but also from the ideological 
characteristics of regions in which industries are located. Since protectionist measures 
concentrate distributive rents on a small set of domestic producers, policymakers have 
substantial incentives to target protection toward particular industries, which will enhance 
their chances of winning election.  
Second, contrary to much previous research that relies on cross-sectional 
observations for a single year, I analyze the effects of industrial location on the cross-
industry structure of trade protection over time. My analysis relies on multiple data 
sources: data on tariffs from 1989 through 1998 and nontariff barriers (NTBs) for 1993, 
1994, and 1996 generated at the four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes, 
district-level data on presidential, gubernatorial, and congressional elections that occurred 
from 1984 through 1997, and geographic information about industrial employment in 
sub-national economies from 1988 through 1997. In doing so, I examine the political 
determinants of the structure of U.S. trade policy during the administrations of George 
H.W. Bush (1989-1992) and Bill Clinton (1993-1998).  
Third, the present study provides new evidence about the political geography of 
U.S. trade barriers. As will be discussed in more detail below, previous research offers 
competing explanations about the relationship between industrial location on the electoral 
map and the cross-industry structure of protection.  Busch and Reinhart (1999) maintain 
that in single-member district systems, like the United States, industries which are 
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geographically concentrated but politically dispersed across congressional districts are 
more likely to have favorable levels of trade protection. Although using an almost 
identical indicator of industrial location for the same time period, Rogowski, Kayser, and 
Kotin (1999) contend that the likelihood that an industry receives protection is 
maximized at a moderate level of dispersion of industrial employment. On the other hand, 
McGillivray (1997, 2004) argues that because of weak party discipline, trade protection 
in the U.S. tends to be directed toward industries located in safe districts, which are 
represented by senior, powerful members.  
The results of my analysis do not support these claims. Rather my findings 
suggest that the level of dispersion of industrial employment across electoral districts 
alone does not accurately capture the extent to which sectoral demands for protectionist 
measures are reflected in trade policy outcomes. Two results deserve emphasis. First, all 
other things being equal, industries located in politically competitive constituencies are 
likely to secure higher levels of tariff protection compared to those in safe constituencies. 
Second, constituency marginality amplifies the effects of protectionist demands of 
industrial sectors on the level of trade protection. The extent to which industry 
comparative disadvantage raises the level of tariff and nontariff protection is much 
greater for industries concentrated in marginal constituencies rather than for those in safe 
ones.  
This chapter proceeds in four sections. Section 2 reviews previous research on the 
impact of industry geography on the inter-industry structure of protection. Section 3 
provides a description of the required data and empirical approach. The main empirical 




2. Existing Explanations  
The idea that industry geography exerts a significant influence on the cross-industry 
variation in trade protection is neither new nor surprising. Researchers, however, consider 
the effects of industrial location in different ways. One line of research mainly focuses on 
the relationship between the geographic concentration of industries and the ability of 
industries to organize and lobby for group benefits. These studies maintain that 
geographically concentrated industries are more likely to secure favorable levels of 
protectionist measures than others (Pincus 1975; Caves 1976; Lavergne 1983; Nelson 
1988; Hansen 1990; Busch and Reinhardt 1999). Due to the spatial proximity of firms 
and workers, geographically concentrated industries tend to enjoy lower transaction costs 
involved in mobilizing, monitoring, and coordinating individual firms’ efforts for 
industry-wide lobbying (Schonhardt-Bailey 1991). Several studies show that the spatial 
concentration of employment also allows industrial workers to be more politically active. 
Workers in geographically concentrated industries tend to articulate their collective 
interests through voting and campaign contributions more effectively, unlike those in 
dispersed industries (Grier, Munger, and Roberts 1994; Busch and Reinhardt 2000). The 
effects of geographic concentration on trade policies and political mobilization in 
industries are regarded as almost invariant under different electoral systems, since they 
are mainly related to the formation of protectionist interests (Rogowski, Kayser, and 
Kotin 1999; Busch and Reinhardt 2005). 
The second line of research posits that industrial location affects not only the 
lobbying efforts of interested industries but also their political representation in the 
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legislature. While the first line of research defines industrial location in terms of the 
physical proximity of industries in space, these studies are more concerned with the 
“political concentration” of industries, that is, the spatial concentration of industrial 
employment across electoral districts.  One of the most common arguments is that in 
single-member district (SMD) electoral systems, the levels of protection are likely to be 
higher for industries widely dispersed across electoral districts rather than those 
concentrated in one or few districts. Since politically dispersed industries on the electoral 
map have a large group of voters in many districts, elected officials have strong 
incentives to build a legislative majority for specific interests of these industries 
(Schattschneider 1935; Pincus 1975; Caves 1976; Busch and Reinhardt 1999).  
In particular, Busch and Reinhardt (1999) argue that the effects of geographic and 
political concentration of industries on protection should be distinguished conceptually 
and empirically. While the physical closeness increases the efficiency of industries in 
articulating their protectionist demands, industries in SMD systems still need to be 
widely dispersed across as many electoral districts as possible, in order to ensure the 
political representation of their group interests. By using a new measure of geographic 
concentration of industries, their findings show that U.S. NTBs are likely to apply to 
industries which are geographically concentrated but politically dispersed across 
congressional districts. Along similar lines, Rogowski, Kayser, and Kotin (1999) examine 
the relationship between the political concentration of industries and sectoral distortion of 
prices between the U.S. and world markets. However, they argue that an industry’s 
political leverage is maximized at a moderate level of political concentration because in 
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SMD systems, like the U.S. and the U.K, industries with high and low levels of political 
concentration are likely to waste their votes in the legislature.  
The third line of research formulates more elaborate explanations about how the 
regional concentration of industries on the electoral map affects the incentives for 
political representatives to concentrate protection to particular industries. For instance, 
McGillivray (1997, 2004) examines the joint effects of industry geography, electoral 
rules, and the strength of political parties on the structure of tariff protection in Canada 
and the United States. She argues that single-party governments in SMD systems have a 
strong incentive to protect industries in marginal districts to obtain a legislative majority. 
The ability of governing parties to do so, however, depends on the degree of party 
discipline which determines the relationship between party leaders and rank-and-file 
legislators. In strong majoritarian systems, like Canada, government parties tend to 
concentrate protection on marginal, party-competitive districts at the expense of their 
core areas of electoral support and opposition strongholds, because party leaders exercise 
tight control over candidate nominations as well as legislative agendas. For weak 
majoritarian systems, like the United States, McGillivray predicts that industries located 
in electorally safe districts are likely to receive favorable levels of protection because 
senior, powerful legislators representing safe districts form a majority coalition for the 
interests of their geographic constituencies. On the other hand, Muûls and Petropolou 
(2008) build a political agency model in which the incumbent politicians improve their 
reelection prospects by attracting swing voters in a continuum of electoral constituencies. 
Their empirical tests show that U.S. industries located in swing and decisive states in 
presidential elections are more likely to receive higher levels of protection than others.  
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Nevertheless, previous research on the political geography of U.S. trade policy 
warrants further discussion. First, there is considerable disagreement about how industrial 
location is related to the cross-industry level of trade protection. By employing an almost 
identical measure of political concentration, Busch and Reinhardt (1999) maintain that 
politically dispersed industries are most likely to maximize their group benefits, whereas 
Rogowski, Kayser, and Kotin (1999) contend that highly dispersed industries are least 
likely to enjoy political clout on setting trade policies. McGillivray (2004) again shows 
that once we consider the electoral marginality of districts, the spread of industries across 
congressional districts rather reduces the levels of protection. These mixed findings stem 
in part from the fact that researchers infer the political clout of industries from different 
dimensions of electoral systems, such as the number of individual legislators having 
industrial workers as geographical constituencies or the electoral incentives of parties in 
the allocation of distributive benefits. Moreover, the larger question of generalizability 
still remains because these studies examine the effect of industrial location on the 
structure of protection, relying on the distribution of industrial employment across 
electoral constituencies for a particular election year.
9
   
Second, and perhaps more importantly, many underlying assumptions in these 
studies need to be reconsidered theoretically and empirically. For instance, McGillivray’s 
argument that U.S. legislators favor industries in safe districts rather than those in 
marginal districts relies on two assumptions: first, party discipline in the United States is 
quite low; second, in weak majoritarian systems, safe districts are more likely to be 
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 Busch and Reinhardt (1999) and Rogowski, Kayser, and Kotin (1999) examine the effects of the political 
concentration of industries across districts for the 102
nd
 Congress. McGillivray regresses sectoral tariff rates 
of 1970 in Canada and 1979 in the United States on the 1968 Canadian Parliamentary election and the 1976 
U.S. House election, respectively. On the other hand, Muûls and Petropolou (2007) link U.S. NTB barriers 
for 1983 to the state-level industrial location in the 1984 presidential election. 
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represented by senior, powerful legislators rather than by junior members, because of 
lower chances of reelection in marginal districts. However, it should be noted that the 
traditional view on “weak parties” in the U.S. Congress has been strongly challenged. A 
number of studies show that partisan organizations exert significant influences on the 
content of legislation, roll-call voting, and the allocation of distributive benefits (Cox and 
McCubbins 1993; Aldrich and Rohde 2000; Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart 2001). 
Unlike McGillivray, these studies regard the concentration of targetable resources on 
partisan strongholds as a proxy for partisan bias in distributive politics rather than as the 
consequence of weak party discipline (Levitt and Snyder 1995; Ansolabehere and Snyder 
2006; Chen 2012). By assuming that party discipline is exogenously given and constant 
over time, McGillivray does not directly test the influence of party discipline on the 
allocation of protection in majoritarian democracies. Thus we do not yet know whether 
her findings about the structure of protection in U.S. industries are generated by either 
weak party discipline or the political incentives for parties to favor their core partisan 
supporters in the allocation of protectionist benefits.  
The existing literature provides competing explanations for the ways in which 
industrial location on the electoral map affects industries’ chances of obtaining 
protectionist relief. This chapter aims to fill this gap by reexamining the effects of 
political representation on the cross-industry structure of U.S. trade protection. Relying 
on the literature of distributive politics, I maintain that the extent to which elected 
officials respond to the policy demands of industrial sectors depends on the political 
attributes of industrial sectors revealed in electoral competition. Because of income 
effects of international trade, industrial sectors articulate different policy preferences for 
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protectionist measures according to their net trade positions. However, the redistribution 
of protectionist rents across industrial sectors does not necessarily coincide with the 
strength of protectionist pressures from industrial sectors. Tariffs and NTBs concentrate 
distributive rents on small groups of domestic sectors but spread the costs of protection 
across the entire population. Hence representative policymakers have substantial 
incentives to target protectionist rents to particular constituencies that will promote their 
chances for reelection.  
Extant models of distributive politics offer contrasting predictions about the 
political characteristics of industries that increase their chance of receiving favorable 
levels of protection. The swing voter model suggests that politicians target protectionist 
rents to marginal constituencies rather than to core partisan supporters, since the former 
are more willing to cast their votes for parties that promise more distributive rewards 
(Lindbeck and Weibull 1987; Dixit and Londregan 1995). In contrast, the core voter 
model maintains that it is more cost-efficient for parties to concentrate protectionist rents 
on their loyal supporters when swing voters might renege on their promises about 
electoral support (Cox and McCubbins 1986), or when parties often differ in their 
abilities to deliver distributive benefits to particular groups of voters (Dixit and 
Londregan 1996).  
In this vein, we could formulate a set of testable hypotheses regarding the political 
and economic determinants of the inter-industry structure of protection, as detailed below. 
Here I use the swing voter model as a baseline to specify the relationship between 




H1: Industries which are adversely affected by import competition are more 
likely to receive higher levels of trade protection. 
H2: Industries which are geographically located in marginal or competitive 
constituencies are more likely to receive higher levels of trade 
protection than those located in safe constituencies. 
H3: The geographic concentration of industries in electorally competitive 
constituencies increases the extent to which industry comparative 
disadvantage raises levels of protection. 
 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that the strength of protectionist demands of industrial sectors 
explain variation in the levels of tariff and nontariff protection across industries. In 
hypotheses 2 and 3, I assume that the political characteristics of industries also matter for 
the inter-industry structure of trade protection because of the incentives of representative 
policymakers to optimize their electoral prospects. Hypothesis 2 maintains that the 
political attributes of industries exert an independent effect on the allocation of protection, 
and hypothesis 3 suggests that reelection-minded representatives respond to protectionist 
demands of industries differently according to their political characteristics.  
 
3. Empirical Research Design 
To test the aforementioned hypotheses, this section describes a model explaining the 
cross-industry structure of trade protection. The industry-level model evaluates the extent 
to which the economic and political attributes of industries independently and 
interactively affect the distribution of tariff and nontariff protection across industries. 
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Specifically, it clarifies the political attributes of industrial workers as electoral 
constituencies, based on the distribution of industrial employment across electoral 
districts and district-level outcomes from different types of elections.  
 
3.1. Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable in the industry-level analysis relies on two different data sources. 
First, I consider ad valorem tariffs for about 394 manufacturing industries at the four-
digit SIC codes from 1989 to 1998. Following previous research, I define industry-level 
tariff protection as collected duties as a percentage of the value of total imports and as a 
percentage of the value of dutiable imports (Irwin 1994; O’Halloran 1994; Epstein and 
O’Halloran 1996). While the gap between these values is not constant over time, the 
latter is always larger than the former. Sectoral data on duties and imports are obtained 
from international trade data by Peter K. Schott (2008).
10
  
Second, I separately consider NTB protection for 356 industries at the four-digit 
SIC codes in 1993, 1994, and 1996, as a coverage ratio and as a frequency ratio, 
respectively. The NTB coverage ratio represents the relative share of import values 
subject to nontariff measures within a corresponding four-digit SIC industry. In a similar 
vein, the NTB frequency ratio denotes the proportion of tariff lines affected by nontariff 
measures within the four-digit SIC industry. Sectoral data on U.S. NTBs are collected 
from Kono (2006), which are originally based on the United Nations Commission on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD)’s Trade Analysis and Information System 
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 Kono’s data show whether a given commodity h at the six-digit 
Harmonized System (HS) level is subjected to non-tariff measures, such as price, quantity, 
quality, threat, and advance payment.  
To calculate the NTB coverage ratio for industry k, I first tabulated Kono’s NTB 
data at the four-digit SIC codes, using concordance of each 10-digit HS code to a single 
four-digit SIC industry from Pierce and Schott (2009). Then I created a dummy variable 
indicating if a six-digit HS commodity h is subjected to any types of NTBs mentioned 
above, and weighted them by the share of import values of h over the total value of 
imports for the four-digit SIC industry k to which h belongs. Finally, by adding up these 
values across six-digit HS codes but within the four-digit SIC industry k, I generate the 
NTB coverage ratio for about 356 industries at the four-digit SIC codes for 1992, 1993, 
and 1996. As in Trefler (1993), the numerical computation of industry k’s NTB coverage 
ratio is summarized in equation (2) in which mh denotes a dummy variable for NTB for 
the six-digit HS industry h, and vh,k /vk is the relative value of imports of h within the 
corresponding four-digit SIC industry. For the NTB frequency ratio, I calculate the ratio 
of the number of HS codes influenced by NTB measures over the total number of HS 
codes within the four-digit SIC industry.  
 
NTB coverage ratios tk =    
 
    × (vh,k /vk) 




                                                     
11
 Kono uses Jon Haveman’s extracts from TRAINS versions 2-8. 
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3.2. Independent Variables 
Our independent variables are divided into three categories: first, industry-level demands 
for protectionist measures; second, industrial location on the electoral map which 
represents the political attributes of industrial sectors as electoral constituencies; and third, 
organizational characteristics of industries that influence sector efficiency in coordinating 
lobbying and campaign contributions.  
First, I generate the variable Industry Comparative Disadvantage which 
represents the strength of sectoral demands for protectionist measures. It measures the 
extent to which each industry develops protectionist demands, based on its relative 
position in international and domestic markets. Following Busch and Reinhardt (1999), I 
measure Industry Comparative Disadvantage as the difference between import 
penetration and export dependence for four-digit SIC industries. Import penetration is 
defined as the ratio of the value of imports over the total value of imports and domestic 
shipments, and similarly, export dependence is measured as the value of exports over the 
total value of exports and domestic shipments. Import penetration indicates the extent to 
which industries are threatened by sectoral import flows, whereas export dependence 
indicates industry’s demands for access to international markets. Thus large positive 
values of Industry Comparative Disadvantage indicate that international competition 
more adversely affects the economic fortunes of industries. Data on imports, exports, and 
domestic shipments for four-digit SIC industries were again collected from Schott’s 
international trade data mentioned above.  
Second, and more importantly, I construct a set of indicators representing the 
geographical location of industries on the electoral map, using district-level results for 
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presidential elections from 1984 through 1996 and data on industrial employment in sub-
national economies from 1988 through 1997. The spatial distribution of industrial 
employment across congressional districts allows us to infer their political characteristics 
in electoral competition. Using district presidential vote measures and industrial 
composition of districts, I construct a variable Partisan Dominance of Industry indicating 
the extent to which a given industry is geographically located in electorally marginal or 
safe constituencies. Partisan Dominance of Industry is conceptually similar to the 
political concentration of industry, which is measured as the Herfindahl-Hirschman (HH) 
index of the district share of industrial employment in the literature (Busch and Reinhart 
1999; Rogowski, Kayser, and Kotin 1999; McGillivray 1997).
12
 However, while the 
political concentration of industry only measures the spatial proximity of industrial 
employment on the electoral map, the Partisan Dominance of Industry variable takes into 
account different electoral characteristics of districts in which a given industry is located. 
Assuming that industry k is dispersed across n congressional districts, Partisan 
Dominance of Industry is calculated from equation (3) below.  
  
Partisan Dominance of Industryk  
=               
  
    × Partisan Dominancei                                    
  (3)        
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 The political concentration of industry is computed as the sum of the square of each district’s share of 
industry k’s total employment at the national level. Thus, the political concentration has zero value for 
industries which are widely dispersed across 435 congressional districts, but takes a value of 1 for a small 
industry concentrated in a single electoral district.  
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Equation (3) shows that Partisan Dominance of Industry is computed as the 
weighted sum of the squared proportion of district i’s employment for industry k, with the 
weight given by the value of Partisan Dominance for district i. Here      presents the 
number of industry k’s employees in district i, and        denotes total employees for 
industry k at the national level. On the other hand, Partisan Dominance indicates the 
strength of district i’s partisan support for either Republican or Democratic candidates. I 
measure Partisan Dominance as the absolute value of district presidential vote share 
normalized around its national mean in the most recent presidential election, as the 
literature on congressional representation commonly sees presidential electoral returns as 
the most reliable indicator of district competitiveness or partisanship (Ansolabehere, 
Snyder, and Stewart 2001; Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan 2002; Abramowitz, 
Alexander, and Gunning. 2006; Griffin 2006). More specifically, Partisan Dominance 
indicates the absolute deviation of the proportion of the two-party vote in district i from 
the average share of the two-party vote in the entire nation. If districts show stronger 
electoral support for one party than the national average, Partisan Dominance takes large 
positive values. For districts having two equally sized groups of partisans as the national 
average, Partisan Dominance is coded as zero, meaning the highest level of district 
competitiveness. In this vein, Partisan Dominance of Industry captures the political 
attributes of industrial sectors revealed in electoral competition. It will take a value closer 
to zero for industries heavily located in competitive districts, but have large positive 
values for industries located in electorally safe constituencies.  
Geographical information about industrial employment was collected from the 
U.S. Census Bureau’s County Business Patterns (CBP) data which offer annual 
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information about industrial employment and payrolls for four-digit SIC industries from 
1988 through 1997 at various levels of geographic units (i.e. county, state, and nation).
13
 I 
convert the CBP’s county-level data on industrial employment to district-level outcomes 
by using the Missouri Census Data Center’s Mable/Geocorr2k geographic 
correspondence engine, which provides detailed information about the geographical 
relationship between county and congressional districts from the 101
st





 For most congressional districts consisting of multiple counties, we can 
easily figure out the industrial composition of employment at the district level, by adding 
the size of employment for each industry across counties but within a corresponding 
district. If a county is divided into two or more congressional districts, I disaggregate 
county-level data on industrial employment into district-level outcomes, based on 
county’s share of population for each congressional district in Mable/Geocorr2k files. As 
supplementary sources, I also use the U.S. Census Bureau’s Congressional District 
Geographic Relationship Tables and Congressional District Atlas to consider redistricting 
and corresponding changes in the subdivision of congressional districts.  
My model contains other substantial variables which may exert significant effects 
on the cross-industry patterns of trade protection. As reviewed above, it is frequently 
argued that geographically concentrated industries are more likely to act upon their 
common interests, because regionally clustered industries tend to have lower transaction 
costs involved in communication, transportation, and mobilization (Trefler 1993; Busch 
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 For some industries, the CBP data uses abbreviations that indicate employment-size classes at the county 
level to protect the confidentially rights of employees. In these cases, I narrow down the range of 
employment-size classes as much as possible, using establishment group categories and the hierarchical 
structure of geographic units and the SIC codes. Then following McGillivray (1997, 2004), I take the mid-
point of employment-size classes as the number of employees for each industry. See Isserman and 
Westervelt (2006) for more details on the structure of the CBP data.  
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and Reinhart 1999). To control for the effect of geographic concentration of industrial 
employment, I construct the Ellison-Glaeser Index at the four-digit SIC codes from 1988 
to 1997. The Ellison-Glaeser Index measures the physical closeness of industrial 
employment in space, using the distribution of industrial employment across plants. 
Drawing on Ellison and Glaeser (1993) and Holmes and Stevens (2004), I compute the 
Ellison-Glaser index, by using equation (4) below.  
 
Ellison-Glaeser Index k  
    
        
  
      
      
  




            G=        
  
    and H =    
  
    
 (4)       
 
Here G indicates the degree of natural or raw geographic concentration of industry. 
Under the assumption that industry k has spread across M states, si represents state i’s 
share of industry k’s total employment, and xi denotes state i’s share of total national 
employment. H is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of industry plant size distribution, in 
which zj denotes the share of employment of plant j of industry k.  
To construct the Ellison-Glaeser Index for all manufacturing industries in my 
dataset, I again use the CBP data on industrial employment at the state level as well as at 
the national level, respectively, during the period from 1988 through 1997. Following 
Holmes and Stevens (2004), I also employ the CBP data on the distribution of 
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employment across establishment categories to calculate the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
of industry concentration (=H) in equation (4), since industrial employment data are not 
available at the plant level for the period of my investigation. Large positive values of the 
Ellison-Glaeser index indicate high degrees of the spatial proximity of industrial 
employment. Thus, if geographically clustered industries more effectively reduce 
transaction costs in coordinating lobbying activities for protectionist measures, the 
coefficient for the Ellison-Glaeser Index should be positive and significant.  
Relying on the literature on endogenous tariff protection, I consider a set of 
industry characteristics which might affect their group efficiency in organizing collective 
political activities for their sectoral interests. Following previous work (Trefler 1993; 
Busch and Reinhart 1999), I control for the effects of Firm Concentration Ratio, 
representing the extent to which an industry’s market share is dominated by a small 
number of large firms. Since it is measured as the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of the 
dollar value of the domestic shipments made by the industry’s fifty largest firms, high 
values of Firm Concentration Ratio indicate that a very few large firms exert greater 
influence on industry. It is frequently argued that industries dominated by a small number 
of firms have strong incentives to organize and lobby for protection, because they would 
enjoy most of the distributive rents yielded from protectionist measures (Hansen 1990; 
Trefler 1993). If this argument holds true, we might expect that the coefficient for Firm 
Concentration Ratio would be positive and significant.  
I also include an industry’s national employment in my model to control for the 
effect of industry size.
15
 Previous research on endogenous protection commonly 
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 For the purpose of presentation, the Size variable is measured as the total number of employees for each 
industry in millions. 
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maintains that the size of an industry is an important factor explaining the cross-industry 
structure of protection. The size of industrial employment might have two conflicting 
effects. On the one hand, it could increase the political importance of the industry, 
because large industries might mobilize more votes from their employees to pressure 
representative policymakers (Trefler 1993; Lee and Swagel 1997). On the other hand, 
industry size might reduce the political clout of industries since greater employment 
might generate more collective action problems in coordinating lobbying efforts for 
protection.  
Last, I add the lagged ad valorem tariff rates at the four-digit SIC codes. Previous 
studies suggest that pre-existing tariff levels might influence both constituent demands 
for trade protection as well as the responsiveness of governments to protectionist 
demands. Specifically, if there is a substitutive relationship between tariffs and NTBs, 
prior tariff rates might moderate the strength of industries’ demands for protection. 
Governments could also be more resistant to protectionist pressures from industries 
which are already the beneficiaries of tariff protection. If tariffs and NTBs are 
complementary to each other, however, higher levels of tariff rates might have a positive, 
significant association with sectoral NTBs (Mansfield and Busch 1995; Busch and 
Reinhardt 1999; Kono 2006). 
Equation (5) summarizes the industry-level model in which the economic and 
political attributes of industries independently and interactively influence the cross-
industry structure of protection. The industry-level model differentiates the political 
attributes of industries based upon the regional distribution of industrial employment 
across congressional districts and district-level election results. In equation (5), β2 
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represent the effect of the geographical concentration of industry k in electorally safe 
districts. β3 indicates the extent to which industrial concentration in safe districts modifies 
the relationship between industry comparative disadvantage and the dependent variable. 
The marginal effect of industry comparative disadvantage is, therefore, hypothesized to 
depend on the degree of industrial concentration in safe districts, as presented in equation 
(6). As explained in detail above, the industry-level model in equation (6) is estimated 
against ad valorem tariffs for about 394 manufacturing industries at the four-digit SIC 
from 1989 to 1998, and for NTB protection for 356 industries at the four-digit SIC codes 
for 1993, 1994, and 1996, respectively. 
 
Industry-level Protectionkt   
= β0 + β1 Industry Comparative Disadvantagekt-1  
+ β2 Partisan Dominance of Indsutrykt-1 
+ β3 Industry comparative Disadvantage × Partisan Dominance of Industrieskt-1 
+ β4 Ellison-Glaeser Indexkt-1 + β5 Firm Concentration Ratiokt-1 
+ β6 Industry Size kt-1 + β7 Industry-Level Tariffkt-1 + εi 
     (5)     
∂Industry-Level Protection / ∂Industry Comparative Disadvantage  
= β1 + β3Partisan Dominance of Industry 






4. Empirical Results 
This section reports estimation results for the industry-level model presented in equation 
(5). Here, the industry-level protection is predicted from industry’s trade positions, 
industrial location on the electoral map, and a set of control variables that might be 
associated with lobbying efforts of industrial sectors. In Tables 3.1 and 3.2, my model is 
tested against ad valorem tariffs for 394 industries at the four-digit SIC codes from 1989 
through 1998, based on the value of total imports and the value of dutiable imports, 
respectively. Table 3.3 displays the estimated results for NTB coverage ratios and NTB 
frequency ratios of 356 four-digit SIC industries in the 1990s. 
Let us briefly examine the effects of industry characteristics related to industrial 
efficiency in organizing lobbying efforts for protection. The results of my analysis 
demonstrate that the economic and organizational characteristics of industries matter for 
the structure of protection, as suggested in the literature on endogenous tariff protection. 
First and foremost, my findings clearly show that industry’s net trade position is one of 
the most important factors explaining sectoral demands for compensation through 
protectionist measures. In Tables 3.1-3.3, the variable Industry Comparative 
Disadvantage mostly has a significant positive association with both tariff and nontariff 
protection. These findings suggest that levels of tariff and nontariff protection tend to be 
higher for industries which are more threatened by international competition but rely less 
on exports.  
Previous research also emphasizes the importance of geographical concentration 
of industry as a substantial factor influencing the cross-industry structure of protection. 
My findings support earlier findings that there is a significant, positive relationship 
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between the geographic concentration of industries and the industry-level trade protection 
(Trefler 1993; Busch and Reinhardt 1999). In Table 3.1, the positive significant 
coefficients on geographic concentration suggest that regionally clustered industries are 
likely to have higher levels of tariff protection. Similarly, Table 3.3 demonstrates that the 
geographic concentration of industries also exerts a significant, positive effect on NTB 
coverage ratio as well as on NTB frequency ratios. These results strongly support the idea 
that geographically concentrated industries are likely to increase sectoral levels of trade 
protection, because the spatial closeness of firms and workers allows industries to have 
lower transaction costs involved in coordinating lobbying efforts for collective interests 
(Busch and Reinhardt 1999). 
Nevertheless, my findings suggest that other organizational characteristics of 
industries might not have significant, consistent effects on the inter-industry structure of 
protection. The results in Tables 3.1-3.3 do not generate convincing evidence for the 
argument that industry size has a positive association with the level of protection, because 
large industries are likely to be considered politically more important than small ones 
(Lee and Swagel 1997). In most cases, the Size variable does not have a significant, 
positive coefficient. In column 5 of Table 3.1, the size of industrial employment is 
inversely related to the level of protection, suggesting that large industries might be less 
efficient in organizing and lobbying for protection for their sectoral interests. 
Nevertheless, Table 3.3 again shows that industry size does not exert significant influence 
on either the NTB coverage ratio or the NTB frequency ratio.  
Table 3.1 also demonstrates that the estimated coefficients for Firm 
Concentration Ratio are negatively signed and mostly significant. This finding implies 
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that the level of tariff protection tends to be rather lower for industries dominated by a 
small number of large, significant firms. In Table 3.3, however, Firm Concentration 
Ratio does not exert any significant effect on the cross-industry structure of NTBs. 
Overall, these findings do not confirm the argument that firm concentration increases 
sectoral levels of trade protection, since it lowers transaction costs involved in 
coordinating collective lobbying but raises the amount of protectionist rents for 
individual firms (Trefler 1993; Busch and Reinhardt 1999; Grier, Munger, and Roberts 
1994). Given that previous research has also generated mixed findings about the effects 
of the size and firm concentration of industries, it is not surprising that my findings 
present weak and insignificant effects of these variables.  
 
[Insert Tables 3.1 and 3.2 here] 
 
Let us now turn to the relationship between industrial location on the electoral 
map and the industry-level of trade protection. Here we focus on examining the degree to 
which the political characteristics of industrial workers revealed in electoral competition 
influence the levels of tariff and nontariff protection, on the one hand, and the marginal 
effect of industry comparative disadvantage on trade policy outcomes, on the other hand.  
The overall results in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 demonstrate that the Partisan Dominance 
of Industry variable is negatively related to the industry-level of tariff protection. As large 
positive values of Partisan Dominance of Industry imply that industries are mainly 
located in electorally safe constituencies, its significant and negative coefficients suggest 
that the levels of tariff protection are likely to be higher for industries located in 
59 
 
politically competitive constituencies rather than for industries in safe constituencies. In 
Table 3.1, Partisan Dominance of Industry exerts a significant, negative effect on ad 
valorem tariffs based on the total value of imports, only with the inclusion of industry-
fixed effects.
16
 On the other hand, findings in Table 3.2 indicate that the coefficients for 
Partisan Dominance of Industry are consistently negatively signed and significant, if we 
consider ad valorem tariffs generated from the value of dutiable imports. These findings 
suggest that the geographical concentration of industrial employment in electorally safe 
constituencies reduces the chance of industry receiving favorable levels of tariff 
protection.  
In Tables 3.1 and 3.2, I also include the multiplicative interaction term between 
Partisan Dominance of Industry and Industry Comparative Disadvantage. In doing so, 
we can evaluate the extent to which the political characteristics of industries affect the 
relationship between protectionist pressures from industries and actual policy outcomes. 
The findings in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 offer strong evidence that industrial concentration in 
electorally safe constituencies reduces the marginal effects of protectionist demands of 
industries on the level of tariff protection. The coefficients for the Partisan Dominance of 
Industry × Industry Comparative Disadvantage are consistently negative and significant 
across different specifications of the model. For instance, column 5 of Table 3.1 shows 
that the estimated coefficients for Industry Comparative Disadvantage and its interaction 
term with Partisan Dominance of Industry are 0.037 and -0.116, respectively. This 
finding suggests that the influence of protectionist interests on tariff protection will drop 
                                                     
16
 As my data fail to meet the asymptotic assumptions of the Hausman Test, we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that differences in coefficients between random and fixed models are not systematic. Using 
generalized least squares (GLS) does not significantly change my results presented in Tables 1 and 2. 
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from 0.037 to -0.058, as the value of Partisan Dominance of Industry moves from its 
minimum (= 0.003) to maximum (= 0.819) in my dataset.  
 
[Insert Table 3.3 about here] 
 
The results of my analysis also demonstrate that similar patterns hold for sectoral 
NTBs. On the one hand, Table 3.3 demonstrates that the marginal voter status of 
industrial employment does not exert a direct and independent influence on the cross-
industry structure of NTB protection. The coefficients for Partisan Dominance of 
Industry are all positively signed and insignificant. These findings do not support my 
initial hypothesis that industries located in electorally competitive regions are more likely 
to receive higher levels of nontariff protection. On the other hand, however, the results 
presented in Table 3.3 provide convincing evidence that the marginal effects of Industry 
Comparative Disadvantage on the NTB coverage ratio and the NTB frequency ratios will 
be maximized, when industrial employment is concentrated in electorally competitive 
constituencies. As shown in Table 3.3, the coefficients for the multiplicative interaction 
term of Partisan Dominance of Industry × Industry Comparative Disadvantage range 
from -4.685 to -3.43, and all of them are statistically significant. More specifically, 
columns 2 and 3 demonstrate that all other things being equal, the marginal effect of 
Industry Comparative Disadvantage on the NTB coverage ratio will be reduced from 
0.254 to -1.5 and from 0.284 to -1.736 respectively, as Partisan Dominance of Industry 
changes from 0.003 to 0.434 in my dataset. In columns 5 and 6, the same change in 
Partisan Dominance of Industry induces the marginal effect of Industry Comparative 
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Disadvantage on the NTB frequency ratio to drop from 0.174 to -1.305 and from 0.193 to 
-1.457, respectively.  
It should also be noted that the coefficients for Partisan Dominance of Industry 
and its interaction term with Industry Comparative Disadvantage rarely change in terms 
of direction and significance, even if we control for the effect of the political 
concentration of industry suggested in previous studies. In Tables 3.1-3.3, the Political 
Concentration variable indicates the degree of the spatial concentration of industrial 
employment across congressional districts. If industries which are widely dispersed as 
many congressional districts as possible have better representation in political institutions 
and hence receive more favorable levels of protection, the coefficients for Political 
Concentration should be negative and significant (Busch and Reinhardt 1999). My results 
in Tables 3.1-3.3, however, show that the Political Concentration variable does not have 
a significant influence on the industry-level tariff and nontariff protection. The only 
exceptions are presented in columns 2 and 5 of Table 3.2, in which I consider ad valorem 
tariffs on the value of dutiable imports as the dependent variable. Nevertheless, these 
findings still suggest that industries dispersed across congressional districts are less likely 
to receive tariff protection, as shown in McGillivray’s work (2004).  
 
Robustness Tests  
As a robustness check, I re-examine the effects of the political characteristics of 
industries on the inter-industry structure of trade protection, considering other types of 
elections with different time frames. Specifically, I construct three different indicators of 
industrial location representing the concentration of industrial employment in electorally 
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competitive (or safe) constituencies: Presidential Closeness of Industry, Closeness to 50-
50 of Industry, and House Marginality of Industry. These measures are again generated 
from equation (3), in which I replace Partisan Dominance with alternative indicators of 
electoral competitiveness, such as Presidential Closeness, Closeness to 50-50, and House 
Marginality.  
While Partisan Dominance is only concerned with district presidential vote shares 
in the most recent presidential election, Presidential Closeness is the average of district 
presidential vote measures in the two most recent presidential elections, with each of 
them normalized around its national mean. Following Ansolabehere and Snyder (2006), 
Closeness to 50-50 denotes the absolute difference between the two-party vote share that 
Democratic Candidates won in presidential, Senate, gubernatorial elections over the past 
four years and 50%. In doing so, I assume that the industry-level of tariff protection 
in1992 is influenced by the political attributes of industrial sectors observed from 1988 
through 1990. As in McGillivray (1997), I also consider House Marginality which 
represents the absolute difference between the two-party vote share for Democratic 
candidates and 50% in the most recent House election.
17
 Like Partisan Dominance, the 
values of Presidential Closeness, Closeness to 50-50, and House Marginality all increase 
from zero to positive values, as a district’s two-party vote share deviates from a 50-50 
split in each combination of election outcomes. Consequently, all three measures of 
industrial location also take large positive values, as industrial employment is more 
concentrated in constituencies showing strong partisanship for one party over the other. 
In contrast, the value of these three measures become closer to zero, as industrial 
                                                     
17
 The absolute value of House Marginality is equivalent to one-half of the absolute difference in the 
Democratic and Republican share of the two-party vote in the most recent House election. 
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employment is mostly located in constituencies having two equally sized groups of 
partisans.   
 
[Insert Tables 3.4 and 3.5 about here] 
 
Table 3.4 and 3.5 report the estimation results for the industry-level model, with 
alternative indicators of industrial location. Here I consider four different dependent 
variables: tariff rates on the value of total imports, tariff rates on the value of dutiable 
imports, NTB coverage ratios, and NTB frequency ratios. My findings in these tables still 
strongly support my argument that the geographical concentration of industries in 
electorally competitive constituencies significantly increases the marginal effect of 
protectionist demands on the levels of both tariff and nontariff protection. Columns 1-3 of 
Table 3.4 demonstrate that the multiplicative interactions between Industry Comparative 
Disadvantage and each indicator of industrial location exert a consistently negative and 
significant effect on the level of tariff rates based on the value of total imports. These 
findings suggest that the extent to which Industry Comparative Disadvantage actually 
increases the level of tariff protection is inversely related to the geographic concentration 
of industries in electorally safe constituencies. In a related vein, the findings in Table 3.5 
also clearly show that the coefficient estimates for interaction terms between Industry 
Comparative Disadvantage and indicators of industrial location are all negatively signed 
and significant. These results provide confirming evidence that the extent to which 
protectionist pressures from industrial sectors would actually increase sectoral NTBs in 
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terms of coverage and frequency is significantly higher for industries located in 
politically competitive constituencies rather than for industries located in safe ones.  
Based on these results, Figure 3.1 graphically presents the marginal effect of 
industry comparative disadvantage on various types of protectionist measures. The solid 
lines in each graph shows the degree to which industry comparative disadvantage 
increases the levels of protection, whereas dashed lines represent 95% confidence 
intervals of the marginal effects. Specifically, the first row of graphs indicates the effects 
of the political attributes of industry on the relationship between industry comparative 
disadvantage and sectoral tariff rates on the value of total imports. Similarly, the second 
and third rows of graphs present the marginal effect of industry comparative disadvantage 
on NTB coverage ratios and NTB frequency ratios, respectively.  
 
[Insert Figure 3.1 about here] 
 
The graphs in Figure 3.1 strongly suggest that the degree to which industry 
comparative disadvantage increases the level of tariff and nontariff protection 
significantly varies according to the political characteristics of industries presented in 
electoral competition. In Figure 3.1, all nine graphs present a negative slope for the 
marginal effect line of industry comparative disadvantage on the industry-level protection. 
This finding implies that all other things being equal, the extent to which industry 
comparative disadvantage raises sectoral levels of tariff and nontariff protection is 
maximized, if the values of three indicators of location are all zero, that is, if industries 
have more electorally competitive constituencies. Nevertheless, if industries are more 
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geographically located in safe constituencies and thus take large positive values for 
indicators of industrial location, the extent to which industry comparative disadvantage 
raises the levels of tariff and nontariff protection significantly drops. Figure 3.1 also 
shows that protectionist pressures from industrial sectors would not raise the level of 
trade protection anymore, once the values of industrial location exceed a certain threshold. 
For instance, the center graph in the second row demonstrates that the effects Industry 
Comparative Disadvantage on NTB coverage ratios become zero, once the value of 
Closeness to 50-50 of Industry is greater than 0.055.  
 
5. Conclusion 
This chapter analyzes the inter-industry structure of U.S. trade protection from 1989 
through 1999. Relying on the literature on the political geography of U.S. trade policy 
and extant models of distributive politics, the present study finds that the inter-industry 
structure of tariff and nontariff protection is influenced not only by sectoral demands for 
protection, but also by the political characteristics of industries as electoral constituencies. 
My findings consistently demonstrate that industries located in electorally competitive 
constituencies are more likely to receive higher levels of tariff protection and that the 
marginal effect of industry comparative disadvantage increases as industries are more 
geographically located in politically competitive constituencies.  
Several studies have already emphasized the importance of the political 
geography of U.S. trade protection. The findings of this study do not confirm previous 
findings that the spatial distribution of industrial employment determines the degree of 
political clout of industrial sectors (Busch and Reinhardt 1999; Rogowski, Kayser, and 
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Kotin 1999) and that because of the weakness of congressional parties, U.S. industries 
located in marginal districts are least likely to receive favorable levels of protection 
(McGillivray 1997, 2004). Rather, the present study suggests that redistribution achieved 
through protectionist policies cannot be explained without considering the political 
characteristics of domestic constituencies that change over time. Constituency 
competitiveness influences not only the distribution of protectionist rents across industrial 
sectors but also the marginal effect of protectionist pressures on policy outcomes.  
These findings imply that trade policy preferences of industrial sectors and their 
organizational characteristics affecting collective lobbying do not fully explain the inter-
industry structure of trade protection. Due to distributive rents yielded by trade barriers, 
representative policymakers strategically direct protectionist measures toward particular 
industrial sectors that will enhance their chances of winning power as politically pivotal 




TABLE 3.1  Partisan Dominance of Industry and Industry-Level Tariffs on Total Imports, 1989-1998 
 
Dep. Variable = Tariff on the Value of Total Imports at the four-digit SIC  
 
(RE) (RE) (FE) (RE) (RE) (FE) 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Industry Comparative Disadvantage 0.031*** 0.031*** -0.028*** 0.036*** 0.037*** -0.032*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) 
Partisan Dominance of Industry -0.004 -0.005 -0.023** -0.003 0.002 -0.023**  
 
(0.009) (0.014) (0.012) (0.009) (0.014) (0.012) 
Partisan Dominance of Industry × ICD 
   
-0.111** -0.116** 0.071 
    
(0.044) (0.045) (0.060) 
Geographic Concentration 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.001 0.020*** 0.021*** 0.001 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) 
Firm Concentration -0.013** -0.013** -0.005 -0.013** -0.012* -0.005 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) 
Size -0.012 -0.012 0.04 -0.012 -0.012* 0.04 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.035) (0.007) (0.007) (0.035) 
Lagged Value of Tariff 0.695*** 0.695*** 0.306*** 0.693*** 0.693*** 0.306*** 
 









(0.015)                 
Constant 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.025*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.025*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
       R-squared 0.792 0.792 0.623 0.793 0.793 0.62 
Number of observations 3482 3482 3482 3482 3482 3482 






TABLE 3.2  Partisan Dominance of Industry and Industry-Level Tariffs on Dutiable Imports, 1989-1998 
 
Dep. Variable = Tariff on the Value of Dutiable Imports at the four-digit SIC  
 
(RE) (RE) (FE) (RE) (RE) (FE) 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Industry Comparative Disadvantage 0.028*** 0.028*** -0.077*** 0.040*** 0.039*** -0.071*** 
 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.014) 
Partisan Dominance of Industry -0.036* -0.086*** -0.057*** -0.035* -0.079*** -0.056*** 
 
(0.019) (0.029) (0.020) (0.019) (0.030) (0.020) 
Partisan Dominance of Industry × ICD    -0.220** -0.193* -0.137 
    (0.102) (0.103) (0.107) 
Geographic Concentration 0.007 0.008 -0.014 0.008 0.009 -0.014 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) 
Firm Concentration -0.019 -0.021 -0.017 -0.018 -0.02 -0.017 
 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) 
Size -0.045 -0.04 0.106* -0.046 -0.041 0.105*   
 
(0.029) (0.030) (0.060) (0.029) (0.029) (0.060) 
Lagged Value of Tariff 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.009*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.009*** 
 









(0.034)                 
Constant 0.057*** 0.055*** 0.057*** 0.056*** 0.055*** 0.057*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
       R-squared 0.148 0.152 0.11 0.159 0.159 0.103 
Number of observations 3379 3379 3379 3379 3379 3379 






TABLE 3.3  Partisan Dominance of Industry and Industry-Level Nontariff Barriers in the 1990s 
 
Dep. Variable = Nontariff Protection at the four-digit SIC codes 
 
NTB Coverage Ratio  NTB Frequency Ratio 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Industry Comparative Disadvantage (ICD) 0.057 0.266** 0.298**  0.008 0.184* 0.204*   
 
(0.096) (0.135) (0.139)  (0.077) (0.108) (0.112) 
Partisan Dominance of Industry 0.528 0.385 0.879  0.363 0.242 0.561 
 
(0.338) (0.343) (0.626)  (0.272) (0.276) (0.504) 
Partisan Dominance of Industry × ICD 
 
-4.069** -4.685**  
 
-3.430** -3.828**  
  
(1.844) (1.957)  
 
(1.484) (1.575) 
Geographic Concentration  0.23 0.357* 0.403*  0.385** 0.493*** 0.522*** 
 
(0.208) (0.214) (0.220)  (0.167) (0.172) (0.177) 
Firm Concentration  -0.149 -0.077 0.007  -0.111 -0.05 0.004 
 
(0.208) (0.209) (0.227)  (0.167) (0.169) (0.183) 
Size 0.32 0.313 0.285  0.121 0.115 0.097 
 
(0.232) (0.231) (0.232)  (0.187) (0.186) (0.187) 
Lagged Value of Tariff 3.281*** 3.146*** 3.093***  2.996*** 2.882*** 2.847*** 
 










Constant 0.039 0.034 0.039  0.011 0.007 0.01 
 
(0.027) (0.027) (0.028)  (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
 
   
 
   R-squared 0.25 0.261 0.263  0.301 0.312 0.313 
Number of observations 356 356 356  356 356 356 





TABLE 3.4  Industrial Location and the Marginal Effect of Industry Comparative Disadvantage on Tariff Protection 
 
Dep. Variable = Tariff Protection at the four-digit SIC codes 
 
Tariff on the Value of Total Imports 
 
Tariff on the Value of Dutiable Imports 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) 
Industry Comparative Disadvantage (ICD) 0.034*** 0.037*** 0.036*** 
 
0.031*** 0.034*** 0.032*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
 
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010) 






































































Geographical Concentration 0.021*** 0.020*** 0.018*** 
 
0.006 0.006 0.004 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Firm Concentration -0.013** -0.014** -0.013** 
 
-0.022 -0.022 -0.02 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Size -0.012 -0.011 -0.011 
 
-0.042 -0.043 -0.043 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
 
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
Lagged Industry-Level Tariff 0.694*** 0.694*** 0.693*** 
 
0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 
 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Constant 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
 
0.056*** 0.056*** 0.056*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
 
   
 
 
  R-squared 0.793 0.793 0.793 
 
0.172 0.168 0.161 
Number of Observations 3482 3482 3483 
 
3379 3379 3379 




TABLE 3.5  Industrial Location and the Marginal Effect of Industry Comparative Disadvantage on Nontariff Protection 
 
Dep. Variable = Nontariff Protection at the four-digit SIC codes 
 
NTB Coverage Ratio 
 
NTB Frequency Ratio 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) 
Industry Comparative Disadvantage (ICD) 0.189* 0.318** 0.380*** 
 
0.121 0.219** 0.302*** 
 
(0.114) (0.135) (0.138) 
 
(0.092) (0.109) (0.110) 






































































Firm Concentration -0.081 -0.087 0.066 
 
-0.063 -0.051 0.079 
 
(0.203) (0.206) (0.214) 
 
(0.163) (0.166) (0.172) 
Geographical Concentration 0.437** 0.465** 0.515*** 
 
0.543*** 0.594*** 0.623*** 
 
(0.214) (0.210) (0.197) 
 
(0.172) (0.169) (0.158) 
Size 0.298 0.298 0.26 
 
0.11 0.093 0.071 
 
(0.229) (0.231) (0.230) 
 
(0.184) (0.186) (0.184) 
Lagged Industry-Level Tariff 3.143*** 3.129*** 3.119*** 
 
2.874*** 2.866*** 2.846*** 
 
(0.390) (0.388) (0.385) 
 
(0.313) (0.313) (0.308) 
Constant 0.039 0.036 0.038 
 
0.009 0.01 0.01 
 
(0.027) (0.028) (0.027) 
 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
 
   
 
 
  R-squared 0.26 0.263 0.269 
 
0.313 0.313 0.326 
Number of Observations 356 356 356 
 
356 356 356 












Electoral Competition and the Allocation of Protectionist Rents: 
An Empirical Test of the Swing Voter Model 
 
 
1. Introduction  
How do elected representatives choose the recipients of trade protection among many 
domestic groups adversely affected by international competition? How do we explain the 
allocation of distributive rents generated from protectionist policies across the electorate?  
The existing literature on international trade commonly argues that trade policy 
outcomes are significantly influenced by the institutional features of domestic political 
systems. These studies begin with the assumption that liberal trade policies yield benefits 
for broad, national constituencies, whereas protectionist policies concentrate particular 
benefits on a specific set of domestic constituencies. Thus, the extent to which 
representative policymakers offer trade liberalization as public goods for the welfare of 
society as a whole is greatly influenced by domestic political institutions, which 
determine types of constituencies that policymakers target to maximize their chance of 
winning power. In this vein, a vast literature has demonstrated both theoretically and 
empirically that the levels of trade protection are explained by various dimensions of 
domestic political systems, such as regime types (Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff 
2002; McGillivray and Smith 2004; Milner and Kubota 2005), constitutional frameworks 
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(Lohmann and O’Halloran 1994; Nielson 2003), electoral institutions (Rogowski 1987; 
Mansfield and Bush 1995; Grossman and Helpman 2005; Goodhart 2008), party strength 
(Hankla 2006), and the number of institutional access points (Ehrlich 2007). With a few 
exceptions, however, institutional explanations of trade policy do not tell us much about 
the structure of trade protection, especially within-country variations in the amount of 
protectionist rents across the electorate. This is not only because existing studies restrict 
their attention to cross-national variations in the average level of protection (e.g. trade 
volumes, average tariff rates, import-duty coverage ratio, etc.), but also because they 
infer trade policy preferences of elected representatives from political institutions which 
are primarily defined at the national level. Some previous research systematically shows 
that the extent to which individual policymakers are protectionist is related to the size and 
policy preferences of their constituencies. Nevertheless, these studies focus their attention 
on congressional voting patterns on trade bills rather than trade policy outcomes (Bailey 
and Brady 1998; Hiscox 2002; Karol 2007; Ehrlich 2009).  
To fill this gap, this chapter explores the determinants of the structure of U.S. 
trade protection from 1989 through 2004. Using sectoral data on tariffs and nontariff 
barriers (NTBs) and district-level election outcomes, I argue that the political 
characteristics of domestic constituencies explain not only the allocation of protectionist 
rents across constituencies but also government responsiveness to protectionist pressures 
from domestic groups. I first match industry-level data on trade volumes and protectionist 
measures with geographical data on the distribution of industrial employment on the 
electoral map. In doing so, I build a set of indicators of voter demands for trade 
protection and the amount of protectionist rents aggregated at the level of congressional 
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districts. Then I investigate the extent to which the political characteristics of electoral 
constituencies (i.e. marginality and the strength of voter partisanship) affect district-level 
concentration of trade protection as well as the marginal effect of protectionist demands 
on trade policy outcomes.  
This chapter attempts to advance our understanding of the political economy of 
trade in three ways. First, it analyzes the effects of electoral competition on the structure 
of U.S. trade protection to clarify the causal mechanism by which representative 
policymakers choose particular constituencies to offer protectionist rents among different 
groups of voters. Previous research on endogenous protection commonly argues that 
within-country variation in the level of protection is mainly determined by interest group 
lobbying and campaign contributions. Although acknowledging the validity of their 
findings, this study pays attention to the fact that money does not fully explain the 
political incentives of elected officials in allocating distributive benefits across the 
electorate.  
Second, this chapter develops empirical tests of extant models of distributive 
politics in a previously unexplored context – trade politics. While the existing literature 
universally assumes that tariffs, subsidies, and other protectionist measures are typical 
examples of “tactical redistribution” that concentrate benefits on particular groups of 
voters, only few studies address these issues systematically and empirically (McGillivray 
1997, 2004).
18
 The present study extends the literature by analyzing the patterns of 
electoral targeting in U.S. trade policy over the past fifteen years. Unlike previous 
research, this chapter relies on multiple data sources: sectoral data on tariffs from 1989 
                                                     
18
 Most empirical studies of distributive politics concentrate on analyzing the allocation of public 
expenditures and intergovernmental transfers. While McGillivray’s work (1997, 2004) is one noteworthy 
exception, her empirical tests rely on cross-sectional observations in a single year.  
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through 2004 and NTBs from 1993, 1994, and 1996, and district-level outcomes for 
presidential, gubernatorial, and general elections from 1984 through 2002.  
Third, this chapter addresses the ongoing debate about extant models distributive 
politics. As will be discussed in more detail below, the existing literature offers two 
competing predictions about the allocation of protectionist rents across the electorate: the 
swing voter model put forward by Dixit and Londregan (1995, 1996) and the core-voter 
model proposed by Cox and McCubbins (1986). A long line of research has also offered 
mixed findings whether parties target swing or core voters. This chapter seeks to narrow 
this gap in the literature, by focusing on examining the validity of the swing voter model 
in U.S. trade politics. Assessing the relative merits of the core-voter model should be 
treated as a separated project, because it requires us to consider more detailed data on the 
distribution of voter partisanship at constituency level or to specify the political 
characteristics of domestic groups outside the context of electoral districts.
19
 Specifically, 
while the existing empirical research on distributive politics concentrates on clarifying 
the direct and independent effects of marginality and voter partisanship, I maintain that 
those political characteristics of voters also modify the relationship between constituent 
demands and policy outcomes. In doing so, I acknowledge the possibility that elected 
officials are more responsive to protectionist demands of constituencies which are more 
likely to increase their chances of winning office.  
The results of my analysis reveal several interesting patterns. First, the estimates 
for my models demonstrate that district competitiveness increases the extent to which 
sectoral tariff protection is targeted toward industries in each district. My findings show 
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 For instance, Cox (2010) maintains that multi-districts models are not often suitable to assess the merits 




that all other things being equal, the district-level of tariff protection is greater in districts 
having two equally sized groups of partisans rather than in districts showing stable, 
strong support for either the Republican or the Democratic Party. Second, I find that the 
political characteristics of electoral constituencies affect the marginal effects of 
protectionist pressures on the allocation of protectionist rents across the electorate. My 
results indicate that the extent to which constituent demands for protection actually raise 
the amount of protectionist rents is much higher in electorally competitive constituencies 
rather than in safe constituencies. These findings imply that even when domestic political 
institutions promote trade liberalization at the national level, elected representatives still 
have strong incentives to target protectionist rents to particular constituencies to optimize 
their electoral prospects. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 develops 
theoretical statements about electoral targeting in trade policies. Relying on the literature 
on standard trade models and distributive politics, this section generates a set of testable 
hypotheses explaining within-country variation in the allocation of protectionist rents. 
Section 3 provides a description of the required data and empirical approach. The main 
empirical findings and robustness tests are presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes 
with a discussion of my findings.   
 
2. Theory  
This section elaborates on the relationship between the political geography of industries 
and within-country variation in trade protection. I argue that the structure of trade 
protection is explained by two factors. First, the economic characteristics of electoral 
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constituencies explain their collective demands for trade protection, because trade 
liberalization has unequal distributive effects on domestic groups. Second, however, 
domestic protectionist pressures are not automatically translated into policy outcomes. 
Elected officials have strong incentives to target protectionist rents to specific 
constituencies that will enhance their chances for reelection. The political attributes of 
domestic constituencies presented in electoral competition, therefore, influence not only 
the allocation of protectionist rents across the electorate but also the effects of 
protectionist interests on trade policy outcomes.  
 
2.1. Constituent Demands for Trade Protection 
The literature on the political economy of trade proposes that domestic groups develop 
heterogeneous preferences over trade openness, according to their economic 
characteristics in the market (Alt and Gilligan 1994; Hiscox 2002). The expansion of 
international trade generates both winners and losers, because it affects the relative 
income of domestic groups within a country. Standard trade models suggest that two 
main variables determine trade policy preferences of domestic groups: factors of 
production (e.g. capital and labor) and the net trade positions of industries. 
First, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem maintains that when factors of production 
are completely mobile across industrial sectors, international trade increases returns to 
owners of relatively abundant factors of production, but decreases returns to owners of 
relatively scarce factors within an economy. Their prediction is based on the Heckscher-
Ohlin model which suggests that a country tends to export goods which intensively use 
its relatively abundant factors, and import goods which employ its relatively scarce 
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factors. As the expansion of international trade lowers the price of the imported goods but 
raises the price of exporting goods, owners of relatively scarce factors strongly support 
protectionist measures, whereas owners of relatively abundant factors prefer trade 
liberalization. Hence, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem implies that trade policy 
preferences of domestic interests are mainly shaped by types of factors of production that 
domestic groups own and a country’s factor endowment relative to other countries. For 
instance, labor in capital abundant countries is likely to oppose lowering existing trade 
barriers, whereas labor in labor abundant countries is more likely to support freer trade to 
have better access to international markets. In a similar vein, capital owners in capital 
abundant countries is expected to pursue trade liberalization, but those in labor abundant 
countries tend to demand more protectionist measures.  
In contrast, the Ricardo-Viner model starts with the assumption that at least one or 
more factors of production are not completely mobile across industrial sectors. When 
factors are specific to particular industries, they do not have good alternative uses in other 
types of production. Specifically, it is quite difficult to reallocate factors heavily used in 
import-competing sectors to export sectors because of declines in their asset values (Alt 
and Gilligan 1994). Based on a different assumption on the mobility of factors of 
production, the Ricardo-Viner model shows that trade policy preferences of domestic 
groups are explained by trade positions of industries rather than by factor types or relative 
factor endowments. Returns to specific factors depend on the economic prospects of 
industrial sectors in which they are employed. Thus, unlike the Stolper-Samuelson 
theorem, the Ricardo-Viner model predicts that capital and labor specific to import-
competing industries both shape strong collective demands for protectionist measures, 
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whereas capital and labor in exporting sectors strongly prefer trade liberalization. In 
particular, factors intensively used in declining industries are more likely to be 
protectionist than other groups, as their productivity is likely to fall continuously over 
time (Alt, Frieden, Gilligan, Rodrik, and Rogowski 1996).  
Theories of international trade offer demand-side explanations of within-country 
variation in the level of trade protection across domestic groups. The economic 
characteristics of domestic groups explain the ways in which protectionist interests exert 
political pressures on representative policymakers to secure more compensation through 
protectionist policies. Depending on the mobility of factors of production, the structure of 
domestic political cleavage on trade issues is formed along the line of broad, factor-based 
classes or around narrow particular interests of industrial sectors (Hiscox 2002). In the 
case of the United States, therefore, we can expect that collective demands for protection 
are politically organized by import-competing sectors rather than by export sectors, and 
by owners of relatively scarce factors (i.e. labor) rather than by owners of relatively 
abundant factors (i.e. capital), respectively, although their relative effects might vary over 
time.  
 
2.2. Electoral Targeting in Trade Policy 
The structure of domestic demands for protection, however, does not solely account for 
the allocation of protectionist rents across different groups of voters. Trade protection is a 
typical example of tactical redistribution by which politicians target distributive benefits 
to specific constituencies. Tariffs, subsidies, and other measures of protection for 
particular firms and industries are likely to concentrate distributive benefits on particular 
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sectors but spread out the costs of protection across the entire population.
20
 Hence, 
protectionist demands of domestic groups are not automatically translated into actual 
policy outcomes because some electoral constituencies are more politically pivotal than 
others. When representative policymakers choose the recipients for protectionist 
measures, they have substantial incentives to consider the political attributes of domestic 
constituencies because the redistribution of wealth caused by trade policies exerts 
significant influence on their chance of winning office.  
The literature on distributive politics and congressional representation allows us 
to understand the political process under which parties and legislators target distributive 
rents generated from protection to particular constituencies as an attempt to optimize their 
electoral prospects. Extant models of distributive politics mainly focus on the effects of 
the electoral incentives for political parties on the allocation of targetable benefits. These 
models commonly envision two parties which compete against each other in elections 
within a single district, promising transfers to different groups of voters. The allocation of 
benefits is contingent upon election outcomes because it is realized only when the 
relevant party wins the election. The swing voter model presented by Lindbeck and 
Weibull (1987) and Dixit and Londregan (1995) maintains that parties concentrate 
distributive benefits on marginal or swing voters since they are more willing to change 
their ideological preferences in response to the promise of distributive benefits. In a 
similar vein, Dixit and Londregan (1995) also argue that targetable resources tend to be 
directed to poor constituencies, which have higher marginal utility of economic benefits 
and thus more easily sell their votes to parties promising larger rewards.  
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 For more explanations of a typology of distributive politics, see Lowi (1979), Dixit and Londregan 
(1995), Cox (2010), and Stokes (2009). 
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In contrast, the core-voter model proposed by Cox and McCubbins (1986) 
emphasizes the advantage of core partisan constituencies in receiving distributive 
transfers. The core-voter model pays attention to the risk-averse nature of parties in 
allocating targetable resources. Parties are reluctant to concentrate distributive benefits on 
marginal or swing voters, since they are more likely to renege on their commitment to 
vote, once they receive the promised rewards from parties. Thus, it is more cost-efficient 
for parties to invest more in their loyal supporters rather than in marginal voters or 
opposition supporters, especially if one party is better than the other in delivering 
targetable resources to specific constituencies (Dixit and Londregan 1996) or if parties 
are more interested in mobilizing the political participation of their core partisan 
supporters rather than in changing political preferences of marginal voters (Cox 2010).  
While similar to extant models of distributive politics, the literature on 
congressional representation pays more attention to the relative effects of political parties 
and individual legislators on electoral targeting in the context of multi-districts models. 
Partisan models suggest that congressional parties, as strategic units, target distributive 
benefits to politically pivotal regions in order to win a majority party’s status in the 
legislature (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991; Cox and McCubbins 1993) or reward core 
supporters in their partisan strongholds (Levitt and Snyder 1995; Chen 2012). In contrast, 
non-partisan models maintain that the allocation of targetable resources is better 
explained by the incentives of legislators to maximize their chances for reelection. Unlike 
parties, individual legislators tend to be more responsive to narrow, particular demands 
from their geographic constituencies than those from broad, partisan constituencies. 
When congressional parties are not strong enough to control these personal vote-seeking 
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activities, the allocation of distributive benefits is more influenced by individual 
characteristics of representatives, such as congressional committee memberships and 
seniority. In many cases, however, it is difficult to identify the independent effect of 
legislator characteristics because most of them are also endogenous to the characteristics 
of geographic constituencies (Levitt and Poterba 1999). 
To integrate these different dimensions of distributive politics, Franzese and 
Nooruddin (2004) build the effective constituency model in which the representation of 
geographic and partisan constituencies is formulated as a continuum. The extent to which 
policymakers concentrate distributive benefits on partisan constituencies over geographic 
ones is determined by several dimensions of political institutions, such as party unity, 
ideological polarization, and electoral competitiveness.  
In a similar vein, McGillivray (1997, 2004) analyzes the interactive effects of 
electoral formula and party strength on the structure of trade protection. She maintains 
that in strong majoritarian systems, like Canada, a single party government protects 
industries in marginal districts to increase the chance of obtaining a legislative majority. 
In weak majoritarian systems, like the U.S., marginal districts are least likely to receive 
protectionist rents because senior, powerful legislators representing safe constituencies 
tend to form policy coalitions to protect industries in their own constituencies. 
McGillivray’s work, however, still raises the issue of generalizability. She does not 
directly clarify the effects of party strength, although emphasizing its modifying effects 
on the structure of trade protection. Rather her analysis focuses more on comparing the 
relationship between district marginality and the district-level concentration of protection 
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for a particular year in two countries, which she assumes are contrasting in terms of party 
strength.  
 
2.3. Testable Hypotheses 
The existing literature allows us to clarify demand-side and supply-side factors 
explaining the allocation of protectionist rents across different groups of voters. The 
economic attributes of domestic interests shape sectoral demands for protectionist 
measures. However, the structure of protectionist interests only partially explains 
redistribution achieved through trade policies. Representative policymakers have strong 
incentives to concentrate protectionist rents on particular constituencies that are critical to 
their electoral prospects. The geographical distribution of industrial employment across 
congressional districts informs politicians of the political characteristics of domestic 
constituencies on which they intend to concentrate protectionist rents. Based on our 
discussion so far, I formulate a set of testable hypotheses concerning the possible 
determinants of the structure of trade protection. As shown below, these hypotheses 
explain within-country variation in the amount of protectionist rents across congressional 
districts.  
 
H1: Protectionist rents are more likely to be targeted to districts in which the 
ratio of import-competing sectors over exporting sectors is relatively 
higher than others.  
H2: Protectionist rents are more likely to be concentrated on districts which 
have a relatively higher proportion of labor than others.  
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H3: The amount of protectionist rents is likely to be higher in competitive, 
marginal districts rather than in safe districts.  
H4: District competitiveness increases the marginal effect of protectionist 
demands on the amount of protectionist rents aggregated at the level of 
congressional districts.  
 
These hypotheses focus on evaluating the extent to which the economic and 
political characteristics of domestic constituencies independently and interactively 
influence the structure of protection within a country. Hypotheses 1 and 2 only consider 
the effect of protectionist demands from domestic constituencies on the allocation of 
protectionist rents across the electorate. As reviewed earlier, I assume that domestic 
protectionist pressures in the U.S. mainly come from import-competing sectors and 
owners of relatively scarce factors (i.e. labor). Hypotheses 3 and 4 are concerned with the 
effects of the political characteristics of domestic constituencies. I use the swing voter 
model as a baseline model in order to specify the political mechanism under which 
governing parties target compensation from protectionist measures to particular groups of 
voters. Hypothesis 3 maintains that constituency marginality exerts an independent 
influence on within-country variation in protection across electoral constituencies. 
Specifically, hypothesis 4 suggests that district competitiveness increases the extent to 
which domestic protectionist pressures actually raise the amount of protectionist rents. In 
doing so, I maintain that the electoral characteristics of domestic constituencies exert 
significant influence on the responsiveness of representative policymakers to 




3. Data and Variables 
This section describes the required data and models that explain the distribution of 
protectionist rents across the electorate. My empirical analysis relies on three data 
sources. The first is sectoral data on U.S. trade protection, including tariff rates for 407 
U.S. manufacturing industries at the four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 
codes from 1989 to1997 and 385 industries at the six-digit North American Industry 
Classification System (NAICS) codes from 1998 to 2004. I also consider NTBs for 356 
industries at the four-digit SIC codes for 1993, 1994, and 1996, because sectoral data on 
NTBs are only available for these years. The second set of data consists of district-level 
results for presidential, gubernatorial, and general elections held from 1984 to 2002. As 
explained in greater detail below, I generate various indicators of electoral competition to 
capture changes in the political characteristics of electoral constituencies.  
Third, to integrate industry-level data with district-level election results, I use the 
U.S. Census Bureau’s County Business Patterns (CBP) which provides information about 
industrial employment and establishment size at various levels of geographic units (e.g. 
country, state, nation, etc.). The CBP data allows us to convert industry-level data on 
trade volumes and protectionist measures into district-level indicators, since it reveals the 
relative share of industrial employment in sub-national economies. As the geographic 
unit of analysis in my models is a congressional district, I transform the CBP’s county-
level data on the composition of industrial employment to district-level outcomes, using 
the Missouri Census Data Center’s MABLE/Geocorr 2k geographic correspondence 
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engine, the U.S. Census Bureau’s Congressional District Geographic Relationship Tables, 
and Congressional District Atlas.  
 
3.1. Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable in my model is the average level of trade protection in a given 
congressional district i in year t. As the present study aims to examine whether the 
incumbent government targets distributive rents generated from trade protection to 
electorally safe or marginal constituencies, we need to construct a comparable measure of 
trade protection across congressional districts. As in Conybeare (1984) and McGillivray 
(1997, 2004), I define the district-level of protection as the degree to which industries in 
district i are protected through tariff or nontariff measures, respectively, or more 
generally, the extent to which protectionist rents are concentrated at the level of 
congressional districts. As presented in equation (1) below, I generate the district-level of 
protection, considering sectoral data on trade barriers, and the composition of industrial 
employment in each congressional district. 
 
District-level Protectionit =    
 
                                       
    (1)                                                                             
 
Here, tk denotes tariff or nontariff protection for industry k located in district i. 
Under the assumption that there are n industries in district i, Ek,i and Ei each represents the 
number of employees for industry k in district i and the total number of employees in 
district i, respectively. Hence equation (1) calculates the district-level of protection as the 
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weighted sum of protection for n industries located in district i, with the weight given by 
the relative importance of industry k to district i’s employment.  
For tk, I consider an ad valorem tariff rate and an NTB coverage ratio for industry 
k, respectively. First, I calculate the ad valorem tariff tk by dividing the value of collected 
duties by the custom value of total imports for industry k. Existing studies measure ad 
valorem tariffs as collected duties either as a percentage of the value of total imports or as 
a percentage of the value of dutiable imports, respectively (Irwin 1994; O’Halloran 1994; 
Hiscox 1999). The value of the former is always smaller than the latter’s value, since 
total imports are always larger than dutiable imports. While the gap between these two 
measures is not constant over time, I mainly focus on ad valorem tariffs on total imports. 
Tariffs based on the value of dutiable imports tend to overestimate the level of protection, 
especially when there are more commodities receiving duty-free treatment.  
Sectoral tariff rates are generated from the SIC87- and NAICS-level U.S. import 
and export data by Peter K. Schott (2008). Based on the Foreign Trade data by the U.S. 
Census Bureau, Schott offers collected duties and the total amount of imports of all 
manufacturing industries both at the four-digit SIC and at the six-digit NAICS codes for 
the entire period of investigation.
21
 To generate the district-level tariff protection, I 
calculate ad valorem tariffs (=tk) for 407 industries at the four-digit SIC codes from 1989 
to1997, and for 385 industries at the six-digit NAICS codes from 1998 to 2004, following 
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 The data are downloadable from Schott's International Economics Resource Page: Trade Data and 
Concordances at http://faculty.som.yale.edu/peterschott/sub_international.htm 
22
 In 1997, U.S. Federal Statistical Agencies replaced the SIC codes with the NAICS in most industry-level 
data, as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) went into effect. Converting the CBP data on 
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I also separately consider industry k’s NTB coverage ratio, as the literature 
suggests that legislators exercise more discretion over the creation of nontariff protection 
(Gawande and Bandyopadhyay 2000; Hauk 2011). Due to data limitation, I measure NTB 
coverage ratios in 1993, 1994, and 1996 at the level of four-digit SIC codes. Sectoral data 
on NTBs are obtained from Kono (2006), which are originally collected from the Trade 
Analysis and Information System (TRAINS) by the United Nations Commission on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD).
23
 Kono’s data present the existence of NTBs (i.e. 
price, quantity, quality, threat, and advance payment) as a dummy variable for industries 
at the six-digit Harmonized Systems (HS). Using Pierce and Schott’s (2009) concordance 
between HS and SIC codes, I measure the extent to which the amount of imports of four-
digit SIC industries are subjected to nontariff measures mentioned above. As suggested in 
Trefler (1993), equation (2) below shows that industry k’s NTB coverage ratio is 
equivalent to the weighted sum of a binary indicator of NTB protection for a six-digit HS 
sector h (= mh) within a four-digit SIC industry k, with a weight given by sector h’s 
relative share of imports within industry k.  
 
NTB coverage ratios tk =       
 
     
 (2) 
 
To measure the extent to which sectoral tariff and nontariff protection are directed 
toward industries in a given district, we need to consider the relative importance of 
                                                                                                                                                              
industrial employment from SIC to NAICS codes will generate a significant bias in the estimates of the 
district-level of protection since the relationship between SIC and NAICS industries are not one-to-one for 
all manufacturing industries. 
23
 Kono uses Jon Haveman’s extracts from TRAINS versions 2-8. 
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industry k (=Ek,i/Ei) in each district’s economy. Geographical information about the 
distribution of industrial employment is collected from the CBP which provides sub-
national data on employment and payrolls by SIC industries from 1989 to1997 and by 
NAICs industries from 1998 to 2004.
24
 It should be noted that there are some issues in 
the use of the CBP data. For some industries, the CBP’s county-level data do not offer the 
exact number of employees but abbreviations representing the intervals of employment 
size, due to the confidentiality rights of employees. In these cases, I continually narrow 
down the size of employment intervals as much as possible, using establishment group 
categories and the hierarchical structure of geographic units and industrial classification 
codes in the CBP data.
25
 Then, as in McGillivray (1997, 2004), I replaced the missing 
values in employment with the mid-points of intervals that I refined.  
Another issue arises from the fact that the basic geographical unit in the CBP is a 
county, not a congressional district. To convert the CBP data on industrial employment 
from county-level to district-level outcomes, I employ the Missouri Census Data Center’s 
Mable/Geocorr2k geographic correspondence engine which offers historical information 
about the geographical relationship between county and congressional districts from the 
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 As supplementary sources, I also use the U.S. Census 
Bureau’s Congressional District Geographic Relationship Tables and Congressional 
District Atlas to reflect redistricting and corresponding changes in the subdivision of 
congressional districts. Since each congressional district usually consists of multiple 
counties in most cases, we can easily generate the industrial composition of employment 
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 Minor differences in the SIC codes between the CBP data and Schott’s trade data were adjusted.  
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 See Isserman and Westervelt (2006) for geographical-level hierarchies and industry-level hierarchies in 
the County Business Patterns. 
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at the district level by adding the size of employment for each industry across counties 
but within a corresponding district. If a county is divided into more than two 
congressional districts, however, I disaggregate county-level data on industrial 
employment into district-level outcomes, based on the relative share of county’s 
population in each congressional district available in Mable/Geocorr2k files. 
 
3.2. Independent Variables 
To test the aforementioned hypotheses, I generate a set of independent variables that 
would explain within-country variation in the amount of protection across electoral 
districts. My independent variables include constituent demands for protection, the 
political characteristics of constituencies, and interactive terms between them.  
First, my model includes a series of economic variables that explain collective 
demands for compensation through protectionist policies at the district level. These 
variables indicate the strength of protectionist pressures from various sources. First, I 
generate a variable District Comparative Disadvantage to consider constituent demands 
for protection generated by industrial sectors. District Comparative Disadvantage 
represents the extent to which voters in district i rely on import-competing industries 
rather than on exporting industries. More specifically, it denotes the difference between 
import-penetration and export dependence at the level of congressional districts. 
Following Busch and Reinhardt (2000), I first measure industry-level comparative 
disadvantage by subtracting import penetration from export dependence for each industry. 
Import penetration, as the ratio of imports to the sum of imports and domestic shipments, 
indicates the extent to which industries are threatened by the flow of imports. Similarly, 
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export dependence is measured as the ratio of exports over the sum of exports and 
domestic shipments, presenting industry’s policy demands for access to international 
markets. District Comparative Disadvantage is then measured as the total sum of 
industry-level comparative disadvantage for n industries located in district i, with each of 
them weighted by its share of employment within district, as equation (3) shows below.  
 
District Comparative Disadvantage  
                                                   
 
     
  (3) 
 
Trade liberalization significantly reduces relative returns to employees in import-
competing sectors, by lowering the price of import-competing goods but raising the price 
of exported goods in the domestic market. Thus we can expect that District Comparative 
Disadvantage would have a positive and significant association with the amount of 
protectionist rents aggregated at the district-level. The greater the relative number of 
workers employed in import-competing sectors, the stronger the constituent demands for 
protectionist measures and regulations, and the higher the district-level of protectionist 
rents yielded from tariffs and NTBs.  
As discussed earlier, constituent demands for trade protection could be generated 
not only from import-competing industries but also from owners of relatively scarce 
factors of production (Mayer 1984; Alt and Gilligan 1994; Hiscox 2002). In the case of 
the U.S., this means that low-skilled labor strongly prefers higher levels of protection, 
whereas capital owners are more supportive of freer trade. To control for the effect of 
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factors of production, I include Labor and No High School Degree to my model. As in 
Hiscox (2002), Labor indicates the relative proportion of manufacturing workers over 
total employees in district i. Similarly, No High School Degree represents the relative 
share of population over 25 years old without a high school degree over district i’s total 
employment. If low-skilled workers have more protectionist demands than other 
domestic interests, and if elected representatives are more responsive to protectionist 
pressures from these groups, both Labor and No High School Degree should also be 
positively associated with district-level trade protection.  
I also consider District-Level Unemployment to control for protectionist pressures 
yielded by macroeconomic fluctuations. It is frequently argued that unemployment is one 
of the most important sources of domestic demands for trade protection. High levels of 
unemployment increase protectionist pressures from domestic constituencies because 
increasing import flows make it difficult for dislocated workers to find alternative jobs 
and reduce their relative wages (Mansfield and Busch 1995). Moreover, elected 
representatives could be more responsive to protectionist demands during economic 
downturns, during which the tendency of voters to cast their votes on the basis of 
personal economic circumstances is more prevalent than ever (Abramowitz, Lanoue and 
Ramesh 1988). All these economic variables reveal the strength of protectionist demands 
at the district level. If elected representatives are responsive to constituent demands for 
protection, therefore, their coefficients should be all positively signed and significant.
27
  
Second and more importantly, I consider the political characteristics of electoral 
constituencies that would affect the electoral incentives of representative policymakers in 
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District-level data on unemployment rates and education are constructed from county-level data from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (http://www.bls.gov/lau/) and the Annual Educational Attainment Estimates for 
U.S. Counties 1990-2005 from Bode (2010), respectively.  
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allocating targetable resources. As an indicator of constituency marginality or district 
competitiveness, I create a variable Partisan Dominance representing the strength of 
voter’s ideological commitment to either the Republican or the Democratic Party at the 
district level. Relying on the literature on congressional representation, I generate 
Partisan Dominance by measuring the deviation of the proportion of the two-party vote 
in the district from the average share of the two-party vote in the entire nation in the most 
recent presidential election. The greater the difference in the presidential vote shares 
between the district-level and the national-level, the stronger the partisan bias of districts, 
and the lower the degree of political competition. Previous research commonly argues 
that presidential electoral returns are one of the most reliable and valid proxies for voters’ 
partisan preferences (Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart 2001; Canes-Wrone, Brady and 
Cogan 2002; Abramowitz et al. 2006; Griffin 2006). District-level presidential vote 
shares not only reflect constituent behavior in electoral competition, but also are highly 
correlated with congressional election outcomes over time (Levendusky, Pope, and 
Jackman 2008). Elected officials also pay significant attention to voting patterns in 
presidential elections, in order to gauge the ideological disposition of voters and the 
degree of electoral competitiveness in their geographic constituencies (Griffin 2006). 
Following previous studies, I calculate Partisan Dominance as the absolute value 
of a district’s proportion of the two-party vote normalized around its national mean.
28
 For 
instance, think about districts A, B, and C in which the share of two-party vote for Bill 
Clinton were 0.53, 0.73, and 0.33 in the 1992 presidential election, respectively. Since the 
national mean of the two-party vote share for Bill Clinton and George W. Bush were 0.53 
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 Data on presidential electoral returns are collected from the Almanac of American Politics from 1984 




and 0.47, respectively, district liberalism (conservatism) for A, B, and C would be 0, 
+0.2(-0.2), and -0.2(+0.2) in my coding scheme. This implies that district B is more 
Democratic or liberal than the national average by 20 percentage points, and similarly, 
district C is also more Republican or conservative than the entire nation by 20 percentage 
points. The value of Partisan Dominance is therefore coded as 0 for A and +0.2 for both 
B and C, such that the degree of voter partisanship for the latter is equally higher than the 
former.  
Additionally, my model includes a set of political variables that might influence 
the political representation of protectionist demands in setting trade policies. As 
mentioned above, non-partisan models of distributive politics suggest that individual 
legislators have electoral incentives to accrue more targetable resources to their own 
geographical constituencies to increase their chances of reelection. If party leaders do not 
control those incentives, legislator characteristics would exert significant influence on the 
amount of rents that districts receive from protectionist measures, especially NTBs. I 
consider two factors which might be associated with the allocation of protectionist rents 
across electoral constituencies: seniority rank and congressional committee memberships.  
Senior representatives might be able to concentrate more protectionist rents on 
industries in their own geographical constituencies, because they are in a better position 
to form a majority coalition for protectionist bills than junior representatives 
(McGillivray 1997). Similarly, members of congressional committees that exercise more 
discretion over trade issues might be more likely to target protection to their geographical 
constituencies than other representatives (Levitt and Poterba 1999). Following previous 
studies, I define Seniority as the natural log of the number of years served since the 
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legislator was first elected. Ways and Means Committee and Committee on Foreign 
Affairs are dummy variables which take a value of 1, if a legislator in district i is 
appointed to these committees. Data on seniority and congressional committee 
assignments were collected from Stewart and Woon (2005).
29
 The Number of Districts 
per State variable is also included to control for the effect of legislative 
malapportionment in the U.S. Senate on trade policies. Every state has two senators 
regardless of its population size. Thus import-competing industries located in less 
populated states could have a better chance of receiving protection, because their 
demands for protectionist measures are more likely to be over-represented in the 
legislature than those located in populated states (Baldwin 1985; McGillivray 1997; Hauk 
2011).  
Last, I also include the dependent variables lagged five years and dummy 
variables for presidential and general elections in some specifications of the model 
explaining the district-level of tariff protection. While using shorter lags does not 
significantly affect my findings, it overwhelms the effects of the main independent 
variables without having a true causal effect (Achen 2001). For the district-level of 
nontariff protection, however, I include the one year-lagged value of tariff protection. 
Tariffs might increase or lower the level of NTBs because their relationship could be 
either substitute or complementary (Kono 2006).  
The district-level model in equation (4) below presents the political and economic 
determinants of the allocation of protectionist rents across electoral constituencies. Here 
the amount of trade protection targeted to industries in district i is presented as a function 
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of constituent demands for protectionist measures and their political characteristics 
revealed in electoral competition.  
 
District-Level Protectionit  
= β0 + β1 District Comparative Disadvantageit-1 + β2 Partisan Dominanceit-1  
+ β3 District Comparative Disadvantageit-1× Partisan Dominanceit-1  
+ β4 Seniorityit-1 + β5 Ways and Means Committeeit-1  
+ β6 Committee on Foreign Affairsit-1 + β7 Labor it-1  
+ β8 No High School Degree it-1 + β9 District Unemploymentit-1  
+ β10 Number of Districts per Stateit-1 + εi  
    (4)     
 
∂District-Level Protection /∂District Comparative Disadvantage  
= β1 + β3 Partisan Dominance 
    (5)     
 
Like McGillivray’s work (1997, 2004), my model attempts to clarify the political 
determinants of the allocation of protectionist rents across 435 congressional districts. 
Unlike McGillivray, however, my model focuses more on examining the extent to which 
protectionist demands and the marginality of electoral constituencies independently and 
interactively influence the district-level of tariff or nontariff protection. Specifically, a 
multiplicative interaction term in equation (4) allows us to estimate the extent to which 
the political attributes of districts modify the relationship between constituent demands 
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for protection and the amount of protectionist rents aggregated at the district level. By 
taking the derivative of equation (4) with respect to District Comparative Disadvantage, 
we obtain equation (5) in which the marginal effect of District Comparative 
Disadvantage depends on the degree of Partisan Dominance in district i. If district 
competitiveness amplifies the effects of District Comparative Disadvantage on the 
dependent variable, the coefficient on Partisan Dominance (= β3) should be negatively 
signed and significant.  
 
4. Empirical Results 
Tables 4.1-4.3 report the results of equation (4) which predicts the district-level 
protection from a set of lagged political and economic characteristics of congressional 
districts. The regression results in Table 4.1 display the extent to which district 
marginality and protectionist demands exert independent influences on the district-level 
tariff protection from 1989 to 2004. Using the same dataset, Table 4.2 examines the 
degree to which electoral competitiveness affects the relationship between protectionist 
demands and the district level of tariff protection. Similarly, Table 4.3 presents the 
interactive effects of constituent demands for protection and district marginality on the 
district-level protection generated from NTBs in the 1990s.  
Before discussing the effects of marginality on the allocation of protectionist rents 
across the electorate, let us first consider the relationship between trade policy 
preferences of voters and the district-level of tariff protection. The results presented in 
Tables 1-3 commonly demonstrate that constituent demands for trade protection are 
important factors explaining within-country variation in the level of protection across 
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electoral constituencies. Most economic variables capturing the strength of protectionist 
pressures from various sources have positive and statistically significant relationships 
with the district-level of trade protection.  
In Tables 4.1-4.3, the estimated coefficients for District Comparative 
Disadvantage are consistently positive and significant across different specifications of 
the model. Since it is measured as the weighted sum of the difference between import 
penetration and export dependence of industries located in a given district, high positive 
values of District Comparative Disadvantage indicate that district economy relies more 
on import-competing sectors rather than exporting industries. The positive significant 
coefficients for District Comparative Disadvantage, therefore, demonstrate the higher the 
relative importance of import-competing sectors over exporting sectors in district 
economy, the stronger voters’ demands for protectionist measures and the greater the 
district-level of tariff and NTB protection. This finding supports the implication of the 
Ricardo-Viner model that domestic groups form different preferences over trade 
openness along the line of industrial sectors, especially when their income is closely tied 
to the fortunes of industries in which they are employed (Hiscox 2002).  
My findings also demonstrate that types of factors of production explain the 
strength of constituent demands for protection as well as their influence on policy 
outcomes. Since the U.S. is relatively poorly endowed with labor compared to its trading 
partners, we can expect that both manufacturing workers and low-skilled labor generate 
collective demands for protectionist measures. The results in Tables 4.1-4.3 offer strong 
evidence that owners of relatively scarce factors in the U.S. tend to support protection, 
whereas owners of relatively abundant factors more favor free trade (Rogowski 1989; 
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Hiscox 2002). The Labor variable has a positive and significant association with the 
district level of tariff and nontariff protection, and its effects remain robust across 
different specifications. This finding implies that all other things being equal, the higher 
the relative proportion of manufacturing employment in districts, the greater the amount 
of protectionist rents that districts receive from tariffs and NTBs, respectively.  
In a related vein, Tables 4.1-4.2 show that levels of education exert significant 
influence on the allocation of protectionist rents across districts. The positive and 
significant coefficients for No High School Degree indicate that an increase in the ratio of 
low-skilled labor is likely to raise the district-level of tariff protection. The impact of 
educational attainment is not, however, as consistent as the effects of protectionist 
demands from import-competing sectors or labor. The positive coefficient for No High 
School Degree loses its statistical significance, if we include the lagged district-level of 
tariff protection. Additionally, Tables 4.1 and 4.2 present the effects of the 
unemployment rate as another source of protectionist demands. The positive and 
significant coefficients for District-Unemployment support the earlier literature arguing 
that widespread unemployment tends to increase domestic pressures for protectionist 
policies (Bergsten and Cline 1983; Mansfield and Busch 1995).  
Let us now examine the relationship between the political characteristics of 
districts and the allocation of protectionist rents across districts presented in each table. 
Here we focus on the extent to which electoral competitiveness influences the allocation 
of protectionist rents across districts and the degree to which competitiveness modifies 




First and foremost, the results in Table 4.1 provide convincing evidence that tariff 
protection is more likely to be directed toward politically competitive districts containing 
more political moderates and independents rather than safe districts. Columns 1-3 
demonstrate that Partisan Dominance consistently has a significant negative association 
with the district-level of tariff protection. As explained earlier, large positive values of 
Partisan Dominance represent strong partisan support for either the Republican or the 
Democratic Party at the district-level. If the value of Partisan Dominance becomes zero, 
it indicates the highest level of electoral competitiveness because the district has two 
equally sized groups of partisans. The negative and significant coefficient for Partisan 
Dominance, therefore, suggests that all other things being equal, protectionist rents 
generated from tariff barriers are more likely to be concentrated on electorally 
competitive districts rather than on safe ones. In column 3, for instance, the coefficient 
estimate for Partisan Dominance (= -0.318) shows that a one standard deviation increase 
in Partisan Dominance reduces the district-level of tariff protection by about 0.026 
percentage points. It also implies that if the value of Partisan Dominance changes from 
zero to 0.492, that is, if we move from the most competitive district to the district 
showing the strongest partisan support for either of two parties in my dataset, the district-




[Insert Table 4.1 here] 
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 These districts voted about 0.492 percentage points more Republican or more Democratic than the 
national average in the most recent presidential election for the period of investigation. 
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Table 4.1 also considers a set of variables that might affect the political 
representation of constituent demands for trade protection. In columns 2 and 3, I examine 
the effect of seniority rank and congressional committee membership, respectively, 
assuming that each variable might exert an independent influence on the district-level of 
protection. Senior members might be able to accrue more rents to their constituencies 
without being appointed to influential committees. Similarly, junior members serving as 
committee members might concentrate more distributive benefits on their own 
constituencies (Levitt and Poterba 1999). Columns 2 and 3 each show that the 
coefficients for Seniority and Ways and Means Committee are positive and statistically 
significant. These finding suggest that trade protection tends to be directed toward 
districts represented by senior legislators or by members of the Ways and Means 
Committee. If we include the lagged dependent variable into our model, however, the 
effects of seniority and committee membership do not remain robust. In columns 4 and 5, 
the relationship between Seniority and the district-level of tariff protection turns negative 
and statistically significant, whereas the positive coefficient for Ways and Means 
Committee does not retain its statistical significance.  
On the other hand, Table 4.1 demonstrates that the estimated coefficients for 
Number of Districts in State remain consistently negative and significant. The negative 
relationship between the number of congressional districts in state and the district-level of 
protection supports the argument that legislative malapportionment in the U.S. Senate 
tends to favor industries located in smaller constituencies. Constituent demands for 
protection are more likely to be politically represented when they come from less-
populated states than populated ones (Baldwin 1985; Hauk 2011).  
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The results of district-level analysis have so far shown that the political and 
economic attributes of electoral constituencies both exert a significant and independent 
influence on the distribution of tariff protection across congressional districts. In Table 
4.2, I include a multiplicative interaction term between Partisan Dominance and District 
Comparative Disadvantage to examine government responsiveness to domestic 
protectionist interests. In doing so, I assume that the extent to which constituent demands 
for protection actually increase the district-level of tariff protection is conditioned by the 
degree of Partisan Dominance in each district. 
 
[Insert Table 4.2 here] 
 
Unlike Table 4.1, Table 4.2 shows that Partisan Dominance does not maintain a 
negative, significant relationship with the district-level of tariff protection, as we include 
an interaction term Partisan Dominance × District Comparative Disadvantage as a 
regressor. The first two columns indicate that the Partisan Dominance variable does not 
exert significant influence on the district-level of tariff protection, whereas columns 3-5 
rather suggest that there exists a positive and significant relationship between them.  
More importantly, however, the results in Table 4.2 clearly demonstrate that 
Partisan Dominance weakens the relationship between protectionist demands and the 
district level of tariff protection. In all columns of Table 4.2, the effect of District 
Comparative Disadvantage is consistently positive and significant, and the coefficients 
for the interaction term Partisan Dominance × District Comparative Disadvantage 
remain consistently negative and significant across different specifications. In my dataset, 
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Partisan Dominance takes large positive values, as the level of district competitiveness 
decreases and as district partisanship for one party over the other increases. Thus these 
findings strongly suggest that the extent to which District Comparative Disadvantage 
increases the district level of tariff protection is maximized when Partisan Dominance 
takes a zero value, that is, when the district shows the highest level of electoral 
competitiveness. In column 1, for instance, the coefficients on District Comparative 
Disadvantage and its interaction term with Partisan Dominance are 0.185 and -0.668, 
respectively. These results indicate that if the value of Partisan Dominance in a given 
district increases from zero to its maximum (= 0.492), the marginal effect of District 
Comparative Disadvantage on the dependent variable declines from 0.185 to -0.09. The 
remaining columns of Table 4.2 similarly provide clear and consistent evidence that 
Partisan Dominance decreases the marginal effect of protectionist demands from import 
competing sectors on the district-level of tariff protection. The negative coefficients for 
the interaction term Partisan Dominance × District Comparative Disadvantage remain 
constantly significant, regardless of the ways in which I control for the effects of other 
political variables and the lagged dependent variables.  
Table 4.2 also provides some evidence that Partisan Dominance constrains the 
effects of protectionist demands from manufacturing workers. As discussed above, my 
findings show that constituent demands for protection are generated not only from 
import-competing sectors but also from owners of relatively scarce factors (i.e. labor). In 
this vein, I also estimate the extent to which Partisan Dominance modifies the 
relationship between Labor and the district level of tariff protection. Column 3 of Table 
4.2 shows that the coefficient for a multiplicative interaction term Partisan Dominance × 
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Labor is -0.034 and statistically significant. This result suggests that the marginal effect 
of Labor on the district level of tariff protection declines from 0.036 to 0.019, as the 
value of Partisan Dominance changes from 0 to 0.492.  
Table 4.3 reports estimation results for the district-level of nontariff protection. 
Here, the dependent variable is the extent to which sectoral NTBs are directed toward the 
4-digit SIC industries located at the level of congressional districts in the 1990s. While 
data on NTBs are only available for 1993, 1994, and 1996, the value of Partisan 
Dominance does not vary significantly, because it is generated from the two-party vote 
share in the 1992 presidential election.
31
 To estimate the effects of district 
competitiveness and protectionist demands on the distribution of nontariff protection 
across the electorate, I generate purely cross-sectional data by taking the average of each 
variable presented in equation (4) for corresponding years. However, my analysis in 
Table 4.3 does not include congressional committee memberships and election years, as 
they are previously defined as dummy variables.    
 
 [Insert Table 4.3 here] 
 
The results in Table 4.3 indicate that the coefficients for District Comparative 
Disadvantage and Labor are all positive and significant. This finding implies that 
protectionist demands from import-competing sectors and low-skilled workers are 
important factors explaining the allocation of nontariff protection across electoral 
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 District vote shares for the 1992 presidential election are not completely identical across all three years. 
Although the reapportionment and delineation of congressional districts for the 103
rd
 Congress (1993-1994) 
were supposed to remain in effect until the 108
th
 Congress, there were several cases of state-initiative and 






 Congresses, respectively. For the 104
th
 Congress 
(1995-1996), redistricting occurred in Georgia, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, South Carolina, and Virginia. 
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constituencies. Nevertheless, contrary to my expectations, the relationship between 
unemployment rate and the district level of tariff protection again turns negative and 
significant.   
Although not as consistent as the main findings in previous tables, Table 4.3 
offers some evidence that marginality voter status exerts significant influence on the 
relationship between constituent demands for protection and the district-level of nontariff 
protection. In columns 3 and 4, the coefficients for the interaction term between Partisan 
Dominance and District Comparative Disadvantage are negatively signed but 
insignificant. The findings in columns 5 and 6, however, show that the multiplicative 
interaction term Partisan Dominance × District Comparative Disadvantage has a 
significant negative coefficient, if the interaction term between Partisan Dominance and 
Labor is included in my model. These results demonstrate that the marginal effect of 
protectionist demands from import-competing sectors on the district-level NTB 
protection is greater for electorally marginal constituencies rather than for safe 
constituencies.  
In column 5, for instance, the coefficient on the interaction term Partisan 
Dominance × District Comparative Disadvantage (= -2.018) indicates that the marginal 
effect of District Comparative Disadvantage on the district-level nontariff protection 
drops from 0.677 to -0.054 points, as the value of Partisan Dominance moves from its 
minimum (= 0.0002) to maximum (= 0.362) for the period of investigation. Similarly, 
column 6 shows that the same change in Partisan Dominance reduces the marginal effect 
of District Comparative Disadvantage from 0.677 to -0.053 points. These findings 
strongly suggest that protectionist pressures from domestic constituencies do not generate 
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an increase in NTB protection, if their electoral safeness exceeds a certain threshold. In 
columns 5 and 6, the sign of the marginal effect of District Comparative Disadvantage 
turns negative, once the value of Partisan Dominance hits 0.335 and 0.336, respectively.   
 
Robustness Tests 
To further test the robustness of my findings, I re-estimate equation (4), using different 
measures of political competitiveness. Although reflecting the effects of complete or 
partial redistricting that occurred for the period of investigation, the Partisan Dominance 
variable is based on district-level presidential electoral returns measured every four years. 
For robustness tests, therefore, I generate alternative indicators of district competitiveness 
by considering other types of elections in different time frames. I measure the average 
proportion of the two-party vote that Democratic candidates received in presidential, 
Senate, and gubernatorial elections held over the past four years. Then I calculate the 
difference between the average Democratic share of the vote and 50% and call it 
Closeness to 50-50, as suggested by Ansolabehere and Snyder (2006). For instance, the 
district-level tariff protection in 1990 in my dataset is matched with Closeness to 50-50, 
which is generated from the average of the two-party vote share that Democratic 
candidates received in races from 1986 through 1988.  
Following McGillivray (1997), I also consider House Marginality which is the 
absolute difference between the two-party vote share for Democratic candidates and 50% 
in the most recent House election.
32
 Like Partisan Dominance, both Closeness to 50-50 
and House Marginality are coded such that large positive values indicate strong partisan 
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 The absolute value of House Marginality is equivalent to one-half of the absolute difference in the 
Democratic and Republican share of the two-party vote. 
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support for Republican or Democrat. If the values of Closeness to 50-50 and House 
Marginality are closer to zero, it means that voter partisanship is almost evenly divided 
between the Democratic and the Republican parties and that district might contain more 
swing and independent voters who are less ideologically attached to parties. 
Tables 4.4 and 4.5 present the effects of alternative indicators of electoral 
marginality on the district-level of tariff and nontariff protection, respectively. My 
findings in these tables demonstrate that politically competitive districts are more likely 
to receive higher levels of tariff protection than safe districts and that district 
competitiveness tends to amplify the marginal effect of protectionist rents on the actual 
amount of tariff and nontariff protection aggregated to the district-level.  
In Table 4.4, the negative and significant coefficients for Closeness to 50-50 and 
House Marginality indicate that the amount of tariff protection would be higher in 
districts in which there are two equally sized groups of partisans than in districts showing 
strong support for one party over the other. In column 1 of Table 4.4, for instance, the 
effect of Closeness to 50-50 is negative and significant, while it does not retain its 
statistical significance across different specifications. Since the value of Closeness to 50-
50 ranges from 0 to 0.345 in my data, the estimated coefficient for Closeness to 50-50 (= 
-0.222) indicates that the amount of tariff protection targeted to the most competitive 
districts is greater than the amount of tariff protection concentrated on the safest districts 
by about 0.077 percentage points. Columns 4 and 5 also show that the coefficient 
estimates for House Marginality are -0.145 and -0.082, respectively. This finding 
suggests that a one standard deviation increase in House Marginality (= 0.092) decreases 
the district-level of tariff protection by about 0.013 and 0.007 percentage points, 
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respectively. Similarly, moving the value of House Marginality from zero to its 
maximum (= 0.471) in these columns again reduces the district-level tariff protection by 
0.068 and 0.039 percentage points, respectively. These findings run contrary to 
McGillivray’s earlier finding that marginal House districts in the U.S. are least likely to 
receive favorable levels of protection, because of weak party discipline. 
 
[Insert Table 4.4 here] 
 
Table 4.4 also provides clear evidence that governing parties are more responsive 
to protectionist demands from politically competitive districts rather than those from safe 
districts. In columns 2 and 3, the coefficients for Closeness to 50-50 × District 
Comparative Disadvantage are -0.395 and -0.192, respectively. Since high positive 
values in Closeness to 50-50 represent that districts are more electorally safe or partisan 
than other districts, the significant negative coefficients for these multiplicative 
interaction terms imply that district competitiveness increases the extent to which 
protectionist pressures from import-competing sectors raise the district level of tariff 
protection. For instance, column 2 shows that as the value of Closeness to 50-50 changes 
from 0 to 0.345, the marginal effect of District Comparative Disadvantage on the 
district-level of tariff protection drops from 0.165 0.029.  Column 3 similarly 
demonstrates that the same change in Closeness to 50-50 reduces the marginal effect of 
District Comparative Disadvantage and Labor on the dependent variable from 0.033 to -
0.033 and from 0.009 to 0.005, respectively. The results in Table 4.4 also suggest that 
House Marginality modifies the relationship between constituent demands for protection 
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and the district-level of tariff protection. In column 6, the coefficients for multiplicative 
interaction terms imply that the marginal effect of District Comparative Disadvantage 
and Labor decreases from 0.04 to -0.021 and from 0.01 to 0.005, respectively, as House 
Marginality increases from 0 to 0.471.  
Table 4.5 investigates the extent to which district competitiveness modifies the 
relationship between protectionist demands and the district level of nontariff protection. 
Unlike Table 4.4, Table 4.5 reveals that there is almost no significant association between 
political competitiveness and the dependent variable. The estimated coefficients for 
Closeness 50-50 and House Marginality are mostly positive and insignificant. 
Nevertheless, Table 4.5 provides strong confirmation for my hypothesis that district 
competitiveness magnifies the effect of protectionist demands from import-competing 
sectors on the district-level nontariff protection. In Table 4.5, the coefficients for the 
multiplicative interaction terms of District Comparative Disadvantage with Closeness to 
50-50 and with House Marginality are all consistently negative and significant. An 
increase in the values of Closeness to 50-50 and House Marginality both denotes a 
decline in district competitiveness. Hence the findings in Table 4.5 suggest that the 
marginal effect of protectionist demands on NTBs will be maximized when the values of 
Closeness to 50-50 and House Marginality takes a zero value, that is, when districts show 
the highest level of electoral competitiveness.  
 




In column 2, the coefficient for the multiplicative interaction term between 
Closeness to 50-50 × District Comparative Disadvantage (= -3.547) implies that if the 
value of Closeness to 50-50 increases from its minimum (= 0.001) to maximum (= 0.329), 
the marginal effect of District Comparative Disadvantage declines from 0.775 to -0.388. 
The coefficient for House Marginality × District Comparative Disadvantage in column 5 
similarly demonstrate that the marginal effect of District Comparative Disadvantage is 
0.719 in the most competitive district but drops to -0.005 in the most safe district, as 
House Marginality ranges from 0.005 to 0.414.  
Relying on Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2006), I graphically represent the 
marginal effect of two sources of protectionist interests on the amount of protection 
aggregated at the district-level. Figures 1 and 2 indicate the extent to which District 
Comparative Disadvantage and Labor influence the district-level of trade protection, 
respectively, according to changes in the levels of district competitiveness. The solid line 
in each graph represents the marginal effect of protectionist demands on the district-level 
protection, and the dashed line illustrates 95% confidence intervals around the marginal 
effect line. In each figure, the top row of graphs is based on results in Tables 2 and 4, in 
which I only examine the district-level of tariff protection from 1989 through 2004. 
Graphs in the second row are drawn from results in Tables 3 and 5, which focus on the 
mean value of the district-level of nontariff protection in the 1990s. As emphasized above, 
the zero values on Partisan Dominance, Closeness to 50-50 and House Marginality all 
denote an equal division of district’s electoral support between Republican and 
Democratic candidates, whereas high positive values of these indicators represent 




 [Insert Figure 4.1 here] 
 
In Figure 4.1, the negative slope of the marginal effect line indicates that as the 
division of the two-party vote share in electoral competition increases, the degree to 
which District Comparative Disadvantage raises the district-level protection significantly 
decreases. In the top left graph, the marginal effect of District Comparative Disadvantage 
declines from 0.043 to -0.099 as the degree of Partisan Dominance moves from 0 to 
0.492. Specifically, the bottom row of graphs shows that the strength of district 
partisanship changes the direction of the effect of protectionist demands on the district-
level nontariff protection. In the bottom-left graph of Figure 4.1, the line indicating the 
marginal effect of District Comparative disadvantage becomes zero, when Partisan 
Dominance reaches 0.335.  It means that District Comparative Disadvantage increases 
the aggregated amount of NTB protection at the district-level only when the value of 
Partisan Dominance does not exceed 0.335.  
The center and right graphs in the bottom row of Figure 4.1 similarly demonstrate 
that the positive relationship between protectionist demands from import-competing 
sectors and the district-level NTB protection would not be maintained if Closeness to 50-
50 and House Marginality are greater than 0.195 and 0.411, respectively. These findings 
support my argument that the allocation of protectionist rents across the electorate is 
determined not only by the strength of protectionist interests but also by their political 
characteristics. All other things being equal, governing parties are more responsive to 
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protectionist interests in electorally competitive constituencies rather than those in 
electorally safe ones.  
 
[Insert Figure 4.2 here] 
 
On the other hand, Figure 4.2 offers some evidence that district competitiveness 
modifies the effect of Labor on the district-level protection, although it does not remain 
robust across different specifications of the model. In Figure 4.2, I display six graphs 
representing the marginal effect of the relative size of manufacturing workers on the 
district-level protection, considering changes in three indicators of marginality. The top 
row of graphs again shows that the extent to which Labor raises the district-level tariff 
protection will decline, as three indicators of electoral competitiveness increases. This 
finding implies that a district having more manufacturing employment is most likely to 
receive higher levels of tariff protection, if the district’s vote is equally divided between 
the Republican and the Democratic parties. The remaining graphs, however, show no 
similar patterns. While the positive slope of the marginal effect lines indicate that strong 
district partisanship might increase the positive effect of labor on the district-level 
protection, none of them are statistically significant.  
 
5. Conclusion 
This chapter analyzes the political and economic determinants of within-country variation 
in the levels of trade protection across electoral constituencies. Building on the literature 
on international trade and distributive politics, I argue that the allocation of protectionist 
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rents is interactively determined by two factors: constituent demands for compensation 
through protectionist measures and the political attributes of domestic constituencies 
revealed in electoral competition.   
My findings show that the economic characteristics of domestic constituencies 
explain the demand side of protectionist policies. The results from my analysis 
consistently demonstrate that domestic groups form heterogeneous demands over trade 
openness, according to the net trade positions of industries in which constituencies are 
employed as well as types of factors of production that constituencies own. All other 
things being equal, protectionist rents are likely to be concentrated on constituencies 
which are more adversely affected by the flow of imports and those in which the 
proportion of low-skilled labor is higher. However, the present study clearly 
demonstrates that the structure of domestic interests only partially explains the structure 
of trade protection within a country. The findings of this study provide consistent 
evidence that distributive rents generated from tariff protection are likely to be targeted 
toward electorally competitive constituencies rather than toward safe constituencies, and 
that marginal voter status significantly increases the chance of protectionist interests 
receiving favorable levels of tariff and nontariff protection. Specifically, the latter finding 
strongly implies that constituencies that make strong protectionist demands would not 
receive compensation through protectionist policies, if they are based on electorally safe 
constituencies.  
One important implication of these findings is that redistribution achieved through 
trade protection does not necessarily coincide with the economic characteristics of 
domestic constituencies and their different preferences for trade openness. The political 
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characteristics of domestic constituencies shape the basis of representation of sectoral 
interests, because elected officials have substantial incentives to concentrate protectionist 





TABLE 4.1   Partisan Dominance and the District-Level of Tariff Protection, 1989-2004 
 
Dep. Variable = District-Level of Tariff Protection  
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
District Comparative Disadvantage (DCD) 0.133*** 0.134*** 0.133*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.006) (0.006) 
Partisan Dominance -0.315*** -0.308*** -0.318*** -0.041* -0.041* 
 
(0.041) (0.042) (0.041) (0.023) (0.023) 
Labor 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
No High School Degree 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.0003 0.0002 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
District Unemployment 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.025*** 0.026*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Number of Districts per State -0.219*** -0.226*** -0.220*** -0.034** -0.034** 
 










Ways and Means Committee  
  
0.029*** 0.008 0.008 
   
(0.009) (0.006) (0.006) 
Committee on Foreign Affairs 
  
0.002 0.004 0.004 
   
(0.008) (0.005) (0.005) 
Lagged District-Level of Tariff  Protection       0.425*** 0.426*** 
        (0.015) (0.015) 
Presidential Election 
    
0.002 
     
(0.004) 
General Election 
    
0.001 
     
(0.003) 
Constant 0.133*** 0.134*** 0.133*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 
 
-0.011 (0.011) (0.011) (0.006) (0.006) 
      R-squared 0.719 0.719 0.719 0.839 0.839 
Number of Observations 6894 6794 6894 4578 4578 






TABLE 4.2  Partisan Dominance and the Marginal Effects of Protectionist Interests on the 
District-Level of Tariff Protection, 1989-2004 
 
Dep. Variable = District-Level of Tariff Protection 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
District Comparative Disadvantage (DCD) 0.185*** 0.186*** 0.173*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
Partisan Dominance -0.017 -0.015 0.473*** 0.169*** 0.170*** 
 
(0.050) (0.051) (0.086) (0.056) (0.056) 
Partisan Dominance × DCD -0.668*** -0.666*** -0.519*** -0.288*** -0.289*** 
 
(0.069) (0.070) (0.073) (0.056) (0.056) 
Partisan Dominance × Labor 
  
-0.034*** -0.007* -0.007* 
   
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Labor 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.036*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
No High School Degree 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.0004 0.0003 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
District Unemployment 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Number of Districts per State -0.210*** -0.217*** -0.222*** -0.031* -0.031* 
 
(0.039) (0.040) (0.040) (0.017) (0.017) 
Seniority 
 
0.007** 0.007** -0.004** -0.004** 
  
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Ways and Means Committee  
 
0.027*** 0.027*** 0.008 0.007 
  
(0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) 
Committee on Foreign Affairs 
 
0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 
  
(0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) 
Lagged District-Level of Tariff  Protection       0.421*** 0.422*** 
        (0.007) (0.007) 
Presidential Election 
    
0.003 
     
(0.004) 
General Election 
    
0.0003 
     
(0.003) 
Constant -0.827*** -0.843*** -0.890*** -0.236*** -0.237*** 
 
(0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.011) (0.011) 
      
R-squared 0.72 0.72 0.719 0.838 0.838 
Number of Observations 6894 6794 6794 4578 4578 








TABLE 4.3  Partisan Dominance and the Marginal Effects of Protectionist Interests on the 
District-Level of Nontariff Protection in the 1990s 
 
Dep. Variable = District-Level of NTB Protection 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
District Comparative Disadvantage  0.510*** 0.510*** 0.616*** 0.616*** 0.677*** 0.677*** 
(DCD) (0.113) (0.114) (0.138) (0.138) (0.143) (0.144) 
Partisan Dominance 0.553 0.554 1.084 1.082 -1.087 -1.086 
 
(0.575) (0.576) (0.696) (0.697) (1.565) (1.568) 
Partisan Dominance × DCD 
  
-1.5 -1.495 -2.018* -2.016*   
   
(1.111) (1.113) (1.158) (1.162) 
Partisan Dominance × Labor 
    
0.137 0.137 
     
(0.088) (0.088) 
Labor 0.086*** 0.086*** 0.086*** 0.086*** 0.073*** 0.073*** 
 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) 
No High School Degree 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 
 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
District Unemployment -0.069** -0.068** -0.064** -0.064** -0.062** -0.062**  
 
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
Number of Districts per State -0.208 -0.209 -0.211 -0.212 -0.223 -0.223 
 














Lagged District-Level of Tariff  
Protection 3.038*** 3.041*** 3.057*** 3.059*** 3.056*** 3.057*** 
 
(0.275) (0.277) (0.275) (0.277) (0.275) (0.276) 
Constant -0.292 -0.262 -0.35 -0.332 -0.15 -0.144 
 
(0.234) (0.304) (0.238) (0.308) (0.270) (0.331) 
 
     
 
R-squared 0.848 0.848 0.849 0.849 0.85 0.85 
Number of Observations 431 431 431 431 431 431 





TABLE 4.4  District Competitiveness and the Marginal Effects of Protectionist Interests on the 
District-Level of Tariff Protection, 1989-2004 
 Dep. Variable = District-Level of Tariff Protection 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
District Comparative Disadvantage  0.137*** 0.165*** 0.033*** 0.111*** 0.129*** 0.040*** 
(DCD) (0.011) (0.016) (0.009) (0.011) (0.018) (0.010) 
Closeness to 50-50 -0.222*** -0.02 0.157* 
  
                
 (0.047) (0.060) (0.080) 
  
                









                









                
House Marginality  
   
-0.145*** -0.082** 0.192*** 
 
   
(0.034) (0.042) (0.062) 
House Marginality  × DCD 
    
-0.122*** -0.129**  
 
    
(0.096) (0.052) 
House Marginality  × Labor 
     
-0.011*** 
 
     
(0.004) 
Labor 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.009*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.010*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
No High School Degree 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.0001 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
District Unemployment 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.026*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.026*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Number of Districts per State -0.234*** -0.228*** -0.028* -0.268*** -0.265*** -0.046*** 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.014) (0.034) (0.034) (0.017) 
Seniority 0.007** 0.007** -0.004 0.010*** 0.010*** -0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Ways and Means Committee  0.025*** 0.024*** 0.008 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.007 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) 
Committee on Foreign Affairs 0.001 0.0004 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.010*   
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) 






























Constant -0.829*** -0.848*** -0.231*** -0.782*** -0.791*** -0.261*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.013) (0.017) (0.018) (0.016) 
 
      
R-squared 0.720  0.720  0.840  0.710 0.710 0.841 
Number of Observations 6800 6800 6800 6800 6800 6800 





TABLE 4.5  District Competitiveness and the Marginal Effects of Protectionist Interests on the 
District-Level of Nontariff Protection in the 1990s 
 Dep. Variable = District-Level of Nontariff Protection 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
District Comparative Disadvantage  0.499*** 0.779*** 0.849*** 0.518*** 0.737*** 0.728*** 
(DCD) (0.114) (0.178) (0.184) (0.116) (0.164) (0.167) 
Closeness to 50-50 0.893 2.483** 0.099 
  
                
 (0.864) (1.162) (1.924) 
  
                









                









                
House Marginality 
   
-0.045 0.676 1.043 
 
   
(0.557) (0.674) (1.474) 
House Marginality × DCD 
    
-1.858* -1.771*   
 
    
(0.984) (1.034) 
House Marginality × Labor 
     
-0.022 
 
     
(0.079) 
Labor 0.086*** 0.087*** 0.072*** 0.085*** 0.086*** 0.089*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.010) (0.010) (0.015) 
No High School Degree 0.017 0.016 0.015 0.018 0.018 0.018 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
District Unemployment -0.072** -0.069** -0.067** -0.072** -0.066** -0.066**  
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
Number of Districts per State -0.185 -0.16 -0.162 -0.132 -0.159 -0.157 
 (0.340) (0.339) (0.338) (0.345) (0.344) (0.345) 
Seniority 0.004 -0.001 -0.006 0.007 0.006 0.007 
 (0.054) (0.053) (0.053) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) 
Lagged District-Level of  3.059*** 2.995*** 3.028*** 3.044*** 3.039*** 3.035*** 
 (0.278) (0.278) (0.279) (0.281) (0.280) (0.281) 
Constant -0.277 -0.405 -0.221 -0.199 -0.332 -0.377 
 (0.306) (0.311) (0.333) (0.322) (0.329) (0.366) 
 
      
R-squared 0.848 0.85 0.851 0.848 0.849 0.849 
Number of Observations 431 431 431 418 418 418 




FIGURE 4.1 The Marginal Effects of District Comparative Disadvantage on the District-Level of Trade Protection 






FIGURE 4.2 The Marginal Effects of Labor on the District-Level of Trade Protection 








Voter Partisanship and the Allocation of Protectionist Rents: 
An Empirical Test of the Core Voter Model 
 
 
1. Introduction  
In the previous two chapters, I examine the effect of electoral competition on the 
structure of trade protection in the United States at the industry-level and at the district-
level, respectively. Using sectoral data on tariff and nontariff protection and district level 
election outcomes, I maintain that within-country variations in U.S. trade protection are 
explained by the interactions of two factors: the strength of protectionist pressures of 
domestic constituencies and their political attributes revealed in electoral competition. 
The results of my analysis demonstrate that tariff protection tends to be targeted to 
politically competitive districts rather than safe ones and that industries located in 
politically competitive constituencies are more likely to secure favorable levels of 
protection than those in safe constituencies. In a related vein, I also find that the political 
attributes of domestic constituencies modify the relationship between protectionist 
pressures and trade policy outcomes. My findings offer consistent evidence that electoral 
competitiveness increases the extent to which comparative disadvantage raises the levels 
of tariff and nontariff protection both at the level of electoral districts and at the level of 
industries. Unlike previous research, these findings suggest that representative 
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policymakers have strong incentives to target trade protection to marginal constituencies 
rather than to safe constituencies to optimize their electoral prospects. Nevertheless, they 
do not fully confirm that governing parties always favor marginal constituencies over 
their core partisan supporters for two reasons. First, the marginality of domestic 
constituencies could be endogenous to the economic characteristics of voters which 
determine their trade policy preferences. For instance, if domestic groups are more 
adversely affected by import competition, they might be more willing to change their 
ideological preferences and cast their votes to parties that promise larger compensation 
through protectionist measures. In this case, the effect of constituency marginality would 
be conflated with the effect of protectionist demands. Second, in some cases, marginal 
(party competitive) districts do not necessarily mean that they have more swing voters 
than other districts. If districts have two equally sized groups of strong partisans, that is, 
if districts have a bimodal distribution of voter partisanship, their margins of votes are 
still relatively smaller than other districts. Hence even if parties offer more protectionist 
rents to marginal districts, we do not know whether this is because parties target marginal 
districts to win a legislative majority or because they favor their core partisan supporters 
belonging to marginal districts (Cox 2010).   
To fill this gap, this chapter extends my findings in two ways. First, I examine the 
relative merits of the core voter model in the context of U.S. trade politics, considering 
the effect of voter partisanship on the allocation of protectionist rents across electoral 
constituencies. Relying on the same dataset employed in Chapters 3 and 4, I evaluate the 
extent to which the direction and strength of voter partisanship affect the amount of tariff 
and nontariff protection aggregated to the level of congressional districts. Second, I 
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investigate the effect of voter partisanship on the relationship between protectionist 
demands and trade policy outcomes. If it were true that representative policymakers are 
more likely to respond to protectionist interest groups from competitive constituencies 
rather than those from safe constituencies, we could expect that the marginal effect of 
voter demands for protection on trade policy outcomes would vary according to the 
strength of district support for the incumbent government party. 
 
2. Model  
Equation (1) is the modification of the district-level model proposed in Chapter 4. Here, 
the dependent variable is the aggregate amount of trade protection at the level of 
congressional districts. The district-level of protection again indicates the extent to which 
industries located in a given congressional district receive tariff and nontariff protection, 
respectively. More specifically, it represents the sum of sectoral tariffs or NTB coverage 
ratios for the four-digit SIC manufacturing industries in district i, with each of them 
weighted by an industry’s share of total employees in district i.   
As explained earlier in greater detail, equation (1) includes three categories of 
independent variables. First, the strength of constituent demands for protection is 
captured by District Comparative Disadvantage, representing the difference between 
import-penetration and export dependence at the district level. Another two economic 
variables, No High School Degree and District Unemployment each represent the 
proportion of low-skilled labor and economic downturn, respectively. Like District 
Comparative Disadvantage, these variables indicate voter demands for compensation 
through protectionist policies. Second, equation (1) includes a set of political variables 
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related to the abilities of individual representatives to provide distributive benefits to their 
geographical constituencies, such as seniority and congressional committee membership. 
In a related vein, the Number of Districts per State variable controls for the effect of the 
size of population in a given state, because protectionist pressures have a better chance of 
political representation in smaller states (McGillivray 1997, 2004; Hauk 2011).  
 
District-Level Protectionit  
= β0 + β1 District Comparative Disadvantageit-1  
+ β2 Support for the Incumbent Governmentit-1 
+ β3 Support for the Incumbent Government
2
it-1 
+ β4 District Comparative Disadvantageit-1× Support for the Incumbent Governmentit-1 
+ β5 District Comparative Disadvantageit-1× Support for the Incumbent Government
2
it-1 
+ β6 Seniorityit-1 + β7 Ways and Means Committeeit-1  
+ β8 Committee on Foreign Affairsit-1 + β9 Labor it-1  
+ β10 No High School Degree it-1 + β11 District Unemploymentit-1  
+ β12 Number of Districts per Stateit-1 + εi  
  (1)    
  
∂District-Level Protection/∂District Comparative Disadvantage  
= β1 + β4 Support for the Incumbent Governmentit-1  
+ β5 Support for the Incumbent Government
2
it-1 




Third and more importantly, equation (1) examines the extent to which district 
support for the incumbent government affects the amount of trade protection targeted to 
each district. My previous findings show that district competitiveness increases the 
district level of tariff protection and that competitiveness also strengthens the relationship 
between protectionist pressures and policy outcomes. Based on these findings, equation 
(1) includes the Support for the Incumbent Government variable and its squared term. In 
doing so, I assume that there exists a non-linear relationship between the strength of 
district support for the incumbent government and the district-level of tariff (or nontariff) 
protection. In equation (1), I also include two multiplicative interaction terms of District 
Comparative Disadvantage with Support for the Incumbent Government and its squared 
term, respectively. These interaction terms imply that the extent to which District 
Comparative Disadvantage in a given congressional district i increases the district level 
of tariff (or nontariff) protection depends on the strength of District Support for the 
Incumbent Government.   
The marginal effect of constituent demands for protection on policy outcomes can 
be expressed by taking the derivative of equation (1) with respect to District Comparative 
Disadvantage. As shown in equation (2), my model hypothesizes that the marginal effect 
of protectionist demands on the district-level of trade protection has a non-linear 
relationship with the strength of district support for the incumbent party. As I argued 
earlier, if protectionist interests in marginal constituencies tend to receive more favorable 
levels of protection than those in safe constituencies, equation (2) should satisfy two 
conditions. First, the coefficient for the squared term of the Support for the Incumbent 
Government (= β5) should be negatively signed and significant. Second, the marginal 
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effect of District Comparative Disadvantage should have its maximum value on the 
midpoint of the Support for the Incumbent Government.   
To measure the degree of Support for the Incumbent Government, I use two 
different indicators: Vote for the Incumbent President and Average Vote for the 
Incumbent President’s Party. On the one hand, Vote for the Incumbent President’s Party 
is measured as the district level of the two-party vote share in the most recent presidential 
election. As I use district presidential vote share normalized around its national mean, 
Vote for the Incumbent President’s Party takes large positive values for its core areas of 
electoral support, but large negative values for its opposition strongholds. If district vote 
shares for Republican and Democratic presidential candidates are identical to the national 
averages, Vote for the Incumbent President is coded as zero, implying the highest level of 
competitiveness.
33
 On the other hand, Average Vote for the Incumbent President’s Party 
is the average of the two-party vote share that the Incumbent President’s Party obtained 
in presidential, general, and gubernatorial elections over the past four years at the district-
level. For instance, it means that Average Vote for the Incumbent President’s Party in 
1996 is computed as the two-party vote share for Democratic candidates in these types of 
elections that occurred from 1992 through 1995. 
34
 In 1989, however, Average Vote for 
the Incumbent President’s Party will be generated by averaging the two-party vote share 
for Republican candidates obtained in elections held between 1985 and 1988.  
 
                                                     
33
 Vote for the Incumbent President is similar to the Partisan Dominance variable descried in Chapters 3 
and 4. Since Partisan Dominance takes the absolute values of district presidential vote shares, it only 
shows the degree of political competitiveness in a given district without revealing the direction of voter 
partisanship.   
34
 Measuring voter partisanship with the four-year window is suggested by Ansolabehere and Snyder 
(2006). Since some states have gubernatorial elections in odd years, I consider them part of the four-year 
window.     
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3. Empirical Results 
Table 5.1 estimates the independent effect of protectionist demands, voter support for the 
incumbent government, and legislator characteristics on the district-level of tariff 
protection. As discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4, my findings show that economic 
variables representing constituent demands for protection have a significant positive 
association with the district-level of tariff protection. The positive significant coefficients 
for District Comparative Disadvantage suggest that protection tends to be concentrated 
in constituencies relying on import-competing sectors rather than exporting industries. In 
a similar vein, the coefficients for Labor and No High School Degree also indicate that 
owners of relatively scarce factors (i.e. low-skilled labor) have strong protectionist 
pressures. However, as shown earlier, I find no consistent evidence on the effect of 
individual characteristics of legislators. While some of my results imply that seniority 
and congressional committee membership might increase the district-level of tariff 
protection, the sign and significance of their coefficients do not remain robust across the 
different specifications of the model.  
 
[Insert Table 5.1 here] 
 
The results of Table 5.1 reveal also interesting patterns about the relationship 
between district partisanship and the district-level of tariff protection. In columns 1-4, I 
measure district support for the incumbent government as its share of the two-party vote 
for the incumbent president in the most recent election, whereas columns 5-8 consider the 
average of the two-party vote share for the incumbent’s president party in presidential, 
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gubernatorial, general elections held over the past four years. On the one hand, findings 
in columns 1-2 and 5-6 suggest that there is no consistent linear pattern between district 
support for the incumbent government and the district level of tariff protection. In column 
2, the negative significant coefficient for Vote for the Incumbent President suggests that 
the district-level of tariff protection would be lower, as districts express stronger support 
for the incumbent president. The finding in column 5, however, again exhibits the 
opposite pattern.  
The effect of voter partisanship on the allocation of protection is more clearly 
presented when we include its squared term. The results in columns 3-4 and 7-8 all 
suggest that there exists an inverted U-shaped relationship between Support for the 
Incumbent Government and the district-level of tariff protection.  In column 4, the 
coefficients for Vote for the Incumbent President and its squared equivalent are -0.033 
and -0.171, respectively, and they are both statistically significant. Since the value of 
Vote for the Incumbent President ranges from -0.492 to 0.405 in my dataset, this finding 
suggests that the district-level of protection will be maximized when Vote for the 
Incumbent President Party is around -0.09. As the value for Vote for the Incumbent 
President Party deviates from -0.09, however, the district-level of tariff protection 
decreases continuously. In other words, it means that the level of tariff protection will be 
the highest in districts in which voter support for the incumbent president is lower than 
the national average by 9 percentage points and that districts showing stronger support 
for the incumbent government or the opposition party are likely to have lower levels of 
tariff protection.  
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Similarly, columns 7 and 8 offer more convincing evidence that there is an 
inverted U-shaped curve relationship between district support for the incumbent 
president’s party and the amount of tariff protection aggregated to the district-level. In 
columns 7 and 8, the coefficients for Average Vote for the Incumbent Party and its 
squared term suggest that the district-level of tariff protection will be maximized when 
the value of Average Vote for the Incumbent President’s Party reaches 0.522 and 0.501, 
respectively. As Average Vote for the Incumbent President’s Party moves from these 
midpoints toward its minimum (=0.155) and maximum (=0.844), the level of tariff 
protection significantly declines.  
 
[Insert Table 5.2 here] 
 
In Table 5.2, I report the comprehensive results from equation (1) by considering 
a series of multiplicative interaction terms of protectionist demands and the direction of 
district partisanship. Unlike Table 5.1, Table 5.2 indicates that district support for the 
incumbent president’s party and the district-level of tariff protection do not have an 
inverted U-shaped relationship any more. Interestingly, however, Table 5.2. still offers 
consistent evidence that the extent to which protectionist demands increase the district-
level of tariff protection will be maximized when district support for the incumbent 
president and his party are at a moderate level. By taking the derivative of the equation in 
each column with respect to the variable capturing protectionist demands, we could 
estimate the extent to which voter demands for protection raise the amount of tariff 
protection at the district level. In column 1, the marginal effect of District Comparative 
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Disadvantage on the district-level of tariff protection can be expressed as 0.146+0.257 × 
Vote for the Incumbent President - 1.556 × Vote for the Incumbent President
2
. Similarly, 
column 2 shows that the marginal effect of Labor could be described as 0.035 + 0.018 × 
Vote for the Incumbent President - 0.109 × Vote for the Incumbent President
2
. As all 
coefficients in these equations are statistically significant, we could infer that both 
District Comparative Disadvantage and Labor have the greatest effect on the district-
level of tariff protection when Vote for the Incumbent President reaches 0.083. As district 
vote share for the incumbent president is higher or lower than 0.083, the marginal effect 
of District Comparative Disadvantage and Labor on the dependent variable also decline.  
Now let us consider columns 4-6, in which district partisanship is measured as the 
average of the two-party vote share for the incumbent president’s party in all other 
elections over the past four years. My findings again clearly demonstrate that the 
marginal effect of protectionist demands on the amount of tariff protection at the district-
level still have an inverse U-shaped curve relationship with the district-level of support 
for the incumbent president’s party. Columns 4 and 5 each show that the extent to which 
District Comparative Disadvantage and Labor increases the dependent variable will be 
maximized when Average Vote for the President’s Party converges to 0.524 and 0.574, 
respectively. For districts having higher or lower levels of support for the incumbent 
president’s party than these values, the effects of voter demands for protectionist 
measures significantly decrease. More specifically, column 6 indicates that an inverted 
U-shaped curve between district’s electoral support for the incumbent party and the 
amount of tariff protection remains robust, when we consider a lagged value of the 
dependent variable. The results in column 6 show that District Comparative Advantage 
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and Labor are most likely to receive higher levels of tariff protection, if the average of 
the two-party vote share for the incumbent president’s party reaches 0.493 and 0.618, 
respectively.  
The key findings in Table 5.2 are presented graphically in Figure 5.1. In each 
graph, horizontal lines indicate the degree of district support for the incumbent president 
(and for his party), whereas vertical lines represent the marginal effects of protectionist 
pressures on the district-level of protection. An asterisk indicates that the marginal effect 
of constituent demands for protection on the district level of tariff protection is 
statistically significant at the 95% level.  
 
[Insert Figure 5.1 here] 
 
Figure 5.1 clearly demonstrates that a moderate level of district support for the 
incumbent president’s party strengthens the relationship between protectionist demands 
and trade policy outcomes. All four graphs show that there exists an inverted U-shaped 
curve relationship between the strength of district support for the incumbent 
administration and the marginal effect of district-level demands for protection. As 
explained in detail above, two graphs on the first row indicate that the marginal effect of 
District Comparative Disadvantage and Labor on the dependent variable will be 
significantly higher, when Vote for the Incumbent President is closer to 0.083. Similarly, 
the bottom row of Figure 5.1 demonstrates that District Comparative Disadvantage and 
Labor have the greatest effects on the district-level of tariff protection, when Average 
District Vote for the Incumbent President’s Party becomes closer to 0.524 and 0.574, 
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respectively. As suggested in Chapters 3 and 4, these findings suggest that while 
protectionist pressures from domestic constituencies are one of the most important factors 
explaining the allocation of protectionist rents across electoral constituencies, their 
effects on policy outcomes are conditioned by the political characteristics of domestic 
constituencies. All other things being equal, protectionist demands are more likely to 
increase the level of protection in politically competitive districts than in safe ones.  
Figure 5.1, however, reveals another interesting pattern regarding the effect of 
voter partisanship on the allocation of protectionist rents across the electorate. In all four 
graphs, the extent to which protectionist demands increase the district-level of trade 
protection is relatively greater in core areas of electoral support for the incumbent 
government rather than in strongholds for the opposition party. If two districts support the 
incumbent government party and the opposition party to the same degree, protectionist 
interests are more likely to increase the level of protection in the former rather than in the 
latter. For instance, the graph in the top left-hand corner shows that if the values of Vote 
for the Incumbent President for two districts are 0.3 and -0.3, the marginal effect of 
District Comparative Disadvantage would be 0.083 and -0.071, respectively. The graph 
in the top right-hand corner similarly indicates that under the same circumstances, the 
degree to which Labor increases the district-level of tariff protection would be 0.03 in the 
former and 0.019 in the latter.  
Moreover importantly, Figure 5.1 demonstrates that District Comparative 
Disadvantage in opposition strongholds does not exert a significant positive effect on the 
district-level of tariff protection, once district support for the opposition party reaches a 
certain threshold. As can be seen in the top left-hand corner of Figure 5.1, District 
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Comparative Disadvantage starts to have a negative association with the district-level of 
tariff protection, as Vote for the Incumbent President is smaller than -0.23. The graph in 
the bottom left corner also shows that the marginal effect of District Comparative 
Disadvantage turns negative, as district share of the Average Vote for the Incumbent 
President’s Party decreases below the 0.025 threshold. In these two graphs, District 
Comparative Disadvantage and the district level of tariff protection has the highest 
negative association when district support for the incumbent president and his party 
reaches its minimum at the value of -0.492 and 0.015, respectively.   
Let us now consider Tables 5.3 and 5.4, which report the effects of district 
partisanship on the allocation of protectionist rents generated from nontariff measures 
across electoral constituencies. Here the dependent variable is the district-level of 
nontariff protection. As described in previous chapters, it indicates the extent to which all 
manufacturing industries in a given district are subjected to import controls in terms of 
price, quantity, and quality (Kono 2006).  
 
[Insert Table 5.3 here] 
 
In Table 5.3, I estimate the independent effects of district partisanship on the 
district-level of nontariff protection. Unlike Tables 5.1, Table 5.3 does not offer 
consistent evidence on the effects of voter partisanship on the structure of nontariff 
protection.
35
 On the one hand, Table 5.3 suggests that there would be a negative 
significant association between district support for the incumbent president and the 
                                                     
35
 As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, my findings show that constituency competitiveness does not exert a 
significant independent effect on the amount of nontariff protection both at the level of congressional 
districts and at the industrial sectors.   
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district-level of nontariff protection. In columns 1 and 3, the district level of nontariff 
protection tends to decrease, as the value of Vote for the Incumbent President and 
Average Vote for the Incumbent President’s Party increases, respectively. Although not 
fully presented in Table 5.3, these finding remain robust even when we do not consider 
the lagged value of the district-level of tariff protection. On the other hand, Table 5.3 also 
offers some evidence that the district-level of tariff protection reaches its minimum when 
Average Vote for the Incumbent President’s Party becomes 0.658. In column 4, the 
coefficients on Average Vote for the Incumbent President’s Party and its squared term 
suggest that there would be a U-shaped curved relationship between voter support for the 
incumbent president’s party and the amount of nontariff protection aggregated to the 
district-level. However, as shown in column 5, these coefficients do not maintain 





[Insert Table 5.4 here] 
 
Table 5.4 includes a set of multiplicative interaction terms between variables 
indicating district-level of protectionist demands and voter partisanship. In doing so, I 
evaluate the extent to which voter partisanship modifies the relationship between 
protectionist interests and trade policy outcomes. In columns 1-3, I find no evidence of a 
significant effect of district support for the incumbent president. None of the estimated 
                                                     
36
 The existing literature acknowledges that tariff protection might increase or decrease the level of 
nontariff protection. For more details, see section 3.2 in Chapter 4.   
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coefficients for multiplicative interaction terms of protectionist interests with Vote for the 
Incumbent President and with its squared terms are statistically significant.  
If we consider voter support for the incumbent president’s party in presidential, 
general, and gubernatorial elections, however, my model provides more clear-cut 
evidence. In column 4, the coefficients for the interaction term of District Comparative 
Disadvantage with Average Vote for the Incumbent President’s Party and its squared 
term are 21.972 and -21.2, respectively. These findings suggest that the extent to which 
District Comparative Disadvantage increases the dependent variable would be 
maximized when the district average of the two-party vote share for the incumbent 
president’s party over the past four years converges toward 0.518. Column 6 also exhibits 
almost identical patterns. The estimated coefficients for multiplicative interaction terms 
between District Comparative Disadvantage and district partisanship indicate that 
District Comparative Disadvantage is most likely to increase the district-level of 
nontariff protection when Average Vote for the Incumbent President’s Party converges 
toward 0.53. Nevertheless, Table 5.4 does not provide robust evidence on the relationship 
between district partisanship and the district-level of nontariff protection. In column 4, 
the coefficients for Average Vote for the Incumbent President’s Party and its squared 
term suggest that the district-level of tariff protection would reach its minimum when 
Average Vote for the Incumbent President’s Party is closer to 0.56. As shown in columns 
5 and 6, however, they fail to reach statistical significance if we consider the marginal 





4. Robustness Check  
To test the robustness of my findings, this section examines the relationship between 
voter partisanship for the majority party in the legislature and the allocation of 
protectionist rents across electoral districts. I re-estimate equation (1) described above, 
using two indicators of voter partisanship. First, Vote for the Majority Party in Congress 
is generated from the majority party’s share of the two-party vote in the most recent 
presidential election in each district. As in Vote for the Incumbent President’s Party, Vote 
for the Majority Party in Congress uses district presidential vote shares normalized 
around their national mean. Secondly, Average Vote for the Majority Party in Congress 
denotes the average share of the two-party vote that the majority party in Congress 
obtained in presidential, gubernatorial and general elections held over the past four years.  
 
[Insert Table 5.5 here] 
 
Table 5.5 reports the extent the extent to which district support for the majority 
party affects the amount of tariff protection concentrated in a given district. Columns 1 
and 5 indicate that two indicators of district support for the majority party in Congress 
both have a negative significant coefficient. These results suggest that as voter support 
for the majority party in the legislature increases, the district-level of tariff protection 
tends to decline. As shown in columns 2 and 6, however, these coefficients do not meet 
standards of statistical significance, if we include the lagged dependent variable to our 
model. On the other hand, the remaining columns in Table 5.5 clearly demonstrate that 
there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between the strength of voter support for the 
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majority party in Congress and the level of tariff protection. Column 3 shows that the 
district-level of tariff protection reaches its maximum in district, in which the majority 
party’s vote share in the recent presidential election is greater than the national average 
by about 7 percentage points. Similarly, columns 7 and 8 indicate that the district-level of 
tariff protection increases until the average vote share that the majority party received in 
presidential, gubernatorial and general elections that occurred during the past four years 
converges around 0.43 and 0.52, respectively.  
In Table 5.6, I include the multiplicative interaction terms of district-level 
protectionist interests with district support for the majority party and its squared term in 
various ways. In doing so, I examine the extent to which voter support for the majority 
party in the legislature modifies the relationship between protectionist interests of 
constituencies and trade policy outcomes. As discussed in the previous section, my 
findings in Table 5.6 indicate that the marginal effect of protectionist interests on the 
level of tariff protection has an inverted U-shaped relationship with the degree of district 
support for the majority party in Congress. In column 1, the interaction terms of District 
Comparative Disadvantage with Vote for the Majority Party in Congress and its squared 
term are -0.366 and -0.417, respectively. These results suggest that the extent to which 
District Comparative Disadvantage increase the district-level of tariff protection will be 
greatest when the value of Vote for the Majority Party in Congress converges toward 
0.21, that is, the majority party’s share of district presidential vote is greater than the 
national average by about 21 percentage points. This finding suggests that if district 
support for the majority party in Congress is measured from normalized presidential vote, 
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the marginal effect of District Comparative Disadvantage tends to be higher in both 
marginal districts and districts express less supporting for the majority party in Congress.  
 
[Insert Table 5.6 here] 
 
However, columns 4-6 offer further confirmation that district competitiveness 
amplifies the impact of voter demands for protectionist measures on the aggregate 
amount of tariff protection in a given district. The multiplicative interaction terms in 
columns 4 and 5 suggest that the marginal effects of District Comparative Disadvantage 
will be maximized when Average Vote for the Majority Party in Congress has a value of 
0.467. The declining portion of the inverted U-shaped curve indicates that as Average 
Vote for the Majority Party in Congress deviates from 0.467, the degree to which District 
Comparative Disadvantage increases tariff protection will decline. In a related vein, the 
findings in column 6 also suggest that the marginal effects of District Comparative 
Disadvantage and Labor will reach their maxima if the average vote share for the 
majority party in Congress in a given district becomes closer to 0.53 and 0.49, 
respectively.  
Figure 5.2 summarizes graphically the core findings of Table 5.6. In Figure 5.2, 
inverted U-shaped curves show that the extent to which constituent demands for 
protection actually increase the district level of tariff protection depends on the strength 
of district partisanship. As demonstrated in Figure 5.1, Figure 5.2 offers further 
confirmation that both import-competing sectors and labor tend to exert larger effects on 
the district-level of protection in politically competitive districts than in districts showing 
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strong support for the majority party in the legislature. Nevertheless, graphs in the first 
row suggest that the marginal effects of protectionist pressures significantly decline, as 
districts show more support for the majority party in Congress.
37
 Given that the 
incumbent president’s party is mostly in the minority in Congress during the period of my 
investigation, these findings seem to support my earlier point that the degree to which 
protectionist demands increase the district-level of tariff protection is relatively larger in 
core areas of electoral support for the incumbent government rather than in strongholds 
for the opposition party.  
 
5. Conclusion 
The empirical analysis in this chapter demonstrates that district partisanship exerts a 
significant effect on the allocation of protectionist rents across electoral constituencies.  
I find that there exists an inverted U-shaped curve between district support for the 
incumbent president (and his party) and the district-level of tariff protection. I also show 
that the extent to which protectionist demands such as district comparative disadvantage 
and labor increase the district-level of tariff and nontariff protection is maximized at a 
moderate level of district support for the incumbent party. All of these results are pretty 
consistent with the key findings presented in Chapters 3 and 4: first, marginal 
constituencies and industries located in marginal constituencies tend to receive higher 
                                                     
37
 In my dataset, the Clinton Administration and the Bush Administration have a majority control of both 
chambers of Congress for the 103
rd
 Congress (1993-1994) and for the 107
th
 Congress (2003-2004), 
respectively. Although not presented here, I examined the extent to which the partisan conflict between the 
President and Congress affect the relationship between the political characteristics of districts (e.g. 
competitiveness and partisanship) and the district-level of trade protection. While including dummy 
variables for divided government did not affect my key findings discussed so far, it is not clear whether the 
partisan conflict and divided government reinforce the incentives for the incumbent government to 
concentrate protection on marginal constituencies.    
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levels of trade protection; and second, political competitiveness amplifies the marginal 
effects of protectionist demands on policy outcomes.  
Unlike previous chapters, however, this chapter finds that the incumbent 
governments are still concerned with their core partisan supporters. The results of my 
analysis indicate that while protection tends to be concentrated on marginal 
constituencies rather than on safe constituencies, the marginal effects of protectionist 
pressures on policy outcomes are larger in constituencies supporting the incumbent 
president’s party rather than in the opposition’s strongholds. These findings imply that 
the incumbent governments are most likely to target protection to marginal constituencies, 





TABLE 5.1  District Support for the Incumbent President’s Party and the District-Level of Tariff Protection, 1989-2004 
 
Dep. Variable = District-Level  of Tariff Protection 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
District Comparative Disadvantage 0.132*** 0.019*** 0.134*** 0.019*** 0.133*** 0.018*** 0.137*** 0.019*** 
 
(0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) 
Vote for the Incumbent President 0.021 -0.032*** 0.001 -0.033*** 
   
                
 
(0.015) (0.011) (0.016) (0.011) 
   
                





   
                
   
(0.124) (0.081) 
   
                
Average Vote for the Incumbent President’s Party 
    
0.041** 0.005 1.091*** 0.421*** 
     
(0.020) (0.014) (0.203) (0.132) 
Average Vote for the Incumbent President’s Party
2
 
      
-1.045*** -0.413*** 
       
(0.201) (0.130) 
Seniority 0.007** -0.005** 0.008*** -0.004** 0.007** -0.004** 0.007** -0.004*   
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Ways and Means Committee  0.024** 0.009 0.026*** 0.009 0.024** 0.008 0.024** 0.009 
  (0.010) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) 
Committee on Foreign Affairs -0.0005 0.003 0.002 0.004 -0.001 0.004 0.001 0.005 
 
(0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) 
Labor 0.033*** 0.008*** 0.033*** 0.008*** 0.033*** 0.008*** 0.033*** 0.008*** 
 
(0.001) 0.000  (0.001) 0.000  (0.001) 0.000  (0.001) 0.000  
No High school Degree 0.027*** 0.0002  0.028*** 0.0003  0.027*** 0.0001  0.027*** 0.0003  
 
(0.001) 0.000  (0.001) 0.000  (0.001) 0.000  (0.001) 0.000  
District Unemployment 0.017*** 0.026*** 0.017*** 0.026*** 0.017*** 0.025*** 0.017*** 0.025*** 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Number of Districts per state -0.002*** -0.000** -0.002*** -0.000** -0.002*** -0.000** -0.002*** -0.000*   
 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  

















Constant -0.847*** -0.217*** -0.831*** -0.216*** -0.869*** -0.217*** -1.121*** -0.319*** 
 
(0.015) (0.010) (0.015) (0.010) (0.018) (0.012) (0.052) (0.034) 
         
R-squared 0.717 0.839 0.72 0.839 0.717 0.839 0.719 0.839 
Number of Observations 6794 4578 6794 4578 6800 4584 6800 4584 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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TABLE 5.2  District Support for the Incumbent President’s Party and the Marginal Effects of Constituent 
Demands on Tariff Protection, 1989-2004 
 
Dep. Variable = District-Level of Tariff Protection 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
District Comparative Disadvantage (DCD) 0.146*** 0.126*** 0.033*** -0.382** 0.136*** -0.341*** 
 
(0.012) (0.011) (0.007) (0.150) (0.011) (0.091) 
Vote for the Incumbent President  -0.112*** -0.270*** 0.095*** 
  
                
 
(0.022) (0.050) (0.027) 
  
                
Vote for the Incumbent President
2
 -0.176 0.705*** 0.496*** 
  
                
 
(0.192) (0.249) (0.180) 
  
                




                




                
Vote for the Incumbent President
2










                









                
Vote for the Incumbent President
2








                
Average Vote for the President’s Party 
   
0.03 -0.929* -0.927*** 
 
   
(0.292) (0.515) (0.300) 
Average Vote for the President’s Party
2
 
   
-0.037 0.704 0.918*** 
 
   
(0.289) (0.522) (0.302) 
Average Vote for the President’s Party × DCD 




      




Average Vote for the President’s Party
2
 × DCD 








Average Vote for the President’s Party × Labor 
    
0.140*** 0.061*** 
      
    
(0.039) (0.023) 
Average Vote for the President’s Party
2
 × Labor 
    
-0.122*** -0.062*** 
 
    
(0.040) (0.023) 
Seniority  0.007** 0.006** -0.004 0.007** 0.006** -0.004 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
Ways and Means Committee  0.028*** 0.027*** 0.006 0.024*** 0.026*** 0.009 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) 
Committee on Foreign Affairs 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.002 0.006 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) 
Labor 0.033*** 0.035*** 0.009*** 0.033*** -0.005 -0.006 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.009) (0.005) 
No High School Degree 0.028*** 0.027*** 0 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.0000  
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
District Unemployment 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.027*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.025*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Number of Districts per State -0.209*** -0.222*** -0.034** -0.220*** -0.223*** -0.023 
  (0.033) (0.033) (0.014) (0.033) (0.032) (0.014) 









Constant -0.847*** -0.861*** -0.231*** -0.859*** -0.563*** 0.013 
 
(0.016) (0.017) (0.011) (0.070) (0.125) (0.072) 
       
R-squared 0.722 0.839 0.839 0.719 0.84 0.84 
Number of Observations 6794 4578 4578 6800 4584 4584 




FIGURE 5.1 District Support for the Incumbent President’s Party and the Marginal Effect of 






TABLE 5.3  District Support for the Incumbent President’s Party and the District-Level of Nontariff 
Protection in the 1990s 
 Dep. Variable = District-Level of Non-tariff Protection 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
District Comparative Disadvantage (DCD) 1.156*** 1.156*** 1.182*** 1.266*** 1.183*** 
 (0.148) (0.148) (0.147) (0.140) (0.147) 
Vote for the Incumbent President -1.160*** -1.164***                   
 (0.342) (0.401)                   
Vote for the Incumbent President
2
  0.054                   
  (1.674)                   
Average Vote for the President’s Party   -1.394** -7.003* -4.886 
   (0.591) (3.753) (4.123) 
Average Vote for the President’s Party
2
    5.323* 3.242 
    (3.211) (3.527) 
Seniority  -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) 
Ways and Means Committee  -0.041 -0.041 -0.023 -0.039 -0.032 
  (0.147) (0.147) (0.142) (0.137) (0.141) 
Committee on Foreign Affairs -0.221 -0.221 -0.208 -0.289* -0.208 
 (0.149) (0.150) (0.152) (0.151) (0.153) 
Labor 0.169*** 0.169*** 0.167*** 0.161*** 0.167*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
No High School Degree 0.082*** 0.082*** 0.084*** 0.077*** 0.084*** 
  (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.014) (0.016) 
District Unemployment -0.107*** -0.107*** -0.118*** -0.123*** -0.118*** 
  (0.039) (0.039) (0.040) (0.037) (0.040) 
Number of Districts per State -0.36 -0.361 -0.445 -0.184 -0.457 
  (0.340) (0.341) (0.345) (0.313) (0.346) 
Lagged District Level of Tariff Protection -13.23 -13.235 -13.026  -12.896 
 (11.796) (11.807) (11.961)  (11.965) 
Constant -1.158*** -1.158*** -0.359 1.19 0.56 
 (0.282) (0.286) (0.327) (1.043) (1.159) 
      
R-squared 0.817 0.817 0.816 0.809 0.816 
Number of Observations 382 382 382 431 382 





TABLE 5.4  District Partisanship and the Marginal Effect of Constituent Demands on Nontariff Protection  
 
Dep. Variable = District-Level of Non-tariff Protection 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
District Comparative Disadvantage (DCD) 1.279*** 1.244*** 1.247*** -4.273 1.266*** -4.279 
 
(0.169) (0.140) (0.178) (2.856) (0.141) (3.073) 
Vote for the Incumbent President  -1.029*** 0.737 1.14 
  
                
 
(0.384) (1.302) (1.361) 
  
                
Vote for the Incumbent President
2
 3.004 -1.419 -2.272 
  
                
 
(2.188) (5.830) (7.290) 
  
                










                
Vote for the Incumbent President
2










                








                
Vote for the Incumbent President
2








                
Average Vote for the President’s Party 
   
-17.44*** -8.808 -19.004 
 
   
(5.471) (11.966) (16.723) 
Average Vote for the President’s Party
2
 
   
15.55*** 8.212 18.209 
 
   
(5.223) (10.774) (15.677) 
Average Vote for the President’s Party × DCD 
   
21.972** 
 
21.015*   
      




Average Vote for the President’s Party
2
 × DCD 
   
-21.2** 
 
-19.662*   




Average Vote for the President’s Party × Labor 
    
0.318 0.541 
      
    
(0.901) (1.011) 
Average Vote for the President’s Party
2
 × Labor 
    
-0.378 -0.611 
 
    
(0.859) (0.978) 
Seniority  -0.038 -0.042 -0.052 -0.04 -0.033 -0.038 
 
(0.063) (0.064) (0.069) (0.063) (0.063) (0.068) 
Ways and Means Committee  -0.063 -0.068 -0.077 -0.059 -0.051 -0.053 
  (0.141) (0.144) (0.149) (0.138) (0.138) (0.143) 
Committee on Foreign Affairs -0.298* -0.319** -0.226 -0.301* -0.309* -0.218 
 
(0.153) (0.153) (0.153) (0.156) (0.159) (0.163) 
Labor 0.162*** 0.158*** 0.162*** 0.160*** 0.098 0.051 
 
(0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.233) (0.257) 
No High School Degree 0.073*** 0.073*** 0.080*** 0.073*** 0.077*** 0.079*** 
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.017) 
District Unemployment -0.110*** -0.110*** -0.104*** -0.117*** -0.123*** -0.114*** 
  (0.037) (0.036) (0.039) (0.037) (0.037) (0.040) 
Number of Districts per State -0.093 -0.092 -0.353 -0.165 -0.177 -0.405 
 
(0.308) (0.306) (0.343) (0.313) (0.316) (0.357) 









Constant -1.095*** -0.985*** -1.037*** 3.815*** 1.316 3.824 
 
(0.264) (0.262) (0.292) (1.436) (3.324) (4.422) 
       R-squared 0.809 0.81 0.818 0.811 0.809 0.818 
Number of observations 431 431 382 431 431 382 




TABLE 5.5  District Support for the Majority Party in Congress and the District-Level of Tariff Protection, 1989-2004 
 
Dep. Variable = District-Level  of Tariff Protection 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
District Comparative Disadvantage 0.133*** 0.018*** 0.134*** 0.018*** 0.133*** 0.018*** 0.137*** 0.019*** 
 
(0.011) (0.006) (0.011) (0.006) (0.011) (0.006) (0.011) (0.006) 
Vote for the Majority Party in Congress -0.131*** -0.009 -0.120*** -0.01 
   
                
 
(0.014) (0.010) (0.014) (0.010) 
   
                





   
                
   
(0.123) (0.060) 
    Average Vote for the Majority Party in Congress 
    
-0.130*** 0.014 0.874*** 0.408*** 
     
(0.019) (0.012) (0.204) (0.111) 
Average Vote for the Majority Party in Congress
2
 
      
-1.003*** -0.398*** 
       
(0.203) (0.112) 
Seniority 0.007** -0.004* 0.007** -0.004* 0.006** -0.004* 0.006** -0.004*   
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Ways and Means Committee  0.024*** 0.008 0.026*** 0.009 0.025*** 0.008 0.025*** 0.009 
  (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) 
Committee on Foreign Affairs 0.001 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.003 0.004 
 
(0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) 
Labor 0.033*** 0.008*** 0.033*** 0.008*** 0.033*** 0.008*** 0.033*** 0.008*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
No High school Degree 0.027*** 0.0000  0.027*** 0.0000  0.027*** 0.0000  0.027*** 0.0000  
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
District Unemployment 0.017*** 0.025*** 0.017*** 0.025*** 0.018*** 0.025*** 0.018*** 0.025*** 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Number of Districts per state -0.242*** -0.035** -0.223*** -0.033** -0.242*** -0.034** -0.229*** -0.032**  
 
(0.033) (0.014) (0.033) (0.014) (0.033) (0.014) (0.033) (0.014) 

















Constant -0.847*** -0.215*** -0.833*** -0.213*** -0.787*** -0.222*** -1.028*** -0.317*** 
 
(0.016) (0.011) (0.016) (0.011) (0.018) (0.012) (0.050) (0.030) 
         R-squared 0.719 0.839 0.721 0.839 0.718 0.839 0.719 0.839 
Number of observations 6794 4578 6794 4578 6800 4584 6800 4584 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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TABLE 5.6  District Support for the Majority Party in Congress and the Marginal Effect of Constituent 
Demands for Tariff Protection 
 
Dep. Variable = District-Level of Tariff Protection 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
District Comparative Disadvantage (DCD) 0.140*** 0.127*** 0.029*** -0.174 0.137*** -0.277*** 
 
(0.011) (0.010) (0.007) (0.162) (0.011) (0.088) 
Vote for the Majority Party in Congress  0.061*** 0.447*** 0.069** 
  
                
 
(0.021) (0.044) (0.031) 
  
                
Vote for the Majority Party in Congress
2
 -0.366* 0.865*** 0.582*** 
  
                
 
(0.198) (0.252) (0.167) 
  
                










                
Vote for the Majority Party in Congress
2










                








                
Vote for the Majority Party in Congress
2








                
Average Vote for the Majority Party in Congress 
   
0.125 -0.287 -0.856*** 
 
   
(0.290) (0.520) (0.303) 
Average Vote for the Majority Party in Congress
2
 
   
-0.184 0.582 0.859*** 
 
   
(0.288) (0.513) (0.299) 
Average Vote for the Majority Party in Congress  




    × DCD 




Average Vote for the Majority Party in Congress
2
  




    × DCD 




Average Vote for the Majority Party in Congress  
    
0.077* 0.061*** 
    × Labor 
    
(0.040) (0.023) 
Average Vote for the Majority Party in Congress
2
  
    
-0.104*** -0.062*** 
    × Labor 
    
(0.039) (0.023) 
Seniority  0.007** 0.006** -0.004* 0.007** 0.007** -0.004 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
Ways and Means Committee  0.025*** 0.023*** 0.007 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.008 
  (0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) 
Committee on Foreign Affairs 0.003 0.006 0.006 0.003 0.004 0.005 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) 
Labor 0.033*** 0.034*** 0.009*** 0.033*** 0.021** -0.006 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.010) (0.006) 
No High School Degree 0.027*** 0.026*** 0 0.027*** 0.026*** 0.0000  
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
District Unemployment 0.017*** 0.019*** 0.026*** 0.018*** 0.019*** 0.025*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Number of Districts per State -0.219*** -0.239*** -0.030** -0.223*** -0.227*** -0.026*   
 
(0.033) (0.034) (0.014) (0.033) (0.032) (0.014) 









Constant -0.836*** -0.845*** -0.229*** -0.869*** -0.846*** -0.012 
 
(0.016) (0.017) (0.011) (0.069) (0.129) (0.074) 
       R-squared 0.727 0.732 0.839 0.72 0.726 0.84 
Number of observations 6794 6794 4578 6800 6800 4584 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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FIGURE 5.2 District Support for the Majority Party in Congress and the Marginal Effect of 














Why do some countries have trade protection biased more toward skill-intensive 
industries than others? This chapter examines the political and economic determinants of 
the structure of tariff protection across democracies. Specifically, it aims to explain the 
conditions under which governments maintain higher tariff rates for skill-intensive 
industries rather than unskilled-intensive industries. The latest studies suggest that the 
skill-bias of tariff protection has a positive association with a country’s long-term output 
growth, because skill-intensive industries produce more positive externalities than 
unskilled-intensive industries (Nunn and Trefler 2006, 2009). The existing literature, 
however, has paid more attention to variation in the average level of trade protection 
across countries rather than varying patterns of trade barriers.  
In this chapter, I maintain that variation in the skill-bias of tariff protection across 
countries depends on two factors: first, a country’s factor endowments that determine the 
median voter’s trade policy preferences, and second, the degree of political particularism 
that affects the responsiveness of representative policymakers to rent-seeking behaviors 
of special interest groups. Relying on Mayer’s (1984) median voter model of trade and its 
extensions (Milner and Kubota 2005; Tavares 2008; Kono 2008), I maintain that the 
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skill-bias of tariff protection tends to be higher in developed countries than in less 
developed countries. As the capital-labor ratio of the median voter (= K/L) increases, the 
median voter is likely to be less supportive of imports of capital- and skill- intensive 
goods but more supportive of imports of lower-earning and unskilled-intensive goods. I 
also argue that the extent of skill-bias of tariff protection is likely to decline, as the degree 
of political particularism in electoral systems increases. Representative policymakers 
have a stronger incentive to offer higher tariffs on skilled-intensive industries, when 
electoral systems moderate the incentives for individual legislators to respond to rent-
seeking behaviors of special interest groups. I test my arguments, using data on tariff 
protection on 29 industrial sectors in 52 democracies from 1988 through 2004.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 2, I briefly 
review the existing literature on the skill-bias of trade protection. Based on previous 
research, it generates a set of hypotheses regarding the effects of factor endowments and 
electoral institutions on the skill-bias of tariff protection. Section 3 describes the variables 
and indicators used in the statistical analysis. Section 4 reports regression results for my 
model, and section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Existing Explanations 
In their recent work, Nunn and Trefler (2006, 2009) point out that a country’s long-term 
output growth is determined by the structure of tariff protection, not by the average level 
of tariff protection. Extending Grossman and Helpman’s (1994) model for “Protection for 
Sale,” Nunn and Trefler argue that the skill-bias of tariff protection enhances a country’s 
output growth for several reasons. First, lower tariffs on unskilled-intensive industries 
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increase consumer surplus by reducing the price distortion within the tradable sectors. 
Second, higher protection for skill-intensive industries provides more positive 
externalities because it stimulates demands for skilled-labor and therefore promotes the 
accumulation of human capital. The features of skill-intensive industries, such as 
complicated production processes and relationship-specific investments also promote 
institutional and legal environments which enhance long-term growth. Protectionist 
measures for unskilled-industries, however, result in a slowdown in economic growth by 
lowering the relative returns to skilled-labor.  
Using sectoral data on tariffs and output growth in 59 countries over 25 years, 
Nunn and Trefler offer convincing evidence that neither the average tariff nor the 
variance of tariffs across industries is correlated with output growth. Their findings show 
that countries with higher tariffs on skill-intensive industries grow faster than those with 
higher tariffs on unskilled-intensive industries. A country’s long-term growth has a 
positive significant association with the skill-bias of tariff protection, that is, the ratio of 
tariffs in skill-intensive industries to tariffs in unskilled-intensive industries. Interestingly, 
however, Nunn and Trefler do not clearly specify the political conditions under which 
governments are more likely to provide relatively higher tariffs for skill-intensive 
industries than unskilled-intensive industries. They suggest that the skill-bias of tariff 
protection will be higher in “good institutions” which induce policymakers to put more 
weight on consumer surplus and future growth rather than on campaign contributions 
from organized industrial sectors (Nunn and Trefler 2006, p.35).  
The issues of the skill-bias of tariff protection have rarely been addressed in the 
political economy literature on trade policy outcomes. As discussed in greater detail in 
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the previous chapters, existing research has focused more on clarifying either the impact 
of group lobbying on the structure of protection within a country or the influence of 
domestic political institutions on the average level of trade openness at the national level.  
There have been a few notable exceptions. Lü, Scheve, and Slaughter (2012) 
explain why in almost all countries, unskilled-intensive industries tend to receive higher 
tariff protection than skill-intensive industries. They point out that protection is biased 
toward lower-earning and unskilled-intensive industries even in developing countries, in 
which skill-intensive industries are the relatively scarce factors of production and need 
more compensation through protectionist measures. Based on individual policy opinion 
in the U.S. and China, Lü, Scheve, and Slaughter find that individual voters’ aversion to 
inequality induces lower-earning and unskilled-intensive industries to become the 
frequent recipients for trade protection. Consequently, their findings suggest that varying 
patterns of trade protection across countries might be explained by the structure of sector-
specific trade policy preferences of individuals.  
On the other hand, Milner and Mukherjee (2009) propose that democratization 
increases the skill-bias of tariff protection in developing countries. Relying on the 
Heckscher-Ohlin model and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, they start with the 
assumption that sectoral trade policy preferences of domestic interests are determined by 
their factor endowments. Because of the relative abundance of low-skilled labor over 
capital and skilled labor in developing countries, low-skilled workers in developing 
countries are intensively employed in labor-intensive, exporting sectors producing low-
skilled goods. Skilled workers, however, would seek more compensation from 
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protectionist measures, as they need to compete with skill-intensive import competing 
goods.  
Here, Milner and Mukherjee argue that democratization, by increasing political 
pressures from both unskilled and skilled workers, generates the skill-bias in trade 
barriers in developing countries. Democratization reduces the relative endowments of 
capital of the median voter, as it extends more political rights to citizens. The shift of 
political power from wealthier to poorer individuals induces democratic leaders to satisfy 
the trade policy preferences of the unskilled median voter by lowering trade barriers on 
unskilled goods. However, democracy also provides policymakers with a strong incentive 
to offer higher levels of protection for skill-intensive industries. As democratization 
increases electoral competition, policymakers become more responsive to protectionist 
demands from skill-intensive, import-competing sectors that provide campaign 
contributions.   
While insightful, Milner and Mukherjee’s proposition regarding the trade policy 
preference of the median voter seems to require further elaboration. As they pointed out, 
micro-level studies of trade policy preferences show that in developing countries, 
unskilled-workers are more pro-trade than skilled workers (Mayda and Rodrik 2005; 
Mayda, O’Rourke, and Sinnott 2007). Nevertheless, the pro-trade attitude of the median 
voter in developing countries does not necessarily mean that the low-skilled median voter 
prefers to set lower tariffs barriers on unskilled import-competing goods.  
Moreover, it should be noted that the existing literature provides competing 
predictions about the sector-specific trade policy preferences of the median voter. For 
instance, Kono (2008) maintains that democratization leads the median voter to prefer 
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lower tariffs on capital- and skill-intensive goods but higher tariffs on labor-intensive 
goods. Based on Mayer’s (1984) median voter theorem of international trade, Kono 
assumes that the median voter’s trade policy preferences are determined by his relative 
factor endowments of capital and labor, as well as by factor endowments of trade partners. 
The median voter relatively well-endowed with capital compared to the national average 
would oppose imports of capital- and skill-intensive goods but support imports of labor-
intensive goods. In contrast, the median voter who is less endowed with capital compared 
to the national mean is expected to support imports of capital- and skill-intensive goods 
but oppose imports of labor-intensive, low-skilled goods. In this vein, Kono argues that 
the latter tendency becomes more prevalent during democratization because the 
expansion of political rights makes the median voter more capital-poor but labor-
abundant.  
In this vein, I extend the findings of previous studies by explaining variations in 
the skill-bias of tariff protection across democracies. I maintain that the extent to which 
tariff protection is biased toward skilled-intensive industries is explained by the 
interaction between two factors: factor endowments and political particularism in 
electoral institutions. Relying on Mayer’s (1984) median voter theorem of international 
trade and its extensions (Dutt and Mitra 2002; Milner and Kubota 2005; Kono 2008; 
Tavares 2008), I maintain that factor endowments affect the sector-specific trade policy 
preferences of the median voter. Specifically, I hypothesize that the median voter’s 
demands for protectionist measures for unskilled-intensive industries would decrease, as 
a country becomes more capital abundant. In contrast, the median voter in a labor-
abundant country prefers to maintain higher protection against low-skilled intensive 
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goods. The median voter in a capital-abundant country is relatively better endowed with 
capital than the median voter in a labor-abundant country. If Kono’s (2008) argument is 
correct, the extent to which the median voter prefers higher trade barriers on capital- and 
skill-intensive goods, but lower trade barriers on labor-intensive, low-skilled goods 
would increase, as a country becomes relatively more capital-abundant and labor-scarce. 
Therefore, we can expect that an increase in the relative abundance of capital compared 
to labor of the median voter (= K/L) would have a positive association with the skill-bias 
of tariff protection. The median voter in a capital abundant country is more likely to 
prefer relatively higher tariffs on capital- and skill-intensive goods but lower tariffs on 
labor-intensive, low-skilled goods than the median voter in a labor abundant country. 
Secondly, I also hypothesize that political particularism conditions the degree to 
which the representative policymakers extract campaign contributions from industries 
seeking protectionist measures. Nunn and Trefler (2006) maintain that tariff protection is 
more likely to be biased toward skill-intensive industries rather than unskilled-intensive 
ones, when representative policy makers effectively control rent-seeking behaviors of 
special industry groups. If an increase in the skill-bias of trade protection yields more 
consumer surplus and enhances long-term growth, we can expect that the skill-bias of 
trade protection will be higher in electoral systems in which policymakers have more 
incentives to offer public goods to the interests of broad, national constituencies rather 
than to those of narrow, particular constituencies.  
The existing literature on comparative political institutions suggests that the 
extent to which elected representatives respond to particular demands of domestic 
interests depends on the institutional features of electoral systems. One of the most 
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common arguments is that proportional representation (PR) system are likely to offers 
more public goods for broad, national interests than single-member district with plurality 
(SMDP) systems. Researchers point to several reasons why SMDP systems are more 
likely to favor geographically-targeted projects rather than broad, redistributive programs. 
In most cases, SMDP legislators generally face stiff electoral competition as they are 
directly voted by local constituencies in many small districts. Thus compared to PR 
legislators chosen by party leaders in large districts, SMDP legislators are more 
vulnerable to particularistic local demands (Rogowski 1987; Mansfield and Busch 1995; 
Milessi-Ferretti, Perotti, and Rostagno. 2002; Grossman and Helpman 2005), and hence 
more likely to engage in universal logrolling (Weingast, Shepsle and Johnson 1981).  
Besides, party leaders in SMDP systems also tend to prefer locally-targeted 
programs rather than broad redistributive programs. To fulfill the requirement of a 
majority winner, parties should receive 50% plus one vote in 50% plus 1 district. In 
SMDP systems, therefore, parties are more likely to concentrate distributive benefits on 
some key marginal districts containing political moderates and swing voters, which could 
be easily swayed by the promise of economic benefits (Persson and Tabellini 1999). In 
contrast, multi-party coalitions in PR systems are more likely to generate redistributive 
tax policies through legislative bargaining in order to gain electoral support from broad, 
national coalitions of voters (Austen-Smith 2000; Verardi 2003; Roland Verardi 2003; 
Iversen and Soskice 2004).  
Instead of using a majoritarian-proportional dichotomy, another line of research 
analyzes how various components of electoral institutions simultaneously affect 
particularistic incentives of elected officials in policy decisions. Cox (1990) and Myerson 
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(1993) suggest that large electoral districts increase the incentives for individual 
legislators to serve narrow particularistic interests rather than the median voter’s 
preference, since large district magnitude increases the number of candidates entering the 
election and also widens ideological distance between candidates. In a similar vein, Carey 
and Shugart (1995) point out that if candidates should compete against other candidates 
from the same party, large district magnitude still offers strong incentives for legislators 
to cultivate personal votes by providing locally-targeted projects. To capture the extent to 
which electoral institutions generate personal vote-seeking incentives, Carey and Shugart 
(1995) develop the Particularism Index in which electoral systems are ranked according 
to the following three variables: (1) “Ballot” which indicates the extent of party leaders’ 
control over candidate nomination and ballot rank; (2) “Pool” which measures the extent 
to which candidates depend on the reputation of their parties or co-partisans; (3) “Vote” 
which specifies the number and nature of votes that electorates cast. Each variable is 
coded as 0, 1, and 2, and 2 denotes electoral systems where candidates have the strongest 
incentive to offer pork to cultivate personal votes.  
The Carey-Shugart’s Index of Particularism suggests that  legislators are likely to 
offer policies aimed at national, broad constituencies rather than particularistic local 
constituencies when the following conditions are met: (1) parties completely control 
candidates’ access to and ranks on ballots; (2) political careers of individual candidates 
are determined by the electoral success of their parties or co-partisans; and (3) the 
electorate cast a single vote for a political party, not individual candidates. However, the 
effect of district magnitude on personal-vote seeking activities remains indeterminate in 
their coding scheme. Carey and Shugart expect that in electoral systems where the 
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reputation of individual candidates is more important than party names, high district 
magnitude enhances intra-party competition, and also induces legislators to build a 
personal reputation through particularism in public policies. If party labels overshadow 
candidate reputation in elections, low district magnitude generates particularistic policies 
for a small sector of population. This is because when district magnitude is small, 
geographical constituencies tend to have homogeneous policy preferences, and parties are 
also likely to maximize the chances of winning office by selecting candidates who have 
stable linkages to the electorate.  
The main point of the literature on political institutions and particularism is that 
electoral systems affect the types of constituencies that representative policymakers are 
motivated to target to maximize their chance of winning power. If the skill-bias of tariff 
protection has the features of public goods that benefit broad, national constituencies, we 
could expect that political particularism tends to reduce the ratio of tariffs on skill-
intensive goods over tariffs on unskilled-intensive goods. When applied to the Carey-
Shugart classification scheme, this means that the skill-bias of tariff protection has a 
negative association with elements of electoral systems that strengthen the incentives of 
legislators to seek personal votes.  
 
3. Empirical Research Design 
This section sets out the model I use to explain variations in the skill-bias of tariff 
structure in 58 democracies from 1989 through 2004. The dependent variable in my 
model is the extent to which tariff protection is biased toward skill-intensive industries at 
the national level. Our independent variables include a country’s factor endowments, the 
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degree of political particularism in electoral systems, and a set of control variables related 
to trade policy decisions in democracies. 
 
3.1. Dependent Variable  
To measure the skill-bias of tariff protection, I collect industry-level data from the World 
Bank’s Trade, Production, and Protection (TPP) Database (Nicita and Olarreaga 2006). 
The TPP database offers information on trade flows, output, and tariff and non-tariff 
protection for 28 manufacturing sectors at the 3-digit International Standard Industrial 
Classification (ISIC) level.  
Based on Nunn and Trefler (2006), I measure the extent to which tariff protection 
is biased toward skill-intensive industries for a given country, as shown in equation (1) 
below.  
 











 are defined as the output-weighted average tariffs for skill-
intensive industries and for unskilled-intensive industries in country i, respectively. To 
classify industries into skill-intensive and unskilled-intensive industries, I consider the 
ratio of skilled workers and unskilled workers for industries which are proposed in Nunn 
and Trefler (2006) and Milner and Mukherjee (2009), respectively. These studies define 
workers with more than 12 years of schooling as skilled workers (= Si) and all other 
workers as unskilled (= Li). Then they compute the ratio of skilled workers over unskilled 
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workers (=Si / Li) to determine a cutoff point dividing industries into skilled and unskilled 
groups. Using production data for 17 industries in the United States in 1972, Nunn and 
Trefler consider changes in the S/L ratio across sectors to determine low (=0.27) and high 
(=0.59) cutoff points, respectively. On the other hand, Milner and Mukherjee (2009) 
compute the S/L ratio for 29 industries from the latest version of the UNIDO Industrial 
Statistics Database 2008. They define industries for which the S/L ratio is greater than 
0.39 as skilled industries and all other industries as low skilled groups.  
To compute the skill-bias of tariff protection from the TPP database, I consider 
the ranking order of skill-industries suggested in both Nunn and Trefler (2006) and 
Milner and Mukherjee (2009), as presented in Tables 6.1 and 6.2. I mainly use the high 
cutoff point (i.e. Si / Li ≥ 0.59) to generate the difference in output-weighted tariff rates 
for skilled and unskilled industries, although considering other cutoff values as a 
robustness check. 
 
 [Insert Tables 6.1 and 6.2 here] 
 
3.2. Independent Variables 
The first independent variable is factor endowments that capture the effects of capital 
accumulation on the skill-bias of protection. As discussed above, I hypothesize that the 
national capital-labor ratio affects the sector specific trade policy preferences of the 
median voter. Following Tavares (2008), I use the natural logarithm of GDP per capita as 
a proxy for the relative abundance of capital to labor of the median voter. While capital 
stock per capita could be considered another indicator of capital accumulation (Nehru and 
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Dhareshwar 1993; Alvarez, Cheibub, Limongi and Przeworski 1996), the limited 
availability of this variable significantly reduces the sample size in my analysis.
38
  
Our second independent variable is the degree of political particularism in 
electoral systems. I use a set of indicators from the Database of Particularism to examine 
the relationship between the incentives for individual legislators to build personal support 
and the skill-bias of tariff protection (Wallack, Gaviria, Panizza, and Stein 2003; Johnson 
and Wallack 2007).
 39
 As in the Index of Particularism by Carey and Shugart (1995), the 
Database of Particularism begins from the assumption that the extent to which electoral 
systems promote personal-vote seeking incentives of legislators is mainly determined by 
three components: Ballot, Pool, and Vote. However, there are some differences in their 
coding schemes. Carey and Shugart maintain that electoral districts in SMDP systems 
operate almost like those in closed-list PR systems. In coding Ballot, Pool, and Vote,  
therefore, they give both SMDP and list-PR systems 0 values which means that 
legislators have the least incentive to seek personal vote base at the local district level.  
In contrast, Wallack et al. maintain that legislators in SMDP systems have 
stronger incentives to build a personal base of support than those in list-PR systems, and 
make a distinction between these two systems as follows. In coding Ballot, they code 
SMDP systems as equal to 1, which indicates that parties mostly control candidate 
nomination but voters still exert some effects on the choice of political parties. Only 
closed-list PR systems and one-party systems are coded as 0.  On the scale of Pool, they 
code SMDP systems as equal to 2 because candidates in SMDP systems do not usually 
                                                     
38
 The World Bank’s TPP database offers sectoral data on protection for 58 democracies from 1989 through 
2004, whereas capital stock per capita in the ACLP Political Database is only available for the period from 
1987 through 1990. 
39
 Johnson and Wallack (2007) have updated and expanded Wallack et al. (2003)’s Database of Political 
Particularism. There are no significant differences in their coding schemes.  
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rely on electoral support for other candidates. In terms of Vote, they also assign 2 to 
SMDP systems in which electorates cast a single vote only for candidates, not for parties.  
I employ the following six variables from the Database of Political Particularism 
as follows. I evaluate the effects of Ballot, Pool, and Vote to examine the ways in which 
certain elements of electoral institutions affect the skill-bias of tariff protection, 
respectively. I also generate the variable Particularism which is the mean of Ballot, Pool, 
and Vote and recode them following Hicken and Simmons (2007).
40
 In doing so, I 
examine the extent to which the general tendency of particularism in electoral systems 
affects patterns of trade protection across countries. Additionally, I consider two other 
variables in the Database of Political Particularism that rank electoral systems according 
to the degree of personal vote incentives across different tiers. The Pers_Rank and 
Dom_Rank variables indicate the extent to which legislators to seek a personal vote in 
their more personalistic tier and in their most dominant tier, respectively. The value of 
these variables range from 1 to 13, based on the Carey-Shugart ranking scheme. Large 
positive values in all of these indicators mean that electoral systems induce legislators to 
build personal support by responding to rent-seeking behavior of special interest groups. 
If the skill-bias of tariff protection is higher in systems where elected officials have 
strong incentives to offer broad-based redistributive programs for a national constituency, 
but lower in systems where elected representatives are easily captured by particularistic 
interests, the coefficients for all five indicators should be negatively signed and 
significant.  
                                                     
40
 In Hicken and Simmons (2007), the values of Parindex below 0.5 are recoded as 0, values between 0.5 
and 1.5 are coded as 1, and values above 1.5 are coded as equal to 2.  
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My analysis also includes the following control variables to gauge the effects of 
socioeconomic factors on patterns of trade protection: the natural logarithm of population, 
trade, GDP per capita growth, the import penetration of skill-intensive industries, the 
import penetration of unskilled-intensive industries, and a dummy variable indicating 
whether a country is a member of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
and the World Trade Organization (WTO). To control for the effect of trade openness, 
the Trade variable is measured as the sum of exports and imports of goods and services 
measured as a share of GDP. If integration into international markets increases the skill-
bias of protection, the coefficients for Trade would be positively signed. The import 
penetration of skill-intensive industries (S/L ≥ 0.59) and unskilled-intensive industries 
(S/L < 0.59) capture the effects of sector-specific trade policy preferences of domestic 
constituencies. Since high import penetration increase protectionist demands of domestic 
groups, we might expect that the skill-bias of tariff protection would be increased by the 
import penetration of skilled-industries and decreased by the import-penetration of 
unskilled industries. Data on socioeconomic variables are collected from the latest 
version of the World Development Indicators by the World Bank (World Bank 2011).
41
  
Additionally, I consider the effects of regime types in some specifications. 
Following the convention in the literature, I use the Polity score from the Polity IV 
Project (Marshall and Jaggers 2010) to control for the effect of the degree of democracy 
on the skill-bias of tariff protection.
42
 The Polity IV Project differentiates regime types, 
considering the following institutional features: competitiveness and openness of 
executive recruitment, constraint on chief executive, and competitiveness of political 
                                                     
41
 Data are available at the website of the World Development Indicator by World Bank 
(http://data.worldbank.org/indicator). 
42
 For more details, see the Polity IV project website: http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm 
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participation. To indicate the degree of democracy for a given country in each year, the 
Polity IV dataset offers the Polity score, which is a composite regime index ranging from 
-10 (for a highly autocratic regime) to +10 (for a highly democratic regime). It is 
generally assumed that the Polity scores below zero mean autocratic regimes, whereas the 
Polity scores between +1 to +6, and +7 to +10 indicate partial- and full- democracies, 
respectively. In this chapter, I focus on the skill-bias of tariff protection in partial and full 
democracies, respectively.  
 
3.3. Model 
To examine the relationship between the aforementioned variables and the skill-bias of 
tariff protection, I estimate equation (2) below.   
 
Skill-Bias of Tariff Protectionit   
= β0 + β1 log GDPpcit-1  
+ β2 Political Particularismit-1 
+ β3 log GDPpc × Political Particularismit-1 
+ β4 log Population it-1 + β5 GATT_WTOit-1 
+ β6 Tradeit-1 + β7 GDPpc Growthit-1 
+ β6 Import Penetration Skilled it-1 + β7 Import Penetration Unskilledit-1 + εi 
 




As explained above, the dependent variable in my model is the skill-bias of tariff 
protection measured as the difference between the output-weighted average tariff for 
skill-intensive industries (S/L ≥ 0.59) and unskilled-intensive industries (S/L < 0.59). 
Large positive values in the skill-bias of tariff protection indicate that governments offer 
higher levels of protection to skilled industries. Thus if the coefficients of independent 
variables are negatively signed and significant, it means that they tend to increase the 
levels of protection for unskilled-intensive industries.   
Equation (2) evaluates the extent to which factor endowments and political 
particularism explain variation in the skill-bias of tariff protection across countries. In 
equation (2), I also include a multiplicative interaction term between factor endowments 
and political particularism to estimates their marginal effects on the dependent variable. 
If capital accumulation has a positive association with the skill-bias of tariff protection, 
the coefficient for the log of GDP per capita (= β1) should be positively signed and 
significant. Also, if political particularism induces policymakers to provide higher tariff 
rates on unskilled industries rather than skilled ones, the estimated coefficients for all 
indicators of political particularism should have negative significant coefficients.   
 
4. Empirical Findings 
The model in equation (2) is tested for pooled cross-sectional and time-series data on 52 
democracies for the period from 1989 through 2004 for which the TPP database allows us 
to examine variation in the skill-bias of tariff protection across countries. Here I do not 
consider countries that have polity scores less than 6, as I assume that electoral 
institutions have substantial effects on policy choice in consolidated democracies.  
168 
 
Table 6.3 reports the result of estimating equation (2), using the skill-bias of tariff 
structure based on the rank-order of the skill-intensity (= Si /Li) for 21 industries in Nunn 
and Trefler (2006) and for 29 industries in Milner and Mukherjee (2009), respectively. In 
Table 6.3, I estimate equation (2) using both random and fixed-country effects. Columns 
1 and 2 indicate that the Hausman p-value (=0.0004) rejects the null hypothesis that 
differences in the estimated coefficients are not systematic. Thus, while the results in 
columns 1 and 2 are pretty similar, fixed-effects estimators are preferred over random-
effects estimators. In columns 3 and 4, however, the Hausman p-value (=.37) suggests no 
correlation between unobserved country-specific effects and independent variables.  
 
[Insert Table 6.3 here] 
 
Let us first consider the effects of Political Particularism in the skill-bias of tariff 
protection. In the previous section, I hypothesized that the skill-bias of tariff protection 
would be higher in systems where elected officials have strong incentives to pursue trade 
policy for a broad, national constituency as a whole, given the positive externalities 
generated from skill-intensive industries. Tariff protection is likely to be targeted to 
unskilled-industries rather than to skilled industries, if elected officials have strong 
political incentives to direct targetable benefits toward narrow, particularistic 
constituencies at the local levels.  
The results in Table 6.3 provide convincing evidence that electoral systems exert 
significant influence on the skill-bias of tariff protection, because they affect the degree 
of personal vote seeking incentives of representative policymakers. In all columns of 
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Table 6.3, the estimated coefficients for Parindex remain negative and significant. As 
previously mentioned, large positive values in the dependent variable represent tariff 
protection biased toward skill-intensive industries. The negative significant coefficients 
for Parindex, therefore, suggest that the skill-bias of tariff protection is likely to be lower 
in candidate-centered electoral systems in which policymakers are more likely to cater to 
special interest lobby groups. For instance, column 2 shows that if the value of Parindex 
increases from 0 to 1, then the skill-bias of tariff structure will decrease by 8.225 points. 
The remaining columns also demonstrate that the skill-bias of tariff protection tends to 
decline when electoral institutions create the incentives for legislators to rely on their 
personal reputation rather than electoral success of parties.  
 
[Insert Table 6.4 here] 
 
In Table 6.4, I evaluate the effects of different indicators of political particularism 
on the skill-bias of tariff protection. Columns 1 and 2 demonstrate that the coefficients 
for Dom_Rank and Pers_Rank are both negatively signed and significant. The Dom_Rank 
and Pers_Rank variables group countries into 13 categories according to the degree of 
personal vote incentives in the most dominant tier and more personalistic tier in a given 
country, respectively. Large positive values indicate strong particularism in electoral 
systems.  The negative significant coefficients for Dom_Rank and Pers_Rank thus 
suggest that political particularism reduces the skill-bias of tariff protection, even if we 
consider personal vote seeking incentives in multi-tier systems. In columns 3-5, I 
examine the individual effects of Ballot, Vote, and Pool on the dependent variable. In 
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doing so, I investigate the degree to which individual elements of electoral institutions are 
related to variation in the structure of trade barriers. While the coefficients for all three 
indicators are all negatively signed, only the Pool variable has a significant association 
with the skill-bias of tariff protection. These results suggest that the more individual 
candidates rely on their individual reputation rather than the electoral success of their co-
partisans, the lower the level of tariff protection for skilled-intensive industries.  
On the other hand, I do not find confirming evidence for the effects of factor 
endowments on the skill-bias of tariff protection. As discussed above, I hypothesized that 
capital accumulation induces governments to provide higher tariff protection to skill-
intensive industries rather than to unskilled-intensive industries. I assume that the median 
voter in developed, capital-abundant countries is likely to be pro-trade about imports of 
labor-intensive, unskilled goods, but prefers protectionist measures against imports of 
capital- and skill- intensive goods. In Tables 6.3 and 6.4, the coefficients for the log of 
GDP per capita are positively signed but insignificant in most specifications. Interestingly, 
however, the findings in Tables 6.3 and 6.4 also demonstrate that the coefficients for the 
multiplicative interaction terms between the indicators of particularism and the log of 
GDP per capita are positive and statistically significant. The capita-labor ratio at the 
national level moderates the relationship between political particularism in electoral 
systems and the skill-bias of tariff protection. These results offer consistent evidence that 
capital accumulation reduces the degree to which personal vote incentives reduce the 
skill-bias of protection.  
I check the robustness of my findings using different samples. Table 6.5 presents 
the estimation results for equation (2) for 58 countries which have the Polity score greater 
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than 0. As shown in previous tables, the findings in Table 6.5 clearly demonstrate that the 
skill-bias of tariff protection declines, as electoral systems provide representative 
policymakers with more incentives to build personal support bases from particular 
constituencies. As shown earlier, the estimated coefficients for the Parindex and 
Dom_Rank variables still remain positive and significant, even if we control for the effect 
of the degree of democracy and country-specific fixed effects. The coefficient for their 
interaction term with the logarithm of GDP per capita also indicate that the extent to 
which political particularism reduce the skill-bias of tariff protection will be lower in 
capital-abundant countries than in labor-abundant countries. In Table 5.6, it should be 
also noted that the logarithm of GDP per capita has a significant, positive association 
with the dependent variable, once we include partial democracies to our sample. This 
finding challenges the literature which maintains that the unskilled median voter in 
developing countries prefers to set lower trade barriers against imports of unskilled goods 
(Milner and Mukherjee 2009).  
 
[Insert Tables 6.5 and 6.6 here] 
 
In Table 6.6, I consider three different measures of the skill-bias of tariff 
protection, considering three different cutoff values in the skill-intensity of industries 
(=Si/Li). As explained above, I define industries with the S/L ratio greater than 0.59 as 
skilled industries and all others with unskilled industries. Following Nunn and Trefler 
(2006) and Milner and Mukherjee (2009), I compute the skill-bias of tariff protection 
again, using low (=0.25) and medium (0.39) cutoff values. Then I re-estimate equation 
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(2). The findings in Table 6.6 suggest that the logarithm of GDP per capita consistently 
exerts a significant, positive effect on the skill-bias of tariff structure across different 
specifications of cutoff values. If we more loosely define the meaning of skilled-
industries, however, the coefficients for institutional variables do not retain their 
statistical significance. As shown in columns 2 and 3, neither regime types nor political 
particularism in electoral institutions does not have a significant association with the 
structure of tariff protection, if we expand the scope of skilled-industries.  
 
5. Conclusion  
How do we explain varying patterns of trade protection across countries? Why do some 
countries target higher levels of protection to skill-intensive industries rather than 
unskilled-intensive industries?  
This chapter answers these questions by investigating the political and economic 
determinants of the skill-bias of tariff protection across democracies. Using a time-series 
cross sectional data on 29 industries in 52 democracies from 1989 through 2004, it 
examines the relationship between factor endowments, electoral institutions, and the 
structure of tariff protection. Relying on the literature on international trade and political 
institutions, I maintain that factor endowments and personal vote incentives in electoral 
systems interactively determine the skill-bias of tariff protection. While factor 
endowments affect the sector-specific trade policy preference of the median voter, 
electoral systems determine the extent to which policymakers favor the collective 
interests of broad, national constituencies rather than those of narrow, particularistic 
groups. My analysis provides two key findings: first, the skill-bias of tariff structure is 
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higher in electoral systems which effectively control the incentives of policymakers to 
build personal support bases; second, the extent to which political particularism in 
electoral systems reduces the skill-bias of tariff protection declines, as the capital-labor 
ratio at the national level increases. These results suggest that the structure of trade 
protection is determined not only by the economic characteristics of domestic 
constituencies that shape their trade policy preferences, but also by institutional 
arrangements of domestic political systems that affect the incentives of representative 





TABLE 6.1  Skill-Intensity of Industries in Nuun and Trefler (2006) 
ISIC 
Revision 2 
Industry Description Si / Li 
∆% in 
skill 
323 Leather & Travel Goods 0.079 
 
331 Wood Products 0.128 62.03 
322 Textile & Clothing 0.132 3.13 
321 Textile & Clothing 0.132 0.00 
332 Furniture 0.154 16.67 
372 Non-ferrous metals 0.184 19.48 
362 Glass and glass products 0.201 9.24 
361 Pottery, china and earthenware 0.201 0.00 
369 Other non-metallic mineral products 0.201 0.00 
 
Low cutoff point 
  
371 Iron & Steel 0.266 32.34 
324 Footwear 0.315 18.42 
 
Medium cutoff point 
  
341 Paper products 0.397 26.03 
382 Non-electric machinery 0.414 4.28 
355 Rubber products 0.462 11.59 
384 Transport equipment 0.466 0.87 
 
High cutoff point 
  
354 Manufacture of miscellaneous products of petroleum and coal 0.593 27.25 
353 Petroleum refineries 0.593 0.00 
383 Electric Machinery 0.617 4.05 
352 Manufacture of other chemical products 0.718 16.37 
351 Manufactured fertilizers/chemicals 0.731 1.81 
385 Professional Equipment 0.797 9.03 
Notes: The skill-intensity in Nuun and Trefler (2006, 2009) is generated from the ratio of skilled 
and unskilled workers for 17 industries in the United States in 1972. Industry code in Nuun and 
Trefler are converted to ISIC Revision 2 for consistency with sectoral data on tariff rates in the 






TABLE 6.2  Skill-Intensity of Industries in Milner and Mukherjee (2009) 
ISIC 
Revision 2 
Industry Description Si / Li 
∆% in 
skill 
314 Tobacco 0.075 
 
323 Leather & Travel Goods 0.091 21.33 
332 Furniture 0.125 37.36 
313 Beverages 0.126 0.80 
331 Wood Products 0.138 9.52 
361 Pottery, china and earthenware 0.14 1.45 
311 Food Products 0.164 0.00 
372 Non-ferrous metals 0.176 7.32 
322 Textile & Clothing 0.193 9.66 
321 Textile & Clothing 0.193 0.00 
369 Other non-metallic mineral products 0.205 6.22 
324 Footwear 0.216 5.37 
362 Glass and glass products 0.216 0.00 
 
Low cutoff point 
  
356 Plastic 0.258 19.44 
371 Iron & Steel 0.283 9.69 
355 Rubber products 0.352 24.38 
 
Medium cutoff point 
  
341 Paper Products 0.391 11.08 
342 Printing, Publishing 0.397 1.53 
381 Fabricated Metal Products 0.404 1.76 
382 Non-electric machinery 0.426 5.45 
384 Transport Equipment 0.465 9.15 
 
High cutoff point 
  
390 Other manufactured product 0.587 26.24 
351 Manufactured fertilizers/chemicals 0.592 0.85 
383 Electric Machinery 0.611 3.21 
353 Petroleum refineries 0.63 3.11 
354 Manufacture of miscellaneous products of petroleum and coal 0.63 0.00 
385 Professional Equipment 0.726 15.24 
Notes: The skill-intensity in Milner and Kubota (2009) is based on the Industrial Statistics 






TABLE 6.3  The Effects of Factor Endowments and Political Particularism  
on the Skill Bias of Tariff Protection in Democracies (with polity score > 6) 
 
Dep. Variable = Skill Bias of Tariff Structure 
 
Nuun and Trefler   Milner and Mukherjee 
 
RE FE  RE FE 
Independent Variables (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Parindex -7.113*** -8.225***  -13.245*** -20.283*** 
 
(2.678) (2.954)  (4.767) (6.444) 
Log GDPpc 0.903 -0.024  2.226*** 2.339 
 
(0.550) (1.083)  (0.844) (2.357) 
Parindex × Log GDPpc 0.810*** 0.938***  1.511*** 2.480*** 
 
(0.313) (0.347)  (0.553) (0.756) 
Log Population 0.491 15.954***  0.795 27.115*** 
 
(0.381) (2.908)  (0.528) (6.281) 
GATT/WTO -0.262 -0.573  -0.438 -0.838 
 
(0.562) (0.549)  (1.189) (1.197) 
Trade Flows 0.015* -0.004  0.016 -0.029 
 
(0.008) (0.010)  (0.015) (0.021) 
GDPpc growth -0.013 0.031  0.057 0.136**  
 
(0.026) (0.026)  (0.056) (0.056) 
Import Penetration of Skilled Industries 0.38 -0.538  3.512** 1.033 
 
(0.709) (0.694)  (1.486) (1.512) 
Import Penetration of Unskilled Industries -0.145 -0.345  -0.586 -1.479 
 
(0.759) (0.731)  (1.612) (1.596) 
Constant -18.700** -263.19***  -40.862*** -473.18*** 
 
(7.781) (43.208)  (11.651) (93.364) 
   
 
  
R-squared 0.111 0.224  0.381 0.247 
Observations 311 311  312 312 
Hausman Test 0.004  0.377 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; Standard errors in parentheses. Country-fixed effects are 






TABLE 6.4  Different Indicators of Political Particularism and  
the Skill Bias of Tariff Protection in Democracies (with polity score > 6) 
 
Dep. Variable = Skill Bias of Tariff Structure 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dom_Rank -4.008*** 
   
                
 
(1.207) 
   
                
Log GDPpc 2.458 2.792 3.223 2.903 3.669 
 
(2.405) (2.449) (2.507) (2.275) (2.513) 
Dom_Rank × Log GDPpc 0.428*** 
   
                
 
(0.132) 
   









                













                
   
(8.649) 
 
                




                
   
(0.899) 
 
                
Pool  
   
-19.15***                 
    
(5.730)                 
Pool × Log GDPpc 
   
2.156***                 
    
(0.627)                 
Vote 
    
-12.719 
     
(9.929) 
Vote × Log GDPpc 
    
1.34 
     
(1.044) 
Log Population 30.130*** 28.486*** 27.023*** 30.302*** 28.380*** 
 
(6.307) (6.408) (6.255) (6.193) (6.423) 
GATT/WTO -0.968 -1.011 -0.972 -0.86 -0.931 
 
(1.220) (1.226) (1.212) (1.194) (1.218) 
Trade Flows -0.036* -0.034 -0.029 -0.037* -0.028 
 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
GDPpc growth 0.143** 0.150** 0.141** 0.140** 0.132**  
 
(0.058) (0.059) (0.058) (0.056) (0.058) 
Import Penetration of Skilled Industries 1.743 0.991 0.655 1.906 0.865 
 
(1.506) (1.557) (1.527) (1.512) (1.529) 
Import Penetration of Unskilled Industries -1.735 -1.162 -1.042 -1.497 -1.136 
 
(1.627) (1.632) (1.610) (1.590) (1.624) 
      
R-squared 0.247 0.239 0.226 0.25 0.219 
Observations 300 300 312 312 312 




TABLE 6.5  The Effects of Regimes Types, Factor Endowments and Political Particularism 
on the Skill Bias of Tariff Protection in Democracies (with polity score > 0) 
 
Dep. Variable = Skill Bias of Tariff Structure 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Polity2 0.436 0.421 0.431 0.411 0.399 0.397 
 
(0.392) (0.429) (0.401) (0.395) (0.394) (0.395) 
Parindex2 -15.75** 
    
                
 
(6.814) 
    
                
Parindex2 × Log GDPpc 1.99** 
     
 
(0.809) 
    




   
                
  
(1.276) 
   
                
Dom_Rank × Log GDPpc 
 
0.313** 
   
                
  
(0.140) 
   





                
   
(1.245) 
  
                




                
   
(0.139) 
  
                
Ballot 
   
-7.816 
 
                
    
(8.945) 
 
                
Ballot × Log GDPpc 
   
0.967 
 
                
    
(0.935) 
 
                
Pool  
    
-9.365                 
     
(5.847)                 
Pool × Log GDPpc 
    
1.095*                 
     
(0.645)                 
Vote 
     
-9.605 
      
(10.309) 
Vote × Log GDPpc 
     
1.087 
      
(1.094) 
Log GDPpc 5.757** 7.063*** 6.481*** 6.516*** 6.665*** 6.800*** 
 
(2.376) (2.563) (2.451) (2.504) (2.321) (2.517) 
Log Population 23.24*** 26.12*** 24.24*** 23.73*** 25.5*** 24.7*** 
 
(6.502) (6.588) (6.611) (6.424) (6.433) (6.599) 
GATT/WTO -1.388 -1.696 -1.523 -1.472 -1.467 -1.453 
 
(1.304) (1.356) (1.335) (1.314) (1.312) (1.317) 
Trade Flows -0.037 -0.049** -0.040* -0.036 -0.041* -0.035 
 
(0.023) (0.025) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
GDPpc growth 0.110* 0.114* 0.118** 0.113** 0.117** 0.104*   
 
(0.056) (0.065) (0.058) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) 
Import Penetration of Skilled Industries 0.387 0.491 0.377 0.353 0.426 0.371 
  (0.516) (0.532) (0.528) (0.519) (0.520) (0.521) 
Import Penetration of Unskilled Industries 1.29 1.096 1.65 1.619 1.496 1.56 
 
(1.739) (1.791) (1.776) (1.745) (1.746) (1.756) 
Constant -449.5*** -504.1*** -470.8*** -462.9*** -492.9*** -481*** 
 
(96.826) (98.767) (98.582) (99.075) (96.764) (96.989) 
      
  
R-squared 0.253 0.25 0.247 0.241 0.243 0.237 
Observations 328 311 316 328 328 328 




TABLE 6.6  The Effects of Regimes Types, Factor Endowments and Political Particularism 
on the Skill Bias of Tariff Protection with Different Cutoff Values 
 
Dep. Variable = Skill Bias of Tariff Structure 
 
S/L ≥ 0.59 S/L ≥ 0.39 S/L ≥ 0.25 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Polity2 0.436 0.351 -0.073 
 
(0.392) (0.312) (0.301) 
Parindex -15.750** -6.006 1.648 
 
(6.814) (5.434) (5.229) 
Log GDPpc 5.757** 3.603* 3.106* 
 
(2.376) (1.895) (1.823) 
Parindex × Log GDPpc 1.990** 0.829 -0.002 
 
(0.809) (0.645) (0.621) 
Log Population 23.243*** 9.951* -6.019 
 
(6.502) (5.185) (4.989) 
GATT/WTO -1.388 -0.841 -0.168 
 
(1.304) (1.040) (1.001) 
Trade Flows -0.037 -0.026 -0.001 
 
(0.023) (0.018) (0.017) 
GDPpc growth 0.110* 0.112** 0.078* 
 
(0.056) (0.045) (0.043) 
Import Penetration of Skilled Industries 0.387 0.173 0.011 
 
(0.516) (0.412) (0.396) 
Import Penetration of Unskilled Industries 1.29 0.233 -0.343 
 
(1.739) (1.387) (1.335) 
Constant -449.489*** -204.355** 70.104 
 
(98.767) (78.767) (75.792) 
    
R-squared 0.253 0.132 0.046 
Observations 328 328 328 
    























Conclusion: Moving Forward 
 
 
This dissertation addresses the following questions regarding trade policy in democracies: 
How do we explain varying patterns of trade protection within and across countries? How 
do representative policy-makers choose the recipients of protectionist measures and 
regulations among domestic groups hurt by trade liberalization? Why do elected officials 
provide favorable levels of trade protection to protectionist interests groups which lack 
the abilities to actively engage in lobbying and campaign contributions? More 
specifically, what are the political characteristics of domestic constituencies that receive 
favorable levels of protectionist rents?  
My dissertation research starts by acknowledging that two dominant approaches 
in the existing literature on trade policy offer partial and incomplete answers to these 
questions. The interest group model of trade policy maintains that sectoral levels of trade 
protection would be higher for protectionist groups which can effectively overcome 
collective action problems in pursuing a common group interest. Empirical research on 
endogenous protection has provided convincing evidence that the economic and 
organizational characteristics of industrial sectors exert significant influence on their 
lobbying efforts and, hence, the levels of protection that they obtain from governments. 
The interest group model, however, does not explain why representative policymakers 
often concentrate distributive benefits from trade barriers to particular industries which 
do not conduct protectionist lobbying significantly or to declining industries which do not 
have enough resources to devote to lobbying activities. On the other hand, institutional 
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explanations for trade policy tend to regard trade openness of countries as a public good 
that maximize the welfare of a society as a whole. While demonstrating the formal design 
and nature of domestic political systems affect the average of trade openness, these 
studies have paid relatively scant attention to varying patterns of trade barriers within and 
across countries.  
In this vein, this dissertation focuses on analyzing the structure of trade protection 
and more specifically, the allocation of protectionist rents across the electorate. I maintain 
that to explain varying patterns of trade barriers within and across countries, we need to 
consider the interaction of two factors: first, the economic structure of domestic interests 
which delineate the scope and characteristic of political cleavages over trade policy; 
second, electoral institutions and conditions which define the political importance of 
partisan and geographical constituencies to elected officials. First, the structure of 
domestic interests refers to the ways in which domestic interests shape policy coalitions 
over the level of trade openness. The extent to which domestic groups demand 
protectionist relief is influenced by their economic characteristics in the market, such as 
types of industrial sectors (i.e. import-competing and exporting sectors) and types of 
factors of production (i.e. capital and labor). Nevertheless, protectionist pressures from 
domestic groups are not automatically translated into trade policy outcomes. Distributive 
rents yielded by trade barriers are concentrated on small sector of population but its costs 
are dispersed across the entire population. These features of trade policy induce 
representative policymakers to concentrate protectionist rents on particular groups of 
electoral constituencies to optimize their electoral prospects. Therefore, secondly, 
electoral institutions and conditions determine the ways in which trade policy preferences 
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of domestic groups are mapped into policy outcomes. The extent to which protectionist 
interests receive favorable levels of protection is significantly influenced by electoral 
institutions and conditions, which define types of domestic constituencies from which 
representative policymakers garner electoral support. In empirical chapters of my 
dissertation, these two key concepts are operationalized differently according to whether I 
examine patterns of trade protection within and across countries.  
 
Within-Country Variation in Levels of Trade Protection across the Electorate 
Chapters 3, 4, and 5 examine the structure of trade protection in the United States from 
1989 through 2004. Specifically, these chapters focus on evaluating the extent to which 
protectionist interests and their electoral characteristics affect the allocation of 
protectionist rents across industrial sectors and across electoral constituencies. In Chapter 
3 and 4, I argue that industries geographically concentrated in politically competitive 
constituencies are likely to secure higher levels of tariff protection rather than those in 
safe constituencies and that district-level of tariff protection is greater in districts having 
two equally sized groups of partisans rather than in districts showing stable, strong 
support for either the Republican or the Democratic party. I also maintain that electoral 
competitiveness of domestic constituencies amplifies the marginal effect of protectionist 
demands on trade policy outcomes. The estimates of my models demonstrate that the 
extent to which industry comparative disadvantage raises the level of tariff and nontariff 
protection itself is much greater for industries concentrated in marginal constituencies 
rather than for those in safe ones both at the district-level and at the industry-level. My 
finding that governments are more responsive to protectionist demands from competitive 
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constituencies rather than those from safe ones remain robust, even after controlling the 
direction and strength of voter partisanship for the incumbent president’s party and the 
majority party in Congress. Chapter 5 demonstrates that the incumbent president’s party 
is still concerned with their core partisan voters. My results demonstrate that the 
incumbent president’s party is most likely to target protection to marginal constituencies, 
somewhat less to their core partisan supporters, and least to its opposition strongholds.  
The analyses presented in Chapters 3-5 contribute to our understanding of the 
structure of U.S. trade barriers over the past fifteen years. Previous research offers 
competing explanations about the effects of the political representation of industrial 
sectors on trade policy outcomes, based on panel data on trade barriers during a particular 
year. Some argue that a certain level of geographical distribution of industrial 
employment across congressional districts affects sectoral levels of trade protection. 
Others argue that regional concentration on the electoral map matters more for the inter-
structure of trade protection, since weak parties in the U.S. induce policymakers to 
protect industries in safe constituencies. My findings in these chapters do not confirm 
previous findings. Using extensive data on district-level election outcomes, and the 
distribution of industrial employment on the electoral map for the period of fifteen years, 
I show that the distribution of industrial employment on the electoral map itself does not 
exert significant influence on sectoral levels of protection and that protectionist interests 
in competitive constituencies are more likely to receive higher levels of protection. 
Chapters 3-5 also aim to contribute to the ongoing debate about extant models of 
distributive politics. In these chapters, I examine the relative merits of swing voter and 
core voter model in a previously unexplored context – electoral targeting in the allocation 
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of protectionist rents across electoral constituencies. These chapters acknowledge the fact 
that testing the validity of the swing voter model should be differentiated from testing the 
validity of the core voter model, unless we have detailed information about the 
distribution of voter partisanship within electoral constituencies.  
The findings in Chapters 3-5 generate the following questions for future research. 
Under what conditions do governments concentrate protectionist rents on competitive 
constituencies over safe ones, and vice versa? How do factor mobility and political 
institutions affect the ways in which governments allocate protectionist rents across the 
electorate? Do executive and legislative institutions exert the same influence on the 
structure of tariff and nontariff protection, respectively? How does the partisan alignment 
between government branches affect the extent to which the incumbent president’s party 
incentives to concentrate protection to marginal constituencies to maximize its chance of 
winning majority in the legislature? What are the implications of these findings for the 
structures of trade protection in other countries under different electoral and institutional 
settings?   
 
Varying Patterns of Trade Protection across Democracies  
Chapter 6 explores the political and economic determinant of the structure of trade 
protection at the national level. Specifically, it focuses on explaining variation in the 
extent of skill bias in tariff protection in 29 industries in 52 democracies. Like Chapters 
3-5, Chapter 6 considers the interaction between the structure of domestic interests over 
trade openness and electoral institutions that determine the political importance of 
particular electoral constituencies to elected representatives.  
185 
 
Under the assumption that higher levels of protection to skill-intensive industries 
generate positive externalities and thus promote long-term economic growth, I argue that 
the skill-bias of tariff protection is determined by the interaction between two factors: 
first, a country’s factor endowments (i.e. the relative ratio of capital to labor) which 
determine the sector-specific trade policy preferences of the median voter; secondly, 
electoral systems that affect the political incentives for individual legislators to cultivate 
personal-support base. As the capital-labor ratio of the median voter (= K/L) increases, 
the median voter is more likely to oppose of capital- and skill-intensive goods but more 
supportive of imports of unskilled-intensive goods. The degree of the skill-bias of tariff 
protection, however, tends to decline, as electoral institutions encourage personal-vote 
seeking activities of individual legislators. My empirical analysis demonstrate that the 
skill-bias of tariff structure is higher in party-centered systems which effectively mute the 
incentives of policymakers to build personal support bases through pork-barrel strategies 
and that extent to which political particularism in electoral systems reduce the skill-bias 
of tariff protection declines, as the capital-labor ratio at the national level increases.  
Chapter 6 suggests that the median voter’s trade policy preferences changes according to 
a country’s factor endowments and that electoral systems affect the ways in which the sector-
specific policy preferences of the medina voter are reflected in trade policy outcomes. These 
findings generate several research questions for future research. How do the collective demands 
from the median voter for redistribution affect the level and patterns of trade protection across 
countries? What are the political conditions under which political leaders choose to change the 
levels of trade barriers to respond to redistributive demands of the median voter rather than to 
provide social welfare programs? And how does the incumbent’s government partisanship 
influence the allocation of protectionist rents across industrial sectors and across owners of 
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factors of production? In this vein, another venue for future research in this area is to articulate 
theoretical links including the mobility of factors of production, democratic institutions, trade 

















APPENDIX A.  Political Competitiveness and State-Level Protection from 1989-2004 
 
Dep. Variable = State-Level  Tariff Protection 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
State Comparative Disadvantage (SCD) 0.0414*** 0.0405*** 0.0413*** 0.0411*** 0.0322*** 0.0244** 
 
(0.0108) (0.0125) (0.0121) (0.0109) (0.0118) (0.0121) 
Partisan Dominance -0.0975 -0.1093 0.7096***    
 
(0.1029) (0.1301) (0.1978)    
Partisan Dominance × SCD  0.0313 0.0646    
  (0.2113) (0.2053)    
Partisan Dominance × Labor   -6.923***    
   (1.2862)    
Closeness to 50-50    0.0402 -0.0708 0.2778* 
    (0.0564) (0.0812) (0.1583) 
Closeness to 50-50 × SCD     0.2844* 0.4517*** 
     (0.1499) (0.1628) 
Closeness to 50-50 × Labor      -2.6713** 
      (1.0438) 
Labor -0.196 -0.1976 0.0939 -0.1223 -0.1233 -0.0283 
 
(0.2036) (0.2041) (0.2055) (0.1951) (0.1945) (0.1969) 
No High School Degree 0.1923 0.1937 0.1866 0.1871 0.1867 0.1868 
 
(0.1202) (0.1207) (0.1173) (0.1209) (0.1205) (0.1198) 
State-Level Unemployment -3.566*** -3.564*** -3.523*** -3.602*** -3.583*** -3.636*** 
 
(0.2281) (0.2287) (0.2223) (0.2244) (0.2240) (0.2237) 
Seniority 0.0007 0.0007 0.0008 0.0007 0.0007 0.0006 
 
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Committee on Finance 0.0098 0.0099 0.0111* 0.01 0.0102 0.0118* 
 
(0.0064) (0.0065) (0.0063) (0.0064) (0.0064) (0.0064) 
Committee on Banking, Housing, and  0.0105* 0.0105* 0.0095* 0.0089 0.0099* 0.009 
    Urban Affairs (0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0055) (0.0056) (0.0056) (0.0056) 
Lagged District-Level Protection 0.6036*** 0.6038*** 0.6135*** 0.5977*** 0.5982*** 0.6029*** 
 
(0.0256) (0.0256) (0.0250) (0.0250) (0.0250) (0.0249) 
Constant 3.3439*** 3.3423*** 3.2667*** 3.3633*** 3.3473*** 3.3831*** 
 
(0.2192) (0.2197) (0.2139) (0.2179) (0.2174) (0.2166) 
    
   
R-squared 0.877 0.876 0.874 0.88 0.879 0.877 
Number of Observations 528 528 528 528 528 528 





APPENDIX B.  Voter Partisanship and State-Level Protection from 1989-2004 
 
Dep. Variable = State-Level  Tariff Protection 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
State Comparative Disadvantage (SCD) 0.0444*** 0.0583*** 0.0655*** 0.0413*** -0.2438 -0.1391 
 
(0.0112) (0.0137) (0.0136) (0.0110) (0.1994) (0.2037) 
Vote for President -0.0194 -0.0145 -0.1418    
 (0.0289) (0.0315) (0.0953)    
Vote for President
2
 0.5295 0.6274 5.0750***    
 (0.5574) (0.5617) (1.1501)    
Vote for President × SCD  0.0336 0.063    
  (0.0681) (0.0673)    
Vote for President
2
 × SCD  -1.4709* -2.282***    
  (0.8504) (0.8621)    
Vote for President × Labor   0.7861    
   (0.6396)    
Vote for President
2
 × Labor   -41.6***    
       
Average Vote for the President’s Party    -0.2887 -0.543 -2.973*** 
    (0.3354) (0.3797) (1.0996) 
Average Vote for the President’s Party
2
    0.2842 0.5102 2.6783**  
    (0.3236) (0.3673) (1.0539) 
Average Vote for the President’s Party      1.035 0.6375 
     × SCD     (0.7911) (0.8099) 
Average Vote for the President’s Party
2
      -0.9112 -0.5543 
     × SCD     (0.7728) (0.7927) 
Average Vote for the President’s Party       16.098**  
     × Labor      (7.1185) 
Average Vote for the President’s Party
2
       -14.364**  
     × Labor      (6.8924) 
Labor -0.0442 -0.0594 -0.0002 -0.1217 -0.1423 -4.5766**  
 
(0.2149) (0.2198) (0.2168) (0.1962) (0.1964) (1.8434) 
No High School Degree 0.197 0.1839 0.1461 0.1913 0.1792 0.1698 
 
(0.1202) (0.1203) (0.1196) (0.1217) (0.1217) (0.1209) 
State-Level Unemployment -3.658*** -3.65*** -3.522*** -3.61*** -3.597*** -3.63*** 
 
(0.2299) (0.2304) (0.2284) (0.2277) (0.2274) (0.2267) 
Seniority 0.0007 0.0009 0.0009 0.0007 0.0006 0.0004 
 
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
Committee on Finance 0.0103 0.0103 0.0110*   0.01 0.0099 0.0128**  
 
(0.0064) (0.0064) (0.0063) (0.0064) (0.0064) (0.0065) 
Committee on Banking, Housing, and  0.0092 0.0084 0.0078 0.0089 0.0079 0.0067 
    Urban Affairs (0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0057) (0.0056) (0.0056) (0.0056) 
Lagged District-Level Protection 0.5898*** 0.5960*** 0.6135*** 0.5971*** 0.6033*** 0.6100*** 
 
(0.0267) (0.0277) (0.0281) (0.0255) (0.0257) (0.0256) 
Constant 3.4027*** 3.3921*** 3.3831*** 3.4439*** 3.5041*** 4.2071*** 
 
(0.2203) (0.2205) (0.2166) (0.2412) (0.2449) (0.3762) 
       
R-squared 0.88 0.879 0.877 0.88 0.881 0.881 
Number of Observations 528 528 528 528 528 528 
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